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Health Care Reform Through
Medicaid Managed Care: Tennessee
(TennCare) as a Case Study and a
Paradigm
James F. Blumstein
Frank A. Sloan 53 Vand. L. Rev. 125 (2000)
TennCare is a Medicaid demonstration project that allows
Tennessee to require all Medicaid beneficiaries to secure medical care
through a mandatory managed care system. Enrollees contract with
private managed care organizations ("MCOs'), which are responsible
for organizing a network of care providers and delivering medical care
to covered beneficiaries. Driven by rapidly escalating Medicaid costs,
TennCare's mandatory managed care program has succeeded in saving
money for the state in its Medicaid program.
To secure the federal waiver that allowed the program to pro-
ceed, the state included non-Medicaid-eligible uninsured and uninsur-
able residents as TennCare beneficiaries. Federal matching funds
accrue for all TennCare expenditures, including those for non-Medi-
caid-eligible enrollees, but federal matching is subject to a global cap.
Cost savings from managed care were to pay for the improved access.
The program covers about 1.3 million persons, 38% of whom are non-
Medicaid-eligibles. The Medicaid component of TennCare has been
stable, but the non-Medicaid-eligible TennCare population has risen by
about 41% in the last two fiscal years, stressing the fiscal capacity of
the program.
The Article provides background on the development of
TennCare, describing the political effect of the federal matching (coop-
erative federalism) aspect of TennCare on both state-level and federal-
level decisionmaking. The Article identifies what it describes as the
political moral hazard dimensions of these federal-state partnerships
on state political decisionmaking and the correlative lock-in effect of
the program on the state. Federal matching funds make program
enhancement appealing and make cutbacks extremely painful. The
interaction of state and federal program incentives is considered in
depth, and both the state responses (use of private funding and pro-
vider-focused taxation) and federal responses (limits on federal match-
ing for those sources of state revenue) to these incentives are described
and analyzed.
The Article considers and analyzes elements of TennCare's
design and implementation from a legal and policy perspective. It
concludes that, in contrast to the contemporaneous Clinton Admini-
stration plan for improved access, TennCare's design demonstrated the
triumph of pragmatism over ideology. It focused on reform of Medicaid
rather than comprehensively encompassing the entire health care
market; it adopted a pluralistic rather than a unitary approach; and,
at least nominally, it adopted a standard of adequacy rather than
equality in defining the scope of the public's obligation to TennCare
beneficiaries. Because the 1997 Balanced Budget Act allows states to
adopt mandatory managed care for Medicaid, TennCare's managed
care features can be replicated by other states without the need for a
waiver.
Finally, the Article reports on empirical findings about such
issues as quality of care, hospital profitability, and patient and physi-
cian satisfaction. The Article concludes that quality of care, in general,
has not suffered, that patient satisfaction has been good, that physician
participation rates in the program exceed those of the pre-existing
Medicaid program, that hospital capacity has been decreasing at levels
above the national average, that hospital profitability overall has not
suffered, but that levels of physician satisfaction are very low.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In 1993, the Clinton Administration proposed a plan for com-
prehensive nationwide healthcare reform (the "Clinton Plan"). It
would have covered all citizens-those insured by private plans, the
uninsured,' and public beneficiaries in programs such as Medicaid'
and Medicare.' By achieving efficiencies in the existing healthcare
market, the Clinton Plan sought to capture and re-channel sufficient
resources to fund a comprehensive package of benefits (health secu-
rity) to all Americans, without an overt increase in taxes.' As
1. See The Health Care Study Group, Understanding the Choices in Health Care Reform,
19 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 499, 501-03 (1994) (emphasizing the desirability of universality in
the Clinton Plan).
2. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §121, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §1396) (1994).
3. See id. § 1801 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994)).
4. For an explanation of the rationale for comprehensive reform and reliance on redistrib-
uting healthcare resources (through recapturing and re-channeling efficiencies) rather than
redistributing income (through taxation), see generally Richard Kronick, Redistributing Health
Care Resources without Redistributing Income, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POL Y & L. 543 (1994). For a
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described by one of its architects and proponents, the Clinton Plan
relied on "a reconstructed market with new rules, incentives, and
limits" to achieve "what government itself cannot easily do."5
The Clinton Plan was not enacted into law. Though the Presi-
dent's party held majorities in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate, the Clinton Plan did not ever come to a vote in either
body. The relevant committees in both chambers declined to report
the bill out for consideration by either full body.'
Also in 1993, Tennessee applied for7 and secured approval' of a
federal waiver for its Medicaid program so that' it could establish
TennCare, effective January 1, 1994. TennCare is a Medicaid demon-
stration, approved for an initial period of five years and renewed for
an additional period of three years,' that allows Tennessee to require
that all Medicaid beneficiaries secure medical care through a manda-
tory managed care system. TennCare enrollees contract with private
entities, managed care organizations ("MCOs"), which are responsible
for organizing a network of health care providers and, under contract
with the state, delivering specified medical care services to covered
beneficiaries."
Because of its focus on Medicaid as a foundation, TennCare is
not comprehensive or universal in its thrust, in contrast to the Clinton
somewhat harsher assessment of the Clinton Administration's approach, describing the complex
proposed system as imposing "stealth taxes" to finance "universal coverage," see CLARK C.
HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM
75-80 (1995).
5. Paul Starr, The Framework of Health Care Reform, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1666, 1668
(1993).
6. For a contemporaneous critique of the Clinton Administration's "comprehensive bene-
fits" and its "comprehensive reform" approach, see James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform: The
Policy Context, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 15, 34-38, 42-45 (1994). For post-mortem discussions of
the Clinton Plan's failure, see generally HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT (1996); THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG:
CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS
(1995).
7. See Letter from Ned McWherter, Governor of Tennessee, to Donna E. Shalala, Secre-
tary, Department of Health & Human Services (June 16, 1993) (available in 1 TENNCARE, A
NEW DIRECTION IN HEALTH CARE (1993)) [hereinafter McWherter Letter] (compilation on file
with Vanderbilt Law School) (submitting TennCare waiver application).
8. See Letter from Bruce C. Vladeck, Administrator, Department of Health & Human
Services, Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") to H. Russell White, Commissioner,
Tennessee Department of Health (Nov. 18, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter HCFA
Approval Letter] (approving waiver application).
9. See Letter from Michael Hash, Deputy Administrator, Department of Health & Human
Services, HCFA, to Nancy Menke, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Health (June 30,
1998) in 2 TENNCARE: A NEW DIRECTION OF HEALTH CARE (1993) (compilation on file with
Vanderbilt Law School) (approving three-year TennCare waiver extension through December 31,
2001).
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
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Plan. TennCare covers Medicaid patients and, in addition, uninsured
and uninsurable Tennesseans. In the sixth year of the TennCare
demonstration program, uninsured/uninsurable TennCare enrollees
constituted nearly 38% of total enrollment-about a half-million per-
sons who would not normally have been covered by Tennessee's pre-
vious Medicaid program." That uninsuredluninsurable TennCare
patient population grew by 23.7% during fiscal 1998, and by an addi-
tional 16.9% during fiscal 1999.' In contrast, the Medicaid-eligible
TennCare patient population has been stable, actually falling 3.3% in
fiscal year 1999."
While TennCare's conception was driven largely by the state's
inability to maintain the "enormous" and "unmanageable" growth 4 in
Medicaid costs," its birth included as a goal an increase in the
healthcare coverage of non-Medicaid-eligible Tennesseans who were
either uninsured or uninsurable." The access-to-healthcare agenda of
TennCare comported with the access-oriented objectives of the Clinton
Plan. Its strategy of capturing efficiencies from managed care for the
benefit of improving access for the uninsured was also comparable,
although the targets of opportunity were quite different. The Clinton
Plan, with its universal coverage focus, sought to capture efficiencies
11. As of June 29, 1999, total TennCare enrollment was 1,312,969. Of that number,
814,181 were Medicaid-eligible patients and 498,788 were uninsured/uninsurable patients. See
<http://www.state.tn.us/health/tenncare> (visited June 29, 1999) [hereinafter TennCare Web-
site]. As of June 27, 1998, total TennCare enrollment was 1,268,887. Of that number, 842,142
were Medicaid patients and 426,745 were uninsured/uninsurable patients. See FISCAL REVIEW
CoMM., REPORT TO THE 100TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1998:
TENNCARE PROGRAM, at 13-15 (Exhibit E) (Nov. 9, 1998).
12. Compare FISCAL REVIEW COMM., supra note 11, at 13-15 (Exhibit E) with FISCAL
REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE 100TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,
1997: TENNCARE PROGRAM, at 4 (Nov. 24, 1997) [hereinafter FISCAL REVIEW COMM., 1997
Report]. These sources show that the uninsured/uninsurable category of TennCare enrollees
accounted for 344,867 cases as of June 21, 1997, and 426,745 cases as of June 27, 1998. From
June 1998 to June 1999, the uninsured/uninsurable category of TennCare enrollment increased
to 498,788, another increase of 16.9% (72,031 additional enrollees). See TennCare Website,
supra note 11.
13. As of June 28, 1996, the Medicaid-eligible TennCare case load was 846,067 (of
TennCare's enrollment of 1,180,449). That number decreased slightly in fiscal 1997 to 842,207
(of TennCare's enrollment of 1,187,074) and to 842,142 in fiscal 1998 (of TennCare's enrollment
of 1,268,887). See FISCAL REVIEW COMM., supra note 11, at 13-15 (Exhibit E); FISCAL REVIEW
COMM., 1197 Report, supra note 12, at 4. By June 29, 1999, the Medicaid-eligible TennCare case
load was 814,181, a 3.3% drop during fiscal 1999. See TennCare Website, supra note 11; see also
infra Table 2.
14. See 1 TENNCARE: A NEW DIRECTION IN HEALTH CARE 11 (1993) (Tennessee's TennCare
waiver application) [hereinafter TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION].
15. See McWherter Letter, supra note 7 (asserting that 'TennCare represents a major ini-
tiative... to address the uncontrollable growth of costs in the Medicaid program!).
16. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 7.
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(or cutbacks) in the private health insurance market as well as in
Medicaid and Medicare to improve the level of access for the unin-
sured and underinsured. TennCare did not include the private health
insurance market, seeking to achieve its access goals through manda-
tory managed care in Medicaid and re-channeling those savings to ex-
pand healthcare coverage for the uninsured.
TennCare's blitzkrieg pace of formulation, adoption, and
implementation has made the program controversial. Many adminis-
trative problems could not be fully dealt with prior to implementation,
spawning some confusion at start-up."' Many stakeholders were left
outside the loop, and that seems to have made the program continu-
ally contentious. This has been particularly true of providers, whose
role at the design stage was minimal." Nonetheless, TennCare was
approved and implemented. It has been in existence for six years, has
increased coverage beyond its Medicaid core by nearly a half-million
people, and has achieved its access goals while spending less than the
negotiated budget neutrality cap-the projection of expected Medicaid
costs had the program not been implemented. 9 The 1997 Balanced
Budget Act institutionalized TennCare's mandated managed care
approach by authorizing states, without seeking a waiver, to require
Medicaid beneficiaries to receive medical care benefits through man-
aged care entities.'
TennCare, therefore, represents a major state-initiated
healthcare reform effort. Along with the Oregon Medicaid demon-
17. See Marsha Gold et al., Medicaid Managed Care: Lessons from Five States, 15 HEALTH
AFF. 153, 156-57 (1996). "TennCare tried to move rapidly from traditional Medicaid to managed
care. Experience suggests that this is difficult to do, especially when there is only a limited
managed care infrastructure and 'little' time to plan. Tennessee was unable to change in so
short a period to a system of well-organized, effectively configured managed care plans." Id. at
162.
18. The Tennessee Medical Association ("TMA") challenged implementation of TennCare.
Since physicians failed to establish injury to themselves or to their patients, the court denied
them standing. Under TennCare, MCOs set physician fees in a negotiation process. Since the
state has no responsibility for MCO physician fees, injury from low fee rates would be attrib-
utable to MCOs not to the state so any physician injury would not likely be redressed by the
TMA lawsuit. Further, TMA and its members did not have standing to represent patient
interests since 'TennCare recipients ha[d] received abundant and appropriate medical services"
and therefore had not been injured. Tennessee Med. Ass'n v. Corker, Appeal No. 01-A-01-9410-
CH-00494, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1995).
19. See Request for Extension of the TennCare Waiver: January 1, 1999-December 31, 2001
(December 30, 1997), at 115 in 2 TENNCARE, supra note 7 [hereinafter WAIVER EXTENSION
REQUEST] (estimating savings from budget neutrality estimate of $1.6 billion over initial five-
year TennCare demonstration period).
20. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, sub. tit. H, sec. 4701(a), tit. XIX, §
1932(a)(1)(A)(i), 111 Stat. 251, 489 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2) (Supp.
1998).
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stration," TennCare is one of the two most far-reaching Medicaid
demonstrations.' A case study and analysis of TennCare is useful
because its approach is "highly distinct" from that of Oregon and
because it reflects a very different approach toward healthcare reform
than the Clinton Plan. TennCare is a paradigm of mandatory Medi-
caid managed care, which is now a statutory option available to states
without a waiver. Historical and analytical consideration of TennCare
may point to useful lessons for future healthcare reform initiatives.
At the outset, it is important to note what this case study and
analysis does not purport to do. It does not cover the mental health
elements of TennCare, which are treated separately (carved out) from
the other components of the program.' Nor does it evaluate compre-
hensively every detail of the program or its empirical outcomes.
Rather, it provides a historical and theoretical context for the pro-
gram, analyzing it as an important example of one state's effort to re-
form Medicaid and, indirectly, its healthcare market, through the use
of market forces. Empirical research on selected program outcomes,
which was carried out as part of this project, shows that quality of
care has not suffered from the implementation of TennCare.
In Part II, we consider Medicaid as a system of cooperative fed-
eralism. Medicaid's structure, we argue, sowed the seeds of TennCare
by inducing states to expand the scope of coverage and benefits for
their Medicaid programs. Generous federal matching encouraged
states to expand programs through a process of political moral hazard.
Political-process constraints built into cooperative federalism pro-
21. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, SUMMARY EVALUATION OF THE OREGON MEDICAID
PROPOSAL (1992).
22. Tennessee and Oregon are not the only states with Medicaid managed care waivers, but
their demonstrations are the most far-reaching and are often compared as contrasting paradigms
of reform. See generally Marsha Gold, Markets and Public Programs: Insights from Oregon and
Tennessee, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POLY & L. 633 (1997) [hereinafter Gold, Insights from Oregon and
Tennessee] (describing early experiences of Oregon and Tennessee with health reform and
Medicaid waivers). For discussions of Medicaid managed care programs in other states, see
generally Gold, supra note 17; John Holahan et al., Medicaid Managed Care in Thirteen States,
17 HEALTH AFFS. 43 (May/June 1998) (examining the experiences of thirteen different states
with the expansion of Medicaid managed care); Jean L. Thorne et al., State Perspectives on
Health Care Reform: Oregon, Hawaii, Tennessee, and Rhode Island, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV.
121 (1995) (analyzing how various states have overcome identified problems with healthcare
reform).
23. Gold, Insights from Oregon and Tennessee, supra note 22, at 638.
24. Behavioral Health Organizations ('BHOs) contract with Tennessee (the state) to pro-
vide mental health services, counterparts to MCOs, which contract to provide non-mental health
services. For discussion of the mental health component of TennCare, see generally John A.
Flippen, Note, Current Issues in Mental Health Care: The Early and Periodic Screening, Diag-
nostic, and Treatment Program and Managed Medicaid Mental Health Care: The Need to Re-
evaluate the EPSDT in the Managed Care Era, 50 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1997).
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grams, which require states to contribute a significant share of overall
program costs, are relatively weak until the absolute levels of expendi-
ture become sufficiently high so as to make incremental state expendi-
tures burdensome on state budgets.
Once adopted, a cooperative federalism program such as Medi-
caid has a political 'lock-in" effect-the matching formula that makes
program enhancements so appealing also makes cutbacks very unap-
pealing. To save a dollar in state funding, a state must absorb pro-
gram cuts of three dollars since about two-thirds of total program
costs are paid for with federal money. The lock-in effect encourages
federal program advocates to put in place additional program man-
dates that, at the outset, might result in states' unwillingness to par-
ticipate. But once states are locked in, departicipation is politically
unthinkable and program cutbacks are very difficult to contemplate.
State-level lock-in, combined with open-ended federal matching fund-
ing, allows states to drive federal expenditures.
These fiscal realities led states to seek painless methods of
financing the state share of Medicaid, particularly as federal man-
dates resulted in sharply escalating total Medicaid program costs.
These "silver bullet" approaches to financing relied on provider dona-
tions and provider taxes, which were matched by federal funding and
then recycled back to providers through adjusted Medicaid provider-
payment schedules. In 1991, the federal government put substantial
limits on these creative financing schemes, which in turn created
something of a crisis for states like Tennessee that had become quite
reliant on those relatively painless methods of raising federally-
matched funds for Medicaid.
In Part III, we review Tennessee's Medicaid experience and its
reliance on provider taxes to raise Tennessee's matching Medicaid ex-
penditures. We discuss the political and legal threat of the Medicaid
Voluntary Contributions and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of
1991' to Tennessee's system of raising funds, analyzing the 1991 Act
and its application to the Tennessee Services Tax Act of 1992." We
conclude that, as a political matter, the 1991 Act placed in jeopardy
political support for the provider tax. Further, as a legal matter, the
provider tax was potentially in violation of the 1991 Act. The decision
to develop TennCare followed from these financial fault-lines in
Tennessee's ability to cope with rapidly escalating Medicaid program
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w) (1994).
26. 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts 913 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801-1815 (1998)) (re-
pealed upon implementation of TennCare program).
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costs while facing the potential loss of a major revenue source for
funding the state's Medicaid expenditures.
Part IV provides an overview of TennCare. We discuss the
strategic considerations that led to the design and objectives of the
TennCare program-why a state faced with a perceived fiscal crisis
chose to develop a program to cover 50% more people than covered
under its traditional Medicaid program. We describe the waiver proc-
ess, the TennCare waiver application, and the contracts that the state
developed for implementing TennCare with MCOs. We also discuss
the financial arrangements that underlie and characterize the
TennCare waiver. The federal financial obligation for matching
TennCare expenditures is capped over the term of the demonstration;
any expenditure over the cap must be absorbed by the state. This cap
contrasts markedly from the normally open-ended nature of the fed-
eral matching obligation.
In Part V, we undertake a policy and legal analysis of
TennCare's program design and implementation. We examine the
TennCare approach to healthcare reform in terms of issues tradition-
ally considered in debates about such reform efforts. We note how
TennCare differed structurally from the Clinton Plan in some ways
but how the approaches were similar in a number of dimensions as
well. We then provide a critique of TennCare as a market-driven re-
form effort, noting that the overall level of expenditures was adminis-
tratively established, not set in a market-validated manner. The lack
of market-validation continues to raise issues regarding the adequacy
of TennCare funding.
We also observe an emerging political calculus associated with
modifications in entitlement programs. Program modifications some-
times seen as limiting program benefits-for instance, a managed care
initiative, which to some extent limits patients' choice of provider-
were supported by advocates for Medicaid beneficiaries provided that
efficiencies secured were used to achieve other access-oriented goals.
In this regard, we note the significance of how issues are framed' If
they are seen as "either/or," then program advocates may be willing to
forgo some benefits in order to achieve other related high-priority
objectives such as providing medical benefits to the uninsured and
uninsurable. If the issue is framed in "yes/no" terms, then program
advocates tend to fight any restraint on benefits because the ability to
recapture and reallocate those savings to program initiatives they
favor is seen as remote.
We next consider the special characteristics associated with
running a public benefits program through use of state purchasing
power rather than through the mechanism of administrative rule-
[Vol. 53:125
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making. Although the contracting purports to be bilateral, the state
retains considerable authority through its ability to determine service-
provision issues under the rubric of interpreting "medical necessity."
In addition, the state retains authority to interpret relevant law and
to settle lawsuits brought under state and/or federal law, thereby im-
posing obligations on MCOs. Since the government does not have an
obligation, at least in the short run, to adjust MCO capitation rates
when government in effect imposes greater costs on MCOs, the state
has an incentive, reinforced by advocacy groups, to compel broader
coverage as a form of an unfunded mandate on MCOs.
Finally, we consider the public/private status of MCOs. If
labeled private entities, MCOs may have advantages in dealing with
issues of fraud and abuse. Whether MCOs are state actors for pur-
poses of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an open question in the Sixth Circuit, is a
threshold issue in determining whether MCO conduct is subject to
procedural and substantive constitutional constraints. If MCOs are
state actors, then what defenses are available and what behavior
triggers liability in such putative litigation? Are MCOs, if deemed
state actors, subject to vicarious liability under a respondeat superior
theory in an action under § 1983? We also examine whether MCOs or
their employees receive qualified immunity as public employees would
and whether an affirmative defense of good faith would be available as
an alternative to qualified immunity.
Part VI presents some empirical findings about TennCare. The
data used is largely from original empirical work done for this project.
In general, levels of utilization have not been adversely affected and
for some services have been enhanced. Health outcomes in the areas
of study have not been impaired, and patient satisfaction has not suf-
fered. On the other hand, physician satisfaction is low, although
levels of physician participation in TennCare are apparently higher
than under Tennessee's traditional Medicaid program.
TennCare was in part designed to reduce health care costs by
streamlining the medical care marketplace in Tennessee. One implicit
goal was reducing excess capacity in the hospital sector. In general,
our data do not show that hospital profitability has suffered, although
certain hospitals have faced lower returns in the TennCare era. How-
ever, compared to the experience of other states in the same time
period, there has been a reduction in hospital resource use under
TennCare. The number of Tennessee hospitals closing has accelerated
since implementation of TennCare in comparison to the experience in
other states, and overall hospital-related expenditures-e.g., number
of hospital beds, inpatient days, average length of stay, emergency
room visits, and total hospital personnel costs-have fallen. In the
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aggregate, Tennessee's hospitals have become healthier because, while
revenues have decreased, total expenses have fallen by more.
After discussing our empirical findings and their implications,
we evaluate TennCare in policy perspective. TennCare has substan-
tially increased access to medical care for non-Medicaid-eligibles, has
constrained costs, and, in our areas of inquiry, has not resulted in
measurably lower quality of care. TennCare, therefore, is worth con-
sideration as a possible vehicle for health care reform, using Medicaid
managed care as a platform.
II. MEDICAID AS A SYSTEM OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM:
SOWING THE SEEDS OF TENNCARE
Medicaid was established in 1965 under the Social Security Act
to provide medical assistance for qualified low-income persons.' "His-
torically, medical support programs have tended to follow and to be
built upon government's income maintenance initiatives."' This was
the case with both Medicaid, whose beneficiaries are low-income per-
sons, and Medicare,' whose beneficiaries are the elderly. Both Medi-
caid and Medicare built upon pre-existing programs of income support
and, categorically, relied upon the definitions of eligibility in those
foundational income maintenance entitlements." For Medicare, the
27. The Medicaid Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (originally en-
acted as Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, tit. XIX, § 1901) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(1994)). See generally ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA:
A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID (1974) (describing early experience under Medicaid).
28. Clark C. Havighurst et al., Strategies in Underwriting the Costs of Catastrophic Disease,
40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 122, 183 (1976).
29. Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, § 101, 79
Stat. 343 (1965) (originally enacted as Act of August 14, 1935, ch. 531, tit. H, § 226) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 426).
30. In 1972, Congress extended Medicare coverage to those who qualified for income sup-
port under the disability components of Social Security. See generally Robert G. Dixon, The
Welfare State and Mass Justice: A Warning from the Social Security Disability Program, 1972
DUKE L. J. 681 (discussing procedural issues associated with processing disability claims); Lance
Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income:
Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1976) (discussing the Social
Security disability program). In the 1980s and 1990s, eligibility for Medicaid was incrementally
separated from eligibility for federal welfare (AFDC). See infra note 38. See generally CLARK C.
HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY: READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIONS 114-15
(1998) (explaining eligibility requirements and coverage under Medicaid). That somewhat
piecemeal expansion of Medicaid and its increased uncoupling from AFDC contributed to the
financial strain on federal and state Medicaid budgets.
2000] TENNCARE 137
underlying income support program was Social Security; for Medi-
caid, it was Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC").32
Medicare and Medicaid not only built upon distinct income
support programs but also built on the financing mechanisms already
in place. Since eligibility for Social Security is based on age and prior
payroll tax "contributions," not financial means at the time of eligibil-
ity, Medicare beneficiaries were not means-tested. Medicaid bene-
ficiaries, however, were defined in large measure by their income,
assets, and also by their categorical status-specifically, their eligi-
bility for AFDC. Thus, from the outset Medicaid was a form of "wel-
fare" medicine,33 a means-tested categorical entitlement program of
medical benefits for low-income (typically AFDC) beneficiaries.3 '
The differences between Medicaid and Medicare extended be-
yond the characteristics of the program beneficiaries. The programs'
financing mechanisms differed widely and importantly. Social Secu-
rity is financed federally, primarily by a dedicated payroll tax; AFDC
was jointly funded by federal and state general-revenue dollars.
Building on Social Security's infrastructure-with its exclusively
federal financing" and program administration-Medicare's imple-
mentation is entirely a function of federal government policy' with
minimal state involvement or responsibility. Medicaid, on the other
hand, represents one of the most significant cooperative federalism
efforts in the United States. The federal program sets minimum
31. 42 U.S.C. § 401.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 601. The AFDC program has now been replaced by the program Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10, 612, 613, 615-17 (Supp. 1999).
33. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 27.
34. "[Medicaid] succeeded earlier cash welfare-linked programs, perhaps the most notable of
these being the Kerr-Mills program that provided medical assistance for the aged. Medicaid acts
as a vendor payment program; that is, it makes direct payments to medical providers for their
services to Medicaid eligible persons." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAID SOURCE
BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS, at vii (1988) [hereinafter MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK
(1988)].
35. Medicare's Part A, which covers hospitalization, 42 U.S.C. § 1395d, is financed primarily
from a part of the overall Social Security payroll tax but, since 1993, see Pub. L. No. 103-66, §
13207(a), 107 Stat. 468 (Aug. 10, 1993), without a cap on the earned income subject to the tax.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3101(b), 3121(a). Beneficiaries pay a deductible. 42 U.S.C. § 1395e. Part B, which
covers physician services, is optional and is funded by general federal revenues and a premium
paid by beneficiaries. 42 U.S.C. § 1395j-k.
36. The Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA!) of the United States Department
of Health and Human Services (THHS') is the federal body responsible for administering
Medicare and Medicaid. The federal government contracts with financial intermediaries in each
state for administrative management and implementation of Medicare through claims process-
ing. While in theory the intermediaries do not make policy, they can affect policy through such
decisions as the amount of reimbursement allowed for certain items or services. Medicaid
programs are administered and implemented through state agencies, which have wide discretion
regarding scope of coverage and benefits. See infra note 38.
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requirements for state participation, which is, in theory at least, vol-
untary.37 Minimum requirements relate to beneficiary and provider
eligibility and to such issues as the nature and scope of services
offered." States have the authority to add beneficiaries (by adjusting
eligibility standards) and to add services, within program constraints
imposed by the federal government.39
Just as Medicaid is administered cooperatively by federal and
state officials, its financing is a joint responsibility. Federal Medicaid
contributions are based on a state's program spending and a matching
formula." A state's total Medicaid program budget is therefore com-
posed of a state dollar component and a federal matching component
that supplements qualified state spending (termed "federal financial
participation" or "FFP").
37. All states agreed to participate in Medicaid except Arizona, which now participates
under a waiver. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND
DATA AND ANALYSIS 1 n.2 (1993) [hereinafter MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993)] ("Arizona is the
only state without a Medicaid program. Since 1982, it has received Federal funds under a
demonstration waiver... the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, or AHCCCS.').
38. To qualify for Medicaid, applicants must meet income limits based on cash welfare
standards. In addition, Medicaid eligibility is subject to categorical restrictions, with most of the
coverage classifications falling into one of six groups: (1) current and some former recipients of
cash assistance (welfare); (2) low-income pregnant women and children who do not qualify for
welfare; (3) the medically needy who do not meet welfare financial standards but meet special
state-established medically needy limits; (4) persons requiring institutional care; (5) low-income
Medicare beneficiaries; and (6) low-income persons losing employer coverage and entitled to
purchase continuation coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1985 ("COBRA"), Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.). See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at 3-4.
While states have much flexibility in defining packages of covered benefits, federal guidelines
specify which services are mandatory or optional. See id. at 13-14. When Tennessee applied for
its waiver, states had to meet four basic requirements in their benefit package design: 1) the
amount, duration, and scope of each covered service must be reasonably sufficient to achieve its
purpose; 2) services must be generally equal in amount, duration, and scope for all categorically
needy beneficiaries in the state; 3) the amount, duration, and scope of coverage must be the same
throughout the state; and 4) beneficiaries must be free to receive services from any participating
provider. See id. at 15-19. TennCare received a waiver from the free-choice-of-provider require-
ment, which was altered by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. See infra notes 191-99 and
accompanying text.
39. In Medicaid's early years, some states saw the opportunity to expand access to medical
care, largely at federal expense, by establishing very generous eligibility coverage standards and
levels of service benefits. For a discussion of this early activity, see generally STEVENS &
STEVENS, supra note 27.
40. The federal portion of a state's payment for services-the Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage ("FMAP')-is calculated annually using a formula designed to provide a higher
federal matching rate to states with lower per capita income. Participating states are responsible
for the nonfederal share of Medicaid payments. See id.
41. See infra Part H.A.
A. Cooperative Federalism: Federal Matching and
Political Moral Hazard
FFP depends on a state's average per capita income and can
range from a match of 50% to 83% of total qualified program costs. 2
Because FFP typically represents a larger share than a state's share,"'
actual program cost is a highly leveraged proposition. FFP has a mul-
tiplier effect, allowing states to draw down from one to five federal
dollars for each state dollar expended. These moneys accrue to the
benefit of state constituents while externalizing 50-83% of the cost on
federal taxpayers.
Under the circumstances, increasing the nature and scope of
services offered and broadening coverage with liberalized eligibility
standards are politically buffered decisions that rest with each state
once federally-mandated floor expenditures are implemented. The
multiplier matching aspect of FFP means that the expenditure of
matching-qualified state funds allows states to provide benefits to
constituents far in excess of funding obligations incurred for each
state. State political officials can secure benefits for constituents by
leveraging state expenditures with an inflow of money raised at the
federal level. This provides a powerful incentive for states to expand
their Medicaid programs, possibly at the expense of programs that
might have a higher state or local priority, but which would have to be
funded entirely by state or local funds and therefore get "crowded
out."4
Correlatively, the availability of FFP offsets many of the politi-
cal constraints that restrain growth of state spending/benefits pro-
grams. In this sense, cooperative federalism programs create a form
of political "moral hazard,""5 encouraging states to adopt and finance
42. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at 25.
43. In FY 1992 the Federal share of Medicaid- payments was estimated at 57 percent. See
MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at 25.
44. In other words, the programs may lose out in the competition for state funds.
45. The term "moral hazard" apparently originated in the nineteenth century fire insurance
trade and referred to temptations created by the providing of insurance against loss. Economist
Kenneth Arrow applied the concept to medical insurance. See generally Kenneth Arrow, Uncer-
tainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963). Individuals
with health insurance use more medical services because their costs are largely borne by others.
In general, the term "moral hazard" applies to a broad range of circumstances in which the
interest of a rational individual is not identical to the interest of the larger collective of which
that individual is a member. For example, an individual decisionmaker may not be required to
pay the full costs of a choice but nonetheless may accrue the entire benefit. In such circum-
stances, a rational economic decisionmaker might choose more of a good or service than would be
the case if he or she had to bear the full cost of the consumption decision. The larger group
therefore benefits from an individual decisionmaker's restraint, but the individual exercising the
restraint only benefits indirectly (as a member of the larger group) from the choice not to pur-
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programs or components of programs that are "worth" (depending on
the applicable matching rate) $.17-.50 on the dollar to the politically
accountable decisionmaking entity-the state.
In this environment, cooperative federalism makes it economi-
cally and politically rational to spend state funds that, were the state
paying the full bill, might not comport with state priorities. Where
federal and state spending priorities are in sync, the multiplier effect
of cooperative federalism allows states to enlist the support of federal
taxpayers in funding state programs. Political moral hazard encour-
ages expansion of state programs beyond what states would be willing
to fund on their own-and to reduce political constraints on expansion
by externalizing the cost of funding those expansions."'
Since the inception of Medicaid, the savviest states have
understood this political/economic calculus." Aggressive states can
achieve state social welfare objectives by externalizing at least half
the cost to federal taxpayers. Born in the name of federalism, this
type of cooperative arrangement has grown up to create a tremendous
vehicle for the expansion of the scope, coverage, and benefits of the
categorical program involved. The ride up the escalator-to increased
benefits and expanded eligibility-is relatively painless to the state.
The availability of FFP allows state-level program advocates to
advance an agenda and offsets the normal fiscal concerns that con-
strain program growth.
Externalization of fiscal impact has resulted in a certain fiscal
divide-and-conquer political dynamic. The fiscal design and conse-
quences of the cooperative federalism concept create incentives for
program expansion (and cost escalation) at both the federal and state
levels. Federal-level program advocates provide a structure that
allows state-level advocates to make the very plausible claim that pro-
gram expansion is a bargain too good to be passed up. Indeed, the
argument can reasonably be made that failure to pick off this low-
chase a good or service. Since the individual decisionmaker can use the resources of others to
subsidize a decision to consume, that person has a strong incentive to expand usage. When the
federal government provides matching funds, a state can tap into a larger (federal) pool of funds.
A rational state with access to matching funds is likely to consume more resources. Gains from
restraint are shared by all fifty states, while gains from consumption accrue disproportionately
to states that aggressively pursue federal funding.
46. See supra notes 39, 44.
47. State Medicaid programs have undergone continual changes in eligibility criteria and
services offered. "Partly as a result of the changes [in eligibility criteria], the number of benefi-
ciaries ... increased from 22.5 million in 1986 to 28.3 million in 1991. More States are offering
optional Medicaid services. Furthermore, innovations in the types of services provided under the
program have continued and become more widespread." MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra
note 37, at vii; see also supra note 39, for further discussion.
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hanging fruit is a strikingly irrational state-level political/economic
decision.
At the federal level, at least at the outset, the total federal
budgetary implications of a cooperative federalism program are neces-
sarily somewhat blurred, unknowable, and therefore subject to con-
siderable errors in estimation. The reason for uncertainty is that a
substantial component of federal costs ultimately is derivative,
dependent on political choices made in the states and controlled by
political officials accountable to state and local constituents. While
federal guidelines (typically, and in Medicaid specifically) set floors
and ceilings on eligibility criteria and scope of benefits, states have a
great deal of flexibility to make policy choices that automatically trig-
ger federal matching dollars through a statutorily-determined for-
mula.48 Thus, the normal indeterminacy of federal spending on health
care programs is exacerbated because federal officials do not control
state-level Medicaid decisions that carry substantial federal budgetary
consequences. This uncertainty regarding the magnitude and scope-
and eventually the costs--of the federal commitment has made federal
authorization of state-driven program expansions easier to implement.
As total Medicaid costs expanded, states learned that ponying
up even a fraction of total program costs was expensive and becoming
somewhat of a financial and political problem. This is a classic conse-
quence of moral hazard-as the absolute level of costs escalates, even
the relatively small percentage of costs borne by the beneficiary (the
insured in the insurance industry context or the states in this situa-
tion) becomes substantial. As federal Medicaid costs escalated and the
federal budget hemorrhaged red ink, federal officials acutely felt the
fiscal pain as the consequences of fiscal externalization became in-
creasingly onerous on federal budgetary resources. Predictably, coun-
tervailing pressures to do something about escalating Medicaid pro-
gram costs began to emerge.
B. The "Lock-in"Effect and Expanded Federal Mandates
A key federal-level insight of the 1980s was that the political
"moral hazard" associated with cooperative federalism programs such
as Medicaid had had a political narcotic effect. A form of state-level
political dependency-a political addiction-resulted from state
responses to the incentives that stemmed from the allure of federal
matching moneys. Federal legislators would then recognize that it
would be difficult politically for states, once -involved in a cooperative
48. See supra note 38.
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federalism program, to departicipate from what had been seen as a
voluntary partnership. Expansion of Medicaid created a potent politi-
cal constituency-a coalition among advocates for beneficiaries and
provider groups such as physicians, hospitals, nursing homes, and
pharmaceutical firms. 49  Cold turkey departicipation in Medicaid was
not a realistic option for states, and program cutbacks were also very
difficult politically. As states became more concerned about rising
state Medicaid expenditures, they realized that the ride down the
escalator (to cost-saving restrictions in Medicaid programs) was excru-
ciatingly painful politically and programmatically. The very lever-
aging of federal money, so appealing when programs are being ex-
panded, makes the cutback process that much harder to stomach. To
save a state-generated Medicaid dollar, a state must reduce program
expenditures by anywhere from two to six dollars (depending on the
federal matching formula for a given state). The reverse effect of the
leveraging phenomenon-the relative modest saving of state dollars
but the loss of a multiple of the state saving in overall program fund-
ing-makes Medicaid cutbacks a particularly unattractive (albeit
sometimes fiscally necessary) political option.
Perceiving the lock-in effect on states, federal legislators in the
1980s adopted a series of mandatory program enhancements that
altered the floor for participation required of states.' Federal-level
49. A similar coalition was a critical force in the enactment of Medicare. See generally
THEODORE R. MARMOR & JAN MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1973) (discussing the
political dynamics of Medicare).
50. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 ("DEFRA"), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (codi.
fied as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (requiring states to provide Medicaid to
first-time pregnant women and those in two-parent families whose principal wage earner is
unemployed, as well as children up to age 5 born after September 30, 1983, who did not meet
categorical tests for eligibility but did meet AFDC financial standards); Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (requiring states to cover all women that met AFDC
standards); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (permitting states to cover
pregnant women and infants up to age 1, to be phased in up to age 5, meeting state income
standards up to 100 percent of the federal poverty level); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987 (Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1987), Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (permitting states to cover pregnant women and
infants with families up to 185% of the Federal poverty level and a phase-in for children ages 1
through 5, with incomes below 100% of poverty; extending required coverage to children up to
age 7 born after September 30, 1983, meeting financial but not categorical eligibility); Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683 (1988) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C) (requiring states to phase in coverage of pregnant
women and infants under age 1 with incomes under 100% of poverty); Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of the U.S.C) (requiring states to cover pregnant women and children up to age 6
born after September 30, 1983, with incomes below 133% of poverty); Omnibus Budget Recon-
TENNCARE
program expansion advocates, typically driven by access concerns,
shifted Medicaid from its historical reliance on categorical eligibility to
encompass indigent persons who fell outside the guidelines of the in-
come-support programs upon which Medicaid had been built. The
focus of these changes was to cover more indigent persons based solely
on income or age rather than on categorical status."
The increased Medicaid mandate strategy allowed federal leg-
islators to impose federal health care priorities on states while sub-
stantially externalizing federal tax-raising costs to the state level.
The betting at the federal level-and it turned out to be a safe bet-
was that Medicaid's political lock-in effect would bar state departicipa-
tion despite the federal imposition of substantially higher costs on
state budgets. The Federal mandates adapted for federal purposes the
tax-externalization strategy used by states for years. Federal health
care priorities could be safely established without full federal financ-
ing of those priorities. While states often viewed these requirements
as unfunded mandates, a fairer characterization is that they were
incompletely funded.
A third factor,'2 price inflation, also contributed to the increase
in Medicaid expenditures during the 1980s and early 1990s. The
medical care component of the Consumer Price Index ("cPr') rose con-
siderably faster than the general CPI during that period. Although
managed care had moderated increases in price and reduced some
forms of utilization in the private sector, Medicaid relied on the tradi-
tional fee-for-service method of compensation. Managed care did not
have much of a role in most Medicaid programs.' Certainly that was
the case in Tennessee prior to TennCare.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, many states (including
Tennessee) were therefore confronted with ever-expanding Medicaid
costs. In addition to price inflation and relatively unrestrained in-
creases in utilization, state Medicaid budgets were buffeted by the
ciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of the U.S.C.) (requiring states to cover all children under age 19 born after
September 30, 1983, with family incomes below 100% of poverty).
51. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at 37; see also supra note 38 for addi-
tional support.
52. The first factor was state program enhancements deriving from the political moral haz-
ard phenomenon of Medicaid's cooperative federalism structure. The second factor was the
expanded federal mandates, built upon the lock-in effect. See supra Part ll.A and text accom-
panying notes 47-49.
53. Holahan and co-authors have found that cost savings from managed care in Medicaid
are "in the order of 5-10 percent relative to fee-for-service." They attribute these modest savings
in part to the "historically low Medicaid payment rates, which make it difficult to achieve the
kind of savings often seen in the private sector." See Holahan et al., supra note 22, at 60.
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impetus of political moral hazard, which led to expanded state pro-
grams and the associated program costs. At the federal level, program
advocates more aggressively pursued program-expansion policies that,
as a price of participation in the Medicaid program, compelled states
to expand their Medicaid programs further.
C. Program Cost Escalation and the Search for the Fiscal Silver Bullet
Faced with expanding Medicaid costs, the political difficulty of
substantially trimming those costs, and the reality of the multiplier
effect of FFP, states understandably looked for a fiscal silver bullet-a
creative financing mechanism to allow for even greater leverage under
the generous federal matching formulas.
One way of relatively painless leveraging was to find mecha-
nisms for spending non-tax-raised monies or at least non-general-tax-
raised monies on state Medicaid programs and then seeking to qualify
those expenditures for FFP. Tennessee was a leader in aggressively
leveraging private expenditures or provider-tax-raised revenues to
capture FFP. This allowed Tennessee to cope with rising Medicaid
costs with modest fiscal pain.
This is how states' creative financing of Medicaid worked.'
The more aggressive approach was for a state to secure private funds
directly from providers, typically hospitals. The state would, in turn,
use these "donated" funds to pay for Medicaid services and, although
these "donated" funds were of private origin, qualify those expendi-
tures for FFP." What made the scheme attractive is that states did
not have to absorb the fiscal pain of raising even the state's component
that qualified for FFP, yet they received the multiplier effect of the
generous FFP matching formula. What made the scheme politically
marketable was the ability of states indirectly to transfer the
"donated" funds back to the donor hospitals. The states served as a
conduit, providing a pass-through mechanism that allowed the
"donated" funds to find their way back-with a federal add-on-to the
original "donor. '
54. For a description and analysis of Tennessee's provider tax legislation, see infra Part
II.B.
55. "In 1985, HCFA began allowing states to include voluntary donations from providers in
calculating federal matching payments under Medicaid. Tennessee was one of the first states to
turn to provider donations to fund its Medicaid program." Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physi-
cian Participation: Patients, Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 203
n.121 (1995).
56. See generally The Medicaid Program: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 7-9, (1991)
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Each state designs and operates its own Medicaid program,
subject to minimum and maximum federal standards.57 Thus, subject
to federal standards," states have wide discretion to determine the
rates of provider compensation under their Medicaid programs, so
they could adjust payment rates to offset the hospitals' "donations." In
addition, and more importantly, because more directly targeted, states
were authorized under the Disproportionate Share Hospital ('DSH")
program to funnel funds directly to hospitals that served a large num-
ber (a "disproportionate share")59 of Medicaid patients. DSH payments
could be adjusted to reflect the magnitude of a DSH hospital's "dona-
tion!' of funds to a state's Medicaid program.' In this way, a hospital
would be held harmless for its donation, the state was able to benefit
from the multiplier effect of FFP without having to raise the state's
matching-qualifying share through taxation, and Medicaid could be
expanded because FFP provided an infusion of new federal money.
A less aggressive version of the same scenario resulted from
state imposition of provider-specific taxes. Instead of seeking volun-
tary contributions from hospitals, states would raise revenue from
providers through targeted taxation rather than through general taxa-
tion. This approach was designed to short-circuit the political (or
political process) constraints on state program expansion that stem
from a state's need to raise its share of the total program cost. Tar-
geted provider-oriented taxes were politically palatable-as were hos-
pitals' voluntary contributions-because states could redirect the tax
(statement of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector General, Department of Health & Human Serv-
ices, describing such provider-based programs). Starting in 1990, these provider-tax and pro-
vider-donation programs were referred to as funding mechanisms. '"At first, [state] legislative
leaders were calling it a scam, they then began calling it a scheme, and now they are calling it a
funding mechanism.'" OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF'HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
USE OF MEDICAID PROVIDER TAX AND DONATION PROGRAMS NEEDS TO BE CONTROLLED 2 (July
1991) (quoting a state legislative staffer).
57. See generally MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at 1-26; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: TENNESSEE'S PROGRAM BROADENED COVERAGE BUT FACES
UNCERTAIN FUTURE 3 (1995) [hereinafter GAO REPORT (1995)]. In FY 1991, Tennessee's Medi-
caid payments totaled $1.485 billion, as compared to the highest of $13.728 billion (New York)
and the lowest of $90 million (Wyoming). See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at
116-17. That year, Tennessee's payment per beneficiary was $2,130, as compared to the highest
of $4,898 (New Hampshire) and the lowest of $1,607 (Mississippi). See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK
(1993), supra note 37, at 119-20.
58. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at 1.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(b)(1) (1994). Congress created the DSH program to allow states
to make additional Medicaid payments to hospitals that treated a disproportionate share of
Medicaid patients. A state's ability to use DSH payments to provide additional revenue for
hospitals was circumscribed in 1993. See id. § 1396r-4(g) (amended by Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107
Stat. 312 (1993)).
60. See supra note 37.
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revenues raised in a straightforward manner (albeit indirectly) back to
the hospital taxpayers through adjustments in payment rates gener-
ally or through DSH payments. As with voluntary contributions, pro-
vider-specific taxes were used to draw down FFP. Their tax payments
were indirectly returned to hospital taxpayers, and the additional fed-
eral money benefited not only patients but also providers-
particularly hospitals.
The result of these methods of creative financing was, as one
might suspect, to increase greatly federal Medicaid expenditures."1
Clearly, political moral hazard had an effect on increasing Medicaid
program costs. Similarly, expanded federal mandates resulted in in-
creased expenditures. Creative financing allowed states to expand
program costs. At the same time, it empowered private self-interested
providers to accelerate program costs even further with boomerang
private financing-either through voluntary contributions or through
provider-specific taxes. This system allowed states painlessly to draw
down federal matching funds and thereby continue to expand Medi-
caid expenditures virtually entirely at federal expense.
The political-process constraints, contemplated as modest
restraints on state-driven program escalation, were effectively circum-
vented. Moreover, a new form of fiscal externalization arose. States
faced political pressures and fiscal incentives to expand program costs
and benefits since the local matching dollars were being supplied.
These dollars insulated state officials from having to raise the state
Medicaid share through general taxation, yet they still qualified for
FFP. To paraphrase Ross Perot, one could almost hear the sucking
sound of dollars flooding out of the federal Treasury to fund ever-ex-
panding state Medicaid cost increases-many of which were imposed
in the first instance by federal mandates that took advantage of the
political lock-in effect described earlier.
The structural result of these creative financing schemes was
that self-interested providers in league with access egalitarians and
other advocates for Medicaid beneficiaries were substantially driving
state program increases. Federal Medicaid outlays, in turn, were
driven, and on fiscal automatic pilot, not. only by non-federal political
actors (state governments) but also by a state-based coalition of pro-
viders and program beneficiaries not politically accountable to anyone
and yet holding keys to the federal treasury.
61. See supra note 47.
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D. Fending Off the Fiscal Silver Bullet: The Federal
Government Fires Back
Drawing on general federal revenues and coming at a time of
substantial federal budgetary deficits, these creative methods of states
financing their share of Medicaid drew a predictable reaction from
federal budgetary authorities. Weak as it is, the political-process
restraint on state expansion of Medicaid turned out to be of conse-
quence. When states were able to avoid a considerable portion of their
cost-sharing component for marginal program enhancements and were
still able to draw down FFP, they had even more incentive to continue
broadening the nature and scope of Medicaid program benefits and
expanding the standards of program eligibility.
These schemes-voluntary provider contributions and pro-
vider-targeted "tax-and-DSIT' schemes-raised revenue that could
then be incorporated into a state's Medicaid program and qualify for
FFP. Federal contributions were then based on artificially elevated
state Medicaid expenditures. That resulted in increased FFP through
use of essentially private funds. Further, the private fund providers
under the silver bullet financing schemes were held harmless because
states could manipulate provider payment formulas under Medicaid to
return the private funds to the providers (typically hospitals) that had
furnished the money in the first instance-along with a multiplier
from the FFPY Because states did not have to raise Medicaid funds
through the normal political process, and because providers had no
incentive to resist provider-targeted taxation,' even the relatively
weak political-process constraints of cooperative federalism were
eviscerated.
In 1991, the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA")
acted to contain what it perceived as the growing abuse of the Medi-
caid financing process.' HCFA sought to circumscribe the ability of
states to draw down FFP by use of provider-specific taxes and dona-
tions and to constrain state flexibility to return provider contributions
by adjusting DSH payments.
62. These devices, known generically as "pass throughs," had been authorized by HCFA in
1985 when it permitted public and private donations to be used as a State's share of financial
participation in the entire Medicaid program. 42 C.F.R. pt. 433.45 (1998).
63. See generally, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (represent-
ing an example of a boomerang provider-targeted tax scheme, in this case designed to protect in-
state industry from out-of-state competition).
64. See Christine M. Solomon & Jennifer L. Smith, TennCare: Up and Running, HEALTH
SYS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 10, 11.
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The Medicaid Voluntary Contributions and Provider-Specific
Tax Amendments of 1991 ('MVCPTA"),' was envisioned by its propo-
nents as the tourniquet on the federal fiscal Medicaid hemorrhage.' It
was designed to restore the built-in fiscal and political-process con-
straints that had always been part of the cooperative federalism Medi-
caid philosophy. MVCPTA was aimed at the more egregious provider-
based "hocus-pocus"' 7 funding schemes concocted by the states to take
advantage of the federal Medicaid matching program.68 MVCPTA sub-
stantially curtailed the ability of states to use provider payments-
either voluntary contributions or provider-specific taxes-to qualify
for FFP, placing quite specific limits on the type of provider-based
financing that would be eligible for FFP.69 MVCPTA is an extraor-
dinarily complex compromise between those who saw state-adopted
creative financing schemes as abusive, something to be reined in," and
those who saw those schemes as a politically palatable vehicle for the
continued expansion of Medicaid program benefits at the state level-
in effect, a state-driven engine of growth effectively beyond the control
of the effective bill-payer, the federal government.
In addition to MVCPTA's restrictions on creative financing, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA '93")" contained
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w) (1994)) (amending the Social Security Act to reduce the amount
expended under state plans for medical assistance by the sum of various revenues received by
the state).
66. For a discussion of the 1991 Act and the politics surrounding its adoption written by a
lobbyist against its enactment, see generally Michael 0. Spivey, Patching the Patchwork Quilt:
"Reforming" the Medicaid Program-The Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific
Tax Amendments of 1991, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37 (1992).
67. Governor Ned McWherter, Address to the Tennessee General Assembly (Apr. 8, 1993).
68. See supra note 56.
69. 42 U.S.C. §1396b(w). This provision-its statutory waiver for New York and President
Clinton's veto of that waiver-was involved in the line-item veto case. See generally Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
70. The objection to politically-unrestrained state ability to tap into the common federal
Medicaid fund can be understood by analogy to Garrett Hardin's well-known parable. See
generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Hardin
described a commons in which herdsmen were able to graze their animals without limit. Each
herdsman had an incentive to add animals to be fed, even though there was an inevitable risk to
the commons. The herdsman would receive 100% of the benefit from each additional animal he
grazed; the cost in terms of the harm to the commons was borne proportionally by all herdsmen.
This created a perverse incentive to overutilize the commons and eventually would result in ruin
of the commons. See id. The analogy to the creative financing schemes under Medicaid is clear.
Each state, through provider-based "hocus-pocus" taxes, sought to game the system in order to
receive more and more federal matching, imposing ever-increasing costs on federal taxpayers.
The rationale was that all federal taxpayers are absorbing the additional cost of each state's
Medicaid program. Yet, as in the case of the commons, such behavior eventually can bring ruin
to all-namely, budget deficits and/or program cuts in Medicaid or other federal programs.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(g).
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further limits. OBRA '93 indirectly limited the use of intergovern-
mental transfers from public hospitals to state Medicaid budgets.
These had been used as a source of FFP when recycled through state
Medicaid budgets. OBRA '93 achieved this result by restricting states'
ability to transfer DSH funds to hospitals. By limiting DSH pay-
ments, OBRA '93 effectively limited one important method through
which the state could recycle provider-tax-raised funds back to the
provider-taxpayer. Further, the limit on DSH payments left the hos-
pitals with less money available for payment of taxes, since hospitals
would presumably need to retain most Medicaid payments to maintain
ongoing operations.'
The curtailment of silver-bullet financing schemes meant that
states with aggressive Medicaid financing strategies (such as Tennes-
see) were at risk. This political and financial background is essential
to an understanding of what led to the development of TennCare.
HI. TENNCARE AS A RESPONSE TO FISCAL STRESS: A THUMBNAIL
SKETCH OF TENNESSEE'S MEDICAID EXPERIENCE
While creative Medicaid financing methods were born else-
where, they were raised and nurtured to maturity in Tennessee."
Some might say raised to an art form. The combination of expanding
program costs-much imposed by federal mandates-and curtail-
ments on creative financing-largely the result of MVCPTA 7 4-meant
that the state faced serious budgetary problems in Medicaid.
TennCare was devised to cope with those budgetary problems.
A. The Financial Stresses on Tennessee's Medicaid Program
In 1992, Tennessee faced a serious Medicaid budget problem.
The budget problem was caused in large part by growing Medicaid
enrollment, escalating health care costs, and an impending threat of
loss of federal funds. Throughout the 1980s, 5 Congress had expanded
Medicaid eligibility, shifting away from the AFDC-based (i.e., cate-
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(g) (amended by Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 629-30 (1993) (limiting
DSH payments to the difference between a hospital's costs and its level of reimbursement from
Medicaid, which presumably was below hospitals' costs)).
73. See Gold, Insights from Oregon and Tennessee, supra note 22, at 651 (noting that the
"impetus for TennCare was largely fiscal" and that Tennessee had made "extensive use of
provider donations and taxes in conjunction with disproportionate share payments to finance the
expansion of Medicaid and the required state contribution).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w).
75. See supra notes 30, 50 (noting the incremental expansion of Medicaid eligibility).
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gorical) eligibility standards to poverty (i.e., income) guideline stan-
dards.6 The largest expansion, however, came in 1990 despite stag-
gering federal budgetary deficits. As part of the same 1990 budget
agreement that resulted in new taxes, Congress enacted a mandated
Medicaid expansion to phase in coverage of all income-eligible (i.e.,
poor) children over a period of twelve years.7 Within specified income
guidelines, all children, already covered through age six, would be-
come covered under Medicaid through age eighteen at the end of the
year-by-year phase-in period. Children aged six who had been covered
under Medicaid would maintain coverage until age eighteen if their
families met income-qualification guidelines. 8
The federally-mandated eligibility expansion, which targeted
pregnant women and children, resulted in an 85% increase in Tennes-
see's Medicaid enrollment between 1988 and 1993." During that same
period of time, annual Medicaid expenditures nearly tripled, swelling
"from less than $1 billion in fiscal year 1987 to [over] $2.8 billion in
fiscal year 1993,"---more than a quarter of the state's budget. 1 Offi-
cials believed that the state could not sustain an ongoing rate of in-
crease in spending of that magnitude. Democratic Governor Ned
McWherter appointed a task force to recommend substantial budget
cutbacks in Tennessee's Medicaid program-in the range of $250
million in state spending and $750 million in overall spending.'
76. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at 37.
77. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990)
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (requiring States to cover all children under age 19
born after September 30, 1983, with family incomes below 100 percent of the federal poverty
level).
78. This process was accelerated by the Children's Health Insurance Program ("CHIP") en-
acted as part of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. For a description of CHIP, see. HAVIGHURST ET
AL., supra note 30, at 116-17.
79. Tennessee's Medicaid enrollment grew from 410,525 in FY 88, FISCAL REVIEW COMM.,
1988 ANNUAL REPORT TO TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at 31 (1989) to 758,574 in FY 93,
FISCAL REVIEW COMM., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT TO TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at 34 (1994).
80. TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 11.
81. See Duren Cheek, State's Health Reform Lacks U.S. Approval, THE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 6,
1993, at 2A.
82. In its TennCare waiver application, Tennessee stated that growth in Medicaid expen-
ditures in recent years had been so steep as to "threaten [ ] the viability of all other functions of
state government. The growth of the Medicaid program has far exceeded the ability of the State
to sustain through normal methods of State revenue generation." TENNCARE WAIVER
APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 1 (Executive Summary).
83. Dr. William Frist, then a transplant surgeon at the Vanderbilt University Medical Cen-
ter, chaired the Task Force and in 1994 successfully ran for the United States Senate as a
Republican, defeating longtime incumbent Democratic Senator James Sasser. One of the
authors of this Article, Professor Blumstein, was a member of the Task Force. In Spring 1993,
Governor McWherter submitted a fiscal 1994 budget that called for $726 million in Medicaid
cuts. The Governor linked the Medicaid cuts with the potential loss of revenue from the gross
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As the Task Force considered a number of proposed cutbacks
during its deliberations, the political pain of the Medicaid cutback
approach became manifest. That spurred Commissioner of Finance
David Manning and Medicaid Director Manny Martins to proceed
along a separate, discrete strategic track. Encouraged by the pur-
ported receptiveness of former-Governor and now-President Clinton to
approving state-based Medicaid experiments, and confronted with the
stark reality of the Medicaid cutback scenario under Task Force con-
sideration, Tennessee officials undertook to develop an alternative
approach. This process, which resulted in TennCare, was imple-
mented in secret. Members of the Task Force were not officially in-
cluded' in the initiative.
B. Tennessee's Medicaid Funding Mechanisms: The Problems
Posed by Provider Taxes
When the Medicaid Task Force was appointed in 1992, a cen-
terpiece of Tennessee's Medicaid financing mosaic was a 6.75% gross
receipts tax (the Tennessee Services Tax Act of 1992 ('CSTA")).'
Originally the tax had been overtly provider-based, levied forthrightly
on hospitals.' The provider tax was quite distinct from the state's
preexisting broad-based sales tax, which has historically been the
state's primary revenue-raising source. For example, the rate (6.75%)
was different from the statewide sales tax rate (6.0%), and, unlike the
receipts tax, which had a sunset provision of March 31, 1994, and whose prospects for reenact-
ment were problematic. See Duren Cheek, State Plans Restructure of Medicaid, THE
TENNESSEAN, Mar. 16, 1993, at 1A.
84. At least two Task Force members were actively involved in the TennCare planning pro-
cess. Glen Watson, a senior official at Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee ("BCBS"), was an
essential player because BCBS was the only entity with a large nearly statewide provider
network in place. BCBS's cooperation was deemed essential for successful implementation of
statewide managed Medicaid. Gordon Bonnyman, then an attorney with Legal Services in
Nashville, a representative of many Medicaid patients, and an influential advocate for Medicaid
patients, was included in the discussions because of the McWherter Administration's desire to
have his political support (in the state and federally with HCFA) and legal blessing (i.e., not to be
sued by Legal Services). The desire to secure support from the Medicaid patient advocates
influenced TennCare's approach to access and scope-of-benefit issues.
85. 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts 913 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801-1815 (1998)) (re-
pealed by TennCare program).
86. For a general discussion of provider-based funding for Medicaid, see Judi Hasson,
States' Funding Loophole Called a 'Scam,'USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 1991, at 6A. For discussions of
Tennessee's use of provider-based taxes, see LaChrisha Butler, Tenn. Medicaid Fight Heating
Up, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 19, 1991; LaChrisha Butler, Tennessee Medicaid Program in
Trouble, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 18, 1991.
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sales tax, the Medicaid provider tax was not subject to a local-option
add-on."
After enactment in 1991 of MVCPTA,' Tennessee revised the
tax in an attempt to comply with the law's restrictions with as little
change in substance as possible. The revision (TSTA)' was enacted as
a temporary stop-gap with a sunset provision after less than two
years.'
Tennessee modified its then-existing tax structure in such a
way as, purportedly, to fall within exceptions carved out by MVCPTA.
Tennessee sought, first, to avoid characterizing its 6.75% gross re-
ceipts tax as a "health care related tax," which in general did not
qualify for FFP under MVCPTA. In the alternative, Tennessee sought
to characterize its taxing scheme, if in fact seen as a "health care
related tax," as "broad based" and therefore eligible for FFP under
MVCPTA.
1. The Medicaid Voluntary Contributions and Provider-Specific
Tax Amendments of 1991: In General
As a general proposition, MVCPTA prohibits the use of revenue
received by states through provider-specific ("health care related")
taxes or through provider-related donations as state Medicaid expen-
ditures that qualify for FFP.9" However, states can use revenue gen-
erated by health care related taxes to pay for Medicaid expenses and
to qualify for FFP 2 if a health care related tax is broad-based and does
not contain a "hold harmless provision.""
Under MVCPTA, a tax is health care related4 when it (1) "re-
late[s] to health care items or services,"" (2) relates to the "provision
of, the authority to provide, or payment for" such items or services,' or
87. The incidence of the sales tax is nominally on the buyer, as the tax is levied as an add-
on to the price of the taxed item. The incidence of the provider gross receipts was nominally on
the service provider (e.g., hospitals). Whether the actual incidence of those taxes differed is an
empirical question, but one can surmise that the nominal difference would be much greater than
the actual difference in incidence (as between sellers and purchasers).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w) (1994).
89. 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts 913 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801-1815) (repealed by
TennCare Program).
90. Id. §18 (provisions of act were to terminate on March 31, 1994).
91. 42 U.S.C. §1396b(w)(1)(A)(i) & (ii) (1994).
92. Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(ii).
93. Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii).
94. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(A).
95. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(A)(i).
96. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(A)(i).
(3) although part of a generally applicable tax, treats health care
providers and non-providers differently in the implementation of the
tax." A tax is considered to "relate to health care items or services" if
"at least 85 percent of the burden of such tax falls on health care pro-
viders."" In general, revenues received by a state from a health care
related tax do not qualify for FFP even if made part of and spent
through the state's Medicaid program.
On the other hand, if a health care related tax is broad-based,
Medicaid expenditures that incorporate those revenues qualify for
FFP. A health care related tax on certain "health care items or serv-
ices" is "broad-based" if it is imposed on all items or services in a class
and is imposed uniformly." The uniformity requirement guards
against singling out certain health care providers for more onerous
taxation with respect to licensing fees or singling out particular health
care items or services for more onerous taxation than others in the
class." The underlying compromise reflected by allowing FFP for
broad-based health care related taxes is that states can tax health
care providers generally as a class and use those revenues to support
Medicaid (and receive FFP for those expenditures). Barred is a tar-
geted health care related tax, which is an unreal tax when the state
serves merely as a conduit for provider tax dollars and returns a mul-
tiple of those dollars (with FFP) back to the particular provider-tax-
payer. Thus, DSH hospitals, which disproportionately serve Medicaid
patients, cannot be singled out for taxation among hospitals; manipu-
lating Medicaid payment formulas or DSH payments would directly
allow states to offset the taxes for DSH hospitals. For other hospitals,
the taxes might be indirectly beneficial as a means of paying for Medi-
caid, but the ability to offset the taxes directly is more attenuated.
The compromise was that, as a means of supporting their Medicaid
programs, states can tax an industry that serves and benefits from
serving Medicaid patients but the tax must be real, not just a disin-
genuous fiscal pass-through device. It reflects a balance of values-
how strong an incentive states should face in constraining Medicaid
expenditures.
One other feature of MVCPTA demonstrates how the compro-
mise was brokered. Although revenues derived from a broad-based
health care related tax and spent through a state's Medicaid program
97. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(A)(ii).
98. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(A).
99. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(B).
100. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(C). The classes of health care "items and services" are specifically de-
fined. Id. § 1396b(w)(7)(A).
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generally qualify for FFP, they do not qualify if the broad-based health
care related tax contains a "hold harmless" provision,"' which arises
when the taxing unit provides a payment to the health care taxpayer
whose amount is "positively correlated... to the amount of the tax."' 2
Similarly, where the unit of government levying the tax "provides
(directly or indirectly) for any payment, offset, or waiver that guaran-
tees to hold taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of the
tax,"'°3 then the hold harmless requirement is breached.
This hold harmless provision demonstrates the distinction
MVCPTA sought to draw. Taxing the health care industry or discrete
segments of the industry on a nondiscriminatory basis would be
acceptable. Those taxpayers would behave like real taxpayers, feeling
the bite of the tax at least to some extent. The political process, how-
ever modestly and albeit with considerable political moral hazard,
would to some extent resist unbounded escalation in Medicaid expen-
ditures. That type of tax, was deemed bona fide. However, where the
incidence of the health care related tax was on providers who could
rather directly be insulated from the effect of the tax, then that
mechanism for financing Medicaid would be discouraged by the with-
drawal of FFP from revenues raised in that way. Violation of the hold
harmless provision, in essence, means that the tax is not a bona fide
tax but a financing conduit for particular provider-taxpayers. In such
circumstances, the total lack of a political-process check on program
expansion was deemed to warrant the withdrawal of FFP from Medi-
caid funds raised in that way."
2. The "Health Care Related Tax" Issue
Prior to enactment of MVCPTA, Tennessee had a provider-
based health care related gross receipts tax of 6.75% on hospital-gen-
erated revenues. It also had a broad-based, statewide sales tax of
6.0% on gross receipts. Localities had the option of adding on 2.75% to
101. Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii).
102. Id. § 1396b(w)(4)(A). The "positively correlated" provision applies to non-Medicaid pay-
ments. There is a comparable provision disallowing any Medicaid payment to vary "based only
upon the amount of the tax." Id. § 1396b(w)(4)(B).
103. Id. § 1396b(w)(4)(C).
104. Under this statute states could maintain existing tax-and-DSH schemes, as long as the
provider tax was levied at no more than a 6% rate. See 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(0(3) (1998). Alter-
natively, states could restrict their scheme to public providers, substituting for provider taxes
with the use of intergovernmental transfers. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(6) (1994).
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the statewide sales tax.' 5 Hospital services were not subject to the
sales tax.
In an effort to comply with MVCPTA, Tennessee amalgamated
these two taxes for a period of nearly two years. After that, the sales
tax would resume as before, and the tax on hospital gross receipts
would sunset. That is, the provider-based gross receipts tax of 6.75%
was lumped together with items in the sales tax base. When the tax
on hospital revenue gross receipts was combined with the items sub-
ject to the state's overall sales tax, the resulting tax, it was contended,
was not a "health care related tax" and therefore not subject to
MVCPTA.
The state's rationale was that, under MVCPTA, a tax is not
considered health care related if less than 85% of the "burden of such
tax falls on health care providers."" While, by 1993, the 6.75% tax on
hospital gross receipts generated nearly 43% ($382 million) of Tennes-
see's share ($894 million) of program expenditures for the Medicaid
program," clearly the provider component did not generate 85% of the
combined total of receipts for sales tax plus hospital gross receipts tax.
If this were accepted as legitimate, then Tennessee would be able to
avoid the impact of MVCPTA by characterizing its tax as non-health-
care-related. Tennessee's position, however, had problems that placed
the taxing scheme in some jeopardy, both legally and politically.
a. Legal Concerns
Initially, the question was whether the 6.75% tax on hospital
gross receipts could be properly linked with the items subject to the
preexisting sales tax. This issue demonstrates the characterization
problems when government legislates a political-process constraint on
taxation.
i. The 'Burden" Issue
Under MVCPTA, a tax is "health care related" if it is "related
to health care items or services" or "related... to the provision of...
or payment for, such items or services. ' A tax is "relate[d] to health
105. The local-option sales tax was capped at a fixed amount per item purchased, since it
applied up to a maximum amount of purchase. This cap applied only to very big ticket items
such as automobiles and expensive durables such as household appliances.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(3)(A).
107. See Duren Cheek, Governor Rebuilds Medicaid Entirely, THE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 4, 1993,
at Al.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(3)(A).
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care items or services, if at least 85 percent of the burden of such tax
falls on health care providers."" The threshold analytical question
was to determine the baseline from which to calculate whether "at
least 85 percent of the burden of [the] tax falls on health care pro-
viders. 1 . Tennessee contended that the "burden" of the revised tax
fell not only on health care providers (hospitals) but on all others
whose sales were subject to the preexisting statewide sales tax and
which were folded into the new services tax. But if one looks to the
taxing situation prior to enactment of MVCPTA as the relevant status
quo ante, then the two taxes should not be lumped together for "bur-
den" analysis. Nothing of substance changed. All the state did was
recharacterize the hospital gross receipts tax as a component of the
sales tax. If that would satisfy the political-process requirements of
MVCPTA, the federal legislation was pretty much a hollow shell,
encouraging artful drafting and statutory recodification rather than
providing any substantial political restraint on the use of provider-
based taxation.
However, and this is the analytical problem with this type of
political-process restriction, if one were to assume that the baseline
should be the time before imposition of the 6.75% provider tax (rather
than the status quo at the time of enactment of MVCPTA), Tennes-
see's position might look more persuasive. Starting at that point sug-
gests that Tennessee merely mislabeled its provider tax at its initial
enactment. Clearly, it could have characterized the provider tax as a
component of the sales tax at that time, and it would have complied
with the 85% burden requirement (which, of course, did not yet exist).
Tennessee could therefore argue that it should not be penalized for
having made a mistake of nomenclature rather than a mistake of
substance.1"
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. That the tax rates differed is a problem here for the state's position. The provider serv-
ices tax was set at 6.75% of gross receipts, whereas the state component of the sales tax was
6.0%. Further, the sales tax could be levied, on a local-option basis, by local governments. See
supra note 105 and accompanying text. That local-option add-on was not available to local
governments with regard to the provider services tax. The nominal incidence and the associated
legal obligations for payment also differed, with health care providers being legally responsible
to pay the services tax and consumers being liable to pay for the sales tax (although retailers
that fail to collect the sales tax are legally obligated to pay the tax to the state themselves). In
considering the consequences of structural arrangements, courts may be influenced by the
technical characteristics of the structural provisions at issue. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524
U.S. 417, 446-47 (1998) (holding the line-item veto unconstitutional and, because of the formal
structure of the legislation, declining to view the President's line-item veto authority as analo-
gous to a discretionary decision not to spend appropriated funds).
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The policy issue, in part, turns on what behavior MVCPTA was
trying to constrain. If it adopted a tax version of the political "freezing
principle,"'' one must assume the existence of the taxation status quo
at the time of enactment of MVCPTA. The status of a subsequently
enacted tax would then be measured by the concept of incremental
burden. Under such an analysis, the Tennessee tax-which provided
for a form of fiscal novocaine rather than political-process restraint-
would be at risk. On the other hand, Tennessee could plausibly con-
tend that it in fact repealed its provider tax and then legislated hospi-
tal services as a new component of the general statewide sales tax. If
viewed in that light, then imposition of sales tax on hospital revenues
would not single out health care providers at all-it would just view
those services as additional covered items, as part of a very broad-
based general system of sales taxation. If a state without a provider
tax when MVCPTA was passed can treat a newly-enacted provider tax
as an item of added coverage under a preexisting broad-based sales
tax-and therefore have it viewed not as a health care related tax-
why should a state with a provider tax not be able to repeal that tax
and reenact it on the same basis as a comparable state that did not
have such a tax in 1991?
The foregoing theoretical discussion assumes that Tennessee's
6.75% gross receipts tax on hospital revenues was merely folded into
the preexisting general sales tax. It demonstrates the conceptual
difficulty in judicial or regulatory administration of the type of politi-
cal-process constraint imposed by MVCPTA by focusing on the burden
of a tax."' However, Tennessee was not the pure case described above.
112. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, prohibits any "covered
jurisdiction," see 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (defining "covered jurisdiction!), from altering any voting
standard, practice or procedure without preclearance from either the Department of Justice or
from the federal court in the District of Columbia. This is the "freezing principle," which bars
suspect ("covered ' ) jurisdictions from any changes in their voting laws until there is either
administrative or judicial review and oversight. The status quo is taken as the yardstick; any
deviation is subject to scrutiny for discriminatory purpose or effect, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, with the
burden of proof resting with the covered jurisdiction. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130,
140-41 (1976) (holding that election procedures in the covered area cannot be changed unless
changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory); James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering
and Vote Dilution: Shaw v. Reno in Doctrinal Context, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 558-60 (1995)
(noting that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was primarily designed as a remedial device and
that it imposed stringent new remedies for voting discriminately in covered jurisdictions).
113. In the area of state taxation, courts carefully scrutinize the actual effect and burden of
state tax legislation. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 206 (1994)
(holding that state tax which placed heavier burden on out-of-state businesses was unconstitu-
tional); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102 (1994) (same);
American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 278-80 (1987) (same); Armco, Inc. v.
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 641-42 (1984) (same); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 753-58
(1978) (same); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reilly, 373 U.S. 64, 70-71 (1963) (same).
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Instead, the Tennessee legislation had a number of provisions that
raised additional concerns about whether it complied with MVCPTA.
ii. The Differential Treatment of Providers and Non-Providers
Under MVCPTA, a tax is "health care related" when it applies
both to health care providers and non-providers but treats health care
providers and non-providers differently."' TSTA"1' treated health care
providers and non-providers, both covered by the tax, differently in at
least two ways. First, it imposed different fiscal burdens on health
care providers and non-providers. Second, TSTA's sunset provision
terminated the provider-tax but not the non-provider tax component of
the law."6 Thus, in the absence of further legislative action, the pro-
vider-tax component would be repealed after two years, but the non-
provider component would remain in effect as part of the preexisting
scheme of sales taxation.
(a) The Differential Fiscal Burden Concern
TSTA explicitly repealed the pre-existing sales taxes on non-
'health-care-related services."7 Entities furnishing those services were
taxed under TSTA, exempt from the state sales tax, but subject to the
local-option sales tax."' Health care provider services were not subject
to either the state or the local-option sales tax."9 While both health-
Courts examine a state's tax structure to determine where the true burden of a tax falls. Since
MVCPTA requires an analysis of "burden," a court would likely look at economic reality rather
than empty formalism in determining the validity of a tax. See generally Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding state tax applied on interstate commerce is not
unconstitutional because it is fairly related to services provided by the state). Since the true
burden of the Tennessee services tax fell exclusively on health care providers, as others subject
to the tax were effectively sheltered from its impact, it seems that the incidence or burden of the
tax was not broadly on Tennessee's taxpayers but on the health care providers exclusively-a
result at odds with the terms and policies of MVCPTA.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(3)(A)(ii).
115. See Services Tax Act, ch. 913 (1992) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801 (1998)
(expired because of TennCare)).
116. Id. § 18 (1992) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801 (1998) (expired because of
TennCare)).
117. Id. § 4 (1992) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801 (1998) (expired because of
TennCare)).
118. Id. § 7 (1992) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801 (1998) (expired because of
TennCare)) at.
119. Under TSTA, a "service" subject to taxation was defined to include "health services pro-
vided by hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, [and] ambulatory surgical treatment centers." Id. §
3(11). The term 'health services" was defined to mean "any clinically related services provided to
patients, including diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation, whether provided on an inpatient or
outpatient basis." Id. § 3(13). See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(22)(f) (1998).
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care provider and non-provider services were taxed under TSTA,
health-care providers and non-providers were in fact treated differ-
ently-non-providers were subject to local-option sales taxes whereas
providers were not.
Further, maximum local-option sales taxes for non-providers
were reduced from 2.75% to 2.0%.1"o This insulated non-providers from
greater sales tax liability than under previous law. Prior to TSTA, en-
tities furnishing (1) services (e.g., hotels, garages, and dry cleaners),"l
or (2) amusement services (e.g., fitness clubs, concert promoters, and
cable television stations)"n were subject to a 6% state sales tax and an
optional local sales tax add-on of no more than 2.75%o-a maximum
sales tax exposure for those "services" and "amusement services" of
8.75%. Under TSTA, the state component of the gross receipts tax on
non-providers rose from 6.0% to 6.75%. A local-option sales tax add-on
of 2.75% would have resulted in a total tax exposure of 9.5% under
TSTA (6.75% + 2.75%) whereas non-providers had previously been
subject to a maximum tax liability of 8.75% (6.0% + 2.75%). The
reduced local-option sales tax add-on offset any additional state and
local tax burden levied on these services and amusement services so
that the overall state and local tax on those items remained the same
after enactment of TSTA.
To offset the potential revenue loss to local governments from
the reduction in the local-option sales tax maximum levy, TSTA
required the state to make localities whole by giving them 11.11% of
the revenue Tennessee received from service tax levies on non-health-
care-services.' The state was therefore obliged to distribute to locali-
ties (in the same manner it distributed the local sales tax it collects for
them) an amount of revenue precisely equal to the amount of revenue
forgone as a result of the .75% reduction in their local sales tax rate
(6.75% x 11.11% = .75%).
TSTA, therefore, can be seen for what Governor McWherter
described it-a "hocus-pocus" tax" designed to eliminate any political-
process constraint on enacting a tax on health care providers. Non-
providers were treated differently because they were subject to local-
option sales taxes that did not apply to providers. But those
120. Services Tax Act §§ 6-7.
121. See TENN. CODEANN. § 67-6-102(24)(f).
122. See id. §§ 67-6-102(25)(E), 67-6-212.
123. Services Tax Act § 3 ("[Ofl all moneys received... pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter from charges for amusement services and services other than health care,... 11.11%...
shall be distributed [to local governments].').
124. Governor Ned McWherter, Address to the Tennessee General Assembly (Apr. 8, 1993),
in TENN. HOUSE J., at 1002.
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additional taxes were not incremental taxes, since non-providers were
subject to the same maximum liability as had been the case under the
pre-existing sales tax. The reduced local-option sales tax exposure
from 2.75% to 2.0% offset the increase in state-level rates from the
sales tax rate of 6.0% to the TSTA rate of 6.75%. In both cases, the
maximum liability was 8.75% for non-providers before and after
enactment of TSTA. Further, local government revenues were pro-
tected since the reduction in local-option maximum sales taxation was
precisely offset by a revenue transfer from the state to local govern-
ments-but only from revenues collected from non-providers. All
services tax revenue derived from taxation on providers was retained
by the state, presumably to be spent on Medicaid and to qualify for
FFP. In this way, TSTA itself retained the difference in gross receipts
tax treatment of provider and non-provider revenues contained in
Tennessee law prior to enactment of TSTA, thereby treating providers
and non-providers differently.
(b) The Differential Sunset Provisions
The taxation of gross receipts on hospital services under TSTA
expired in less than two years.' The tax on the other (i.e., non-
health-care-related) services of the amalgamated taxing scheme were
not scheduled to sunset but to go back after the two-year period to the
preexisting sales tax regime." Whereas the state would have to leg-
islate anew in two years regarding the tax on hospital gross receipts,
it did not impose that political obligation on itself with respect to the
underlying sales tax base upon which funding of the state and local
budgets was so dependent. Consequently, with regard to the sunset
provision, TSTA retained the preexisting distinction between hospital
revenues and items previously subject to sales taxation. This raised
the question whether providers and non-providers were treated differ-
ently. 7 If they were, the tax would be a health-care-related tax, even
if nominally covering both providers and non-providers.'
125. The tax was scheduled to expire on its own, without any additional legislative action, on
March 31, 1994. Services Tax Act § 18.
126. Services Tax Act § 18.
127. See Jackson-Madison County Gen. Hosp. Dist. v. White, No. 3-93-0217, slip op. at 6
(M.D. Tenn. May 18, 1993) (unpublished opinion on file with Professor Blumstein, Vanderbilt
Law School), affid. sub nom. Williamson v. White, 16 F.3d 1223, 1223 (6th Cir. 1994) (denying
preliminary injunction against enforcement of TSTA, but noting the "admittedly suspect fact"
that non-providers "bear none of the burden" of TSTA and that providers alone bear the "ffll
burden" of TSTA).
128. In addition, there were special provisions in the amalgamated tax legislation allowing
for the waiver of penalty and interest for certain hospitals that were in "financial distress" and
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In essence, Tennessee's compliance plan for MVCPTA was to
borrow a preexisting tax base and attach the provider tax to it so that
the tax on provider revenues could be viewed as part of a broader,
more comprehensive system of taxation and therefore not a health
care related tax. But the temporary character of the plan was mani-
fest by the differential sunset provisions, which, in two years, termi-
nated the tax on hospital revenues and returned other items to their
former place in the code as part of the sales tax base.' The prove-
nance of these two taxes-different statewide rates, provider gross
receipts taxes not subject to local option add-on, and general sales
taxes subject to local option add-ons-was retained and reinforced the
point that the scheme was a formalistic sham, a fiscal marriage of
convenience akin to a non-citizen obtaining a green card by nominally
marrying an American citizen in an otherwise non-existent relation-
ship. 30
iii. The "Related To" Issue
To qualify as a "health care related ta' under MVCPTA, a
state tax need only "relate[ ] to" one of three health-care-related ele-
ments: (a) the provision of health care items or services; (b) the
authority to provide health care items or services; or (c) the payment
for health care items or services. 13' TSTA arguably "relate[d] to" both
the first and third of those elements since the tax was expressly levied
on the provision of and the payment for health care services. The
term "service" in TSTA explicitly included "health services provided by
hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, [and] ambulatory surgical treatment
that received an extension for payment of their services tax liability. Those special provisions
did not apply to non-providers who might also be in "financial distress." See infra notes 137-38
and accompanying text.
129. The sunset provisions were necessary to assure industry support for the tax on hospital
revenues. Preservation of the local-option sales tax on the preexisting sales tax base was neces-
sary to allow localities to collect revenues upon which they depended. Hospitals did not want
their revenues to be subject to the local-option sales tax.
130. In litigation challenging the validity of TSTA under MVCPTA, TSTA was labeled a
"Green Card" tax, referring to the then-popular movie in which a non-citizen married an Ameri-
can citizen with whom he had had no relationship for the purpose of securing a green card and
thereby remaining and working in the United States. In time, it was understood, the marriage
would be terminated. One of the co-authors of this Article (Professor Blumstein) was of counsel
to the legal team that challenged TSTA. The District Court declined to issue a preliminary
injunction, largely on equitable grounds. See Jackson-Madison, No. 3-93-0217, slip op. at 6. The
case was dropped with the adoption of TennCare, which ended the provider tax. No decision on
the merits regarding the validity of TSTA under MVCPTA was further sought or obtained.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(3)(A)(i) (1994).
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centers."' Further, "health service" was defined to include "any clini-
cally related services provided to patients, including diagnosis, treat-
ment and rehabilitation, whether provided on an inpatient or out-
patient basis.".. These definitions strongly indicate that TSTA
"relate[d] to" the "provision" of or "payment' for health care services.
Support for an expansive interpretation of the term "relate[s]
to" in MVCPTA stems from the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA")."' Section 514(a) preempts state laws "insofar
as they.., relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA."'
The "relate to" language has repeatedly been characterized as "delib-
erately expansive, and "conspicuous for its breadth.""' 7 Thus, a law
"relate[s] to" an ERISA benefit plan "in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."..8
The "relate[s] to" language in MVCPTA is the same expansive
term used in the ERISA preemption provision. TSTA seemed to have
"reference to" and "a connection with" the "provision of' and "payment
for" health care services. TSTA, as previously noted, defined the pro-
vision of and the payment for health care services as covered items
under the services tax. Since TSTA seems to have "relate[d] to" the
"provision of' and "payment for" health care services, it would seem to
be a "health care related tax" under MVCPTA.' 39
132. Services Tax Act, ch. 913, § 3 (11) (1992) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801 (ex-
pired 1994)).
133. Id. § 3(13).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
136. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1985) (holding that ERISA preemp-
tion provisions are deliberately expansive to establish pension plans as an exclusive federal
concern).
137. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (holding that state law was pre-
empted because ERISA's preemption provision broadly establishes as a federal concern the
subject of every state law that relates to a covered benefit plan).
138. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990); see also District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992) (holding that state law is
preempted by ERISA when it refers to or has connection with covered benefit plan); Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (holding state law is preempted because it has
connection by reference to benefit plan and, therefore, it "relates to" the benefit plan).
139. A state law can "relate to" an ERISA benefit plan "even if the law is not specifically de-
signed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect." Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 139
(holding state tort law was preempted even though the law was not designed to affect such
plans). A common law cause of action regarding unlawful discharge and having no specific
reference to an ERISA plan nevertheless can be "relate[d] to" an ERISA plan. See id.; see also
FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 56-57 (holding state law was preempted because ERISA's preemption
provision broadly establishes as a federal concern the subject of every state law that relates to a
covered benefit plan); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 508-09, 525 (1981)
(holding state workers' compensation law is preempted because it relates to a benefit plan even
though the impermissible intrusion is indirect). For more restrictive views of the scope of
b. Political Concerns
The requirements imposed by MVCPTA created political prob-
lems with Tennessee's method of financing Medicaid. As the provider
tax had to look more like a bona fide tax, part of a general redis-
tributive scheme of taxation, it became apparent that there would be
some "losers" among hospitals-those that paid the tax but could not
receive sufficient additional Medicaid-based revenue to offset the tax
liability. This resulted in special statutory accommodations for some
(primarily rural) hospitals (specifically those in financial distress),"'
which raised problems under the uniformity provisions of MVCPTA if
the Tennessee taxing scheme were in fact deemed to be a health care
related tax."' Politically, those accommodations were apparently
necessary; from a legal standpoint, those accommodations dictated a
strategy of attempting to defeat a characterization of the services tax
as a health care related tax.
As intended and contemplated by federal supporters of
MVCPTA, political support from hospitals fragmented and began to
erode when Tennessee's adaptation to MVCPTA caused real financial
impact on some hospital providers.' This is manifested by the two-
year sunset provision the hospital industry won in TSTA. Once hospi-
tals perceived that they might in fact be subjecting their revenues to
substantial taxation, and that the relationship between "sales" tax
payments and Medicaid-based benefits was necessarily attenuated,
hospitals' enthusiasm for the creative method of financing waned."'
The risk was that the tax would remain while the pass-through bene-
fits might be reduced or eliminated, leaving some or many hospitals
facing considerable tax liability without assurance that those tax
payments would return in Medicaid-derived payments.
Another political complication arose from the need to fold the
provider tax into the preexisting broad-based sales tax. Local
ERISA preemption, see De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814-
15 (1997) (holding state law imposed some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans, but
did not "relate to" the benefit plan); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1995) (same).
140. Services Tax Act, ch. 913, § 14 (1992) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801 (expired
1994)).
141. In fact, HCFA found those provisions to violate the requirements of the Act. See Letter
from Clarence J. Boone, Regional Administrator, HCFA, to Manny Martins, Assistant Commis-
sioner, Bureau of Medicaid, Tennessee Department of Health, at 1 (Dec. 19, 1994) (on file with
the author) [hereinafter Letter from Clarence J. Boone]..
142. Bill Lewis, State Seeks Brakes to Put on Runaway Medicaid Costs, MEMPHIS BUS. J.,
Dec. 28, 1992, at 14.
143. Id.
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governments in Tennessee had traditionally been able to levy a local-
option sales tax in addition to the state's sales tax.' Hospitals op-
posed subjecting themselves to that additional levy. So, local
government power to tax sales had to be maintained, but hospitals
had to be exempted from the local-option component of the amalga-
mated sales tax. This caused problems with the differential treatment
provisions of VVCPTA, as discussed above, and the uniformity
requirements of MVCPTA, as discussed below. In short, as MVCPTA
mandated that provider taxes be "real" taxes (i.e., somewhat redis-
tributive) the political-process-oriented constraints contemplated in
MVCPTA emerged. Even the weak restraints in MVCPTA had an im-
pact on the Tennessee Medicaid funding political landscape.
3. The "Broad Based" Tax Issue
Under MVCPTA, a tax can be "health care related" and still
qualify for FFP if it is "broad-based. '45 Tennessee contended that its
tax, even if deemed a health care related tax, was broad-based and
that revenues generated by the tax therefore qualified for FFP.
To be broad-based, a health care related tax (a) must be im-
posed on "all items or services" in a class,"6 (b) must be imposed uni-
formly,"7 and (c) must not contain a "hold harmless"1 '8 provision. To be
uniform, a health care related tax based on revenues or receipts must
be "imposed at a uniform rate for all items and services.., in the
class." 9 A tax on a class of items or services is not "uniform" if it pro-
vides for "any credits, exclusions, or deductions which have as their
purpose or effect the return to providers of all or a portion of the tax
paid"" so that the tax is not "generally redistributive in nature'' or
has a "hold harmless" provision."'
144. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-702 (1998). The local-option sales tax is an important
component of financing local governments in Tennessee, and local governments have been very
successful in protecting that source of tax revenue. See John Commins, Solution Sought for Tax
Puzzle: Tenn. Legislators Hoping for Deal, CHATTANOOGA TIMES & FREE PRESS, March 29, 1999,
at Al (discussing success of local governments in protecting local-option sales tax on food in face
of governor's proposal to eliminate state and local sales tax on food).
145. 42 U.S.C. §1396b(w)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
146. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(B)(i).
147. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(B)(ii).
148. Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii).
149. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(C)(i)(II1).
150. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(C)(ii).
151. Id. §§ 1396b(w)(3)(C)(ii) & 1396b(w)(3)(E)(ii)(l).
152. Id. § 1396b(w)(4).
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TSTA raised concerns under all three broad-based tax
requirements. First, TSTA in effect excluded certain "financially dis-
tress[ed]" hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers from the tax by
granting an extension on paying the tax owed without imposing pen-
alty or interest.I" That exclusion raised concerns under the broad-
based tax requirement that a health care related tax must be imposed
on "all items or services" in a class." Second, the special accom-
modation for financially distressed hospitals could be construed to con-
flict with the uniformity requirement that "exclusions" or "credits" not
have as their "purpose or effect ' the return to providers of "all or a
portion of the tax paid""' in a manner that is not "generally redistribu-
tive."" In addition, the differential rates of taxation of health care
services (6.75%) as compared to other items subject to the same tax
(up to 8.75% when local-option sales taxes are included) raised poten-
tial issues of concern under the uniformity requirement that a health
care related tax on revenues or receipts be "imposed at a uniform rate
for all items and services ... in the class. 1 ' 57
Third, MVCPTA's hold harmless provision barred the taxing
entity from, directly or indirectly, providing any "offset ' or "waiver
that guarantees to hold taxpayers harmless for any portion of the
costs of the tax.''58  Under TSTA, sellers that paid the services tax
(which included hospital services) were relieved from their preexisting
tax obligations-to pay the general sales tax, which otherwise
remained in effect, or to pay the provider tax, which went out of exis-
tence. Thus, sellers of items or services previously subject to the sales
tax or the provider tax and then subject to the amalgamated services
tax were not obligated to pay both taxes. Therefore, the new tax was
153. Services Tax Act, ch. 913, § 14, (1992) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-1801 (ex-
pired 1994)).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(3)(B)(i). See Letter from Clarence J. Boone, supra note 141 ('By
excluding certain hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers," TSTA "does not meet the broad
based requirements" of MVCPTA.).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(3)(C)(ii).
156. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(E)(ii)(I).
157. With respect to licensing fees or similar taxes, MVCPTA required uniformity only with
respect to the taxation of a defined "class of health care items or services" or providers of such
items or services. Id. § 1396b(w)(3)(C)(i)(I) & (II). Thus, for licensing taxes, uniformity is
achieved if all inpatient hospital services (or providers) are treated alike. The same would be
true regarding outpatient hospital services, physicians services, home health care services and so
forth. For a listing of separate classes of 'health care items or services" that can be treated
uniformly, see Id. § 1396b(w)(7)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 433.56 (1998). In contrast, the uniformity
requirement for taxes based on revenues or receipts applies not only to a class of "health" care
items or services but more generally to "a class of items or services" subject to the tax. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(3)(C)(i)(llM). Thus, differential tax rates for health care related items and
other items subject to a sales tax could be problematic under MVCPTA's uniformity requirement.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(4)(C); 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(f) (1998).
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not an incremental burden for those previously subject to the sales
tax. As a structural matter, non-health-care-providers subject to
TSTA were not obliged to pay the state's general sales tax. And
health care providers no longer paid the provider tax. Such relief rea-
sonably could be construed as a hold harmless provision that insulates
non-health-care-related and health-care-related taxpayers from any
new burden from TSTA,"9 which folded hospital services into a
broader base to defeat its characterization as a health-care-related
tax.'
C. The Decision to Develop TennCare
As Governor McWherter's Task Force met to consider possible
recommendations for substantial cutbacks in Medicaid expenditures,
the state confronted a series of unpleasant alternatives. Although the
Task Force never issued a final report with recommendations for
cutbacks, senior state officials were aware of the nature and scope of
the ongoing deliberations.
Because of the FFP leveraging of Medicaid, the saving of a
dollar in state funds would mean the loss of an additional two dollars
in FFP. The simple arithmetic was that saving $250 million in state
Medicaid funds required a total program cutback of over $750 million.
While much of that cutback undoubtedly would have hit the provider
(hospital) community hardest, some benefits or eligibility cutbacks
were somewhat inevitable as well. 6' This was not an attractive pros-
pect to the McWherter Administration on policy/political grounds, to
advocates for program beneficiaries on ideological grounds, to program
beneficiaries themselves on obvious pragmatic grounds, or to pro-
viders on economic grounds. Further, the creative financing methods
that had softened the political/fiscal impact of Medicaid's cost escala-
tion were in potential peril legally (because of MVCPTA) and politi-
159. Since TSTA was greater than 6%, Tennessee had to meet the twin 75% rules for deter-
mining whether a hospital receives an indirect guarantee in violation of the hold harmless
provision. HCFA deems a hold harmless provision to exist "if 75 percent or more of the taxpayers
in the class receive 75 percent or more of their total tax costs back in enhanced Medicaid pay-
ments or other State payments. The second prong of the hold harmless test is applied in the
aggregate to all health care taxes applied to each class." 42 C.F.R. §433.68()(3)(i).
160. HCFA charged that Tennessee's nursing home tax violated MVCPTA's hold harmless
provision. See Letter from Clarence J. Boone, supra note 141, at 1, stating that although the
state taxed licensed nursing home facility beds, a grant program offset that tax in violation of
MVCPTA, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(4)(C)).
161. Since the Task Force never finalized its report (which was pretermitted by the
TennCare proposal), it is impossible to know how the balance of cutbacks would have been struck
in the ultimate set of recommendations or in the cutback process itself.
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cally (because of waning support for taxing hospital revenues among
hospitals). Yet, the state had to plan for and deal with projections of
continued escalating costs. To avoid substantial cutbacks, Tennessee
faced having to raise very substantial new sums of money through
genuine broad-based taxes while losing a source of taxation that had
contributed nearly 43% of the state's share of Medicaid funding.
This left the state's political officials a number of conflicting
choices and unpalatable political options. With encouraging state-
ments of the newly elected Clinton Administration that it would be
receptive to state-based Medicaid experimentation through use of the
Medicaid waiver process, Commissioner Manning and Medicaid Direc-
tor Martins embarked on developing TennCare-an innovative ex-
perimental alternative to traditional Medicaid. 2
IV. TENNCARE: AN OVERVIEW AND A PRIMER
A. Strategic Considerations
Coping with and paying for escalating Medicaid costs were the
overarching considerations that led Tennessee to seek a Medicaid
waiver and formulate an alternative program." Significant program
cutbacks, which could have adversely affected access to medical care,
were politically unappealing to Governor McWherter's Administration
and could have triggered legal challenges by advocacy groups for poor
patients. Cost savings through mandatory managed care, which were
appealing because economies might retain levels of benefits, required
a federal waiver of Medicaid's guarantee of patient freedom of choice.
Since 1997, states have been entitled to mandate managed care in
Medicaid, but that was not the case in 1993. The Clinton Administra-
tion, which had campaigned to improve access to medical care and was
promoting national health care reform, would not likely have
approved a waiver proposal that adversely affected access to medical
care for Medicaid beneficiaries.
Accordingly, state officials developed a two-track strategy-
restrain program cost while maintaining or expanding access to
services. In contrast to Oregon, which systematically determined
162. See Gold, Insights from Oregon and Tennessee, supra note 22, at 651-54 (noting that
TennCare was developed and implemented quickly after HCFA approved the waiver); Duren
Cheek, supra note 81, at 2A (explaining that the State does not yet have a "waiver" to implement
new "radical reform" in Tennessee's health care system); Solomon & Smith, supra note 64, at 11-
13 (noting that TennCare had received federal approval and was operating).
163. See supra Part Ill.C.
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what various levels of program benefits would cost as part of its con-
temporaneous waiver application, T Tennessee started with the
assumption65 that the then-existing Medicaid funding level was ade-
quate.'" The goal was to determine, programmatically, how to
increase access within existing resource constraints and, prag-
matically, how to maximize FFP.
Since Tennessee had low levels of managed care, the state
believed that a Medicaid managed care strategy could achieve consid-
erable savings, spreading existing dollars over a larger patient popula-
tion. Again, unlike Oregon (often considered the other major
contemporaneous Medicaid experiment), which already had a well-
developed managed care marketplace, Tennessee sought to influence
the cost of delivering Medicaid services as a clear goal of its managed
care strategy. Efficiencies in medical care delivery were sought. In
economic terms, policymakers promoted a shift in the production func-
tion to a more efficient technology-for the delivery of services to
TennCare patients and, perhaps, exporting those efficiencies to non-
TennCare patients as well. TennCare might serve as a laboratory for
developing, and a yardstick for measuring, improved ways of deliv-
ering service. At the same time, one might fear that the cost savings
would accrue at the expense of substantial unacceptable reductions in
the quality of services provided.
Providers worried that cost savings from TennCare's managed
care would result not from securing production-function efficiencies
but from reducing provider compensation based on monopsonistic pur-
chasing practices by government or its agents. Under that scenario,
TennCare would be a heavy-handed system of income redistribution-
away from providers and to low-income patients-using public pur-
chasing power to take advantage of somewhat captive providers.
164. For a discussion of the Oregon approach to Medicaid reform, see James F. Blumstein,
The Oregon Experiment: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Allocation of Medicaid Funds,
45 SOC. SCi. & MED. 545, 547 (1997) (noting that Oregon retained an actuarial consultant to
estimate the cost of funding various condition-treatment pairs).
165. This premise was stated explicitly in Tennessee's initial waiver application: 'There are
sufficient resources now in the overall public-supported health care system to provide an accept-
able level of quality care both to the needy who have been traditional clients of public programs
and those who are not covered by health insurance through their employment or otherwise."
TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 2.
166. It was not until the sixth year of TennCare that the state commissioned an "evaluation
of the actuarial soundness of the rates paid under the TennCare program." That study concluded
that "the methods used to develop capitation rates for TennCare are not consistent with gen-
erally accepted standards." See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ACTuARIAL REVIEW OF CAPITATION
RATES IN THE TENNCARE PROGRAM, at i, iii (1999) (on file with author).
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Patient advocates tended to see the issue (positively) in these terms. '67
The secrecy in which TennCare was developed and the blitzkrieg with
which it was implemented-keeping providers uninformed and out of
the policy-development loop-suggest that this pro-patient scenario
was not far-fetched at least as one part of the overall program design
and implementation strategy.'"
One could project that Medicaid managed care would help
squeeze out excess capacity in Tennessee's health care industry. It
may particularly squeeze out inpatient hospital facilities, but it could
also have affected expensive inputs such as some medical specialties
and sub-specialties.'69 The concern, of course, was that too much
squeezing could hamper incentives to innovate or to invest in quality-
oriented services that contribute to important patient benefits. Di-
minishing access to physician specialists or sub-specialists could re-
duce the quality of those services for patients in need of them.
B. Implementation Considerations
1. The Medicaid Waiver Process
Although the federal government promulgates minimum stan-
dards for the operation of Medicaid, states can be exempted from com-
pliance with the federal guidelines through a waiver process,'70 which
provides for "any experimental, pilot, or demonstration proj-
ect... likely to assist in promoting the objectives""' of Medicaid."n
Under Section 1115 the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services ('DHHS") can "waive compliance with any of the
requirements of [specific sections of the Act] ... to the extent and for
167. See G. Gordon Bonnyman, Jr., Stealth Reform: Market-Based Medicaid in Tennessee, 15
HEALTH AFF. 306, 311 (1996) (noting that the state as purchaser was functioning in a "buyer's
market," taking advantage of substantial excess capacity in the system to purchase services at
marginal rather than average cost, and using the savings from reduced provider fees to finance
TennCare's expansion in coverage).
168. See id. at 307 (noting that legislature enacted Governor McWherter's TennCare pro-
posal within weeks of its submission, with the legislature giving the governor "carte blanche to
seek a federal waiver and implement TennCare by executive fiat, by the beginning of the follow-
ing year').
169. See id. at 311.
170. See Judith M. Rosenberg, Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115 & State Health
Care Reform, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 545, 546-57 (1995).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1994).
172. The general Social Security Act waiver provision applies to Medicaid. See Health Insur-
ance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 87-543, tit. I, § 122, 6 Stat. 172, 192 (1965)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1)) (originally enacted as Act of August 14, 1935, ch.
531, tit. II, § 226).
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the period... necessary to enable such State or States to carry out
such a project ... ..1 3 The Secretary has discretion whether to grant
waivers, even when a project meets established conditions."' A Sec-
tion 1115 waiver may exempt a state demonstration project from com-
pliance with federal standards or may grant FFP for traditionally
excluded expenditures. 5
Procedurally, states submit a waiver proposal to HCFA de-
scribing a project, specifying statutory and regulatory mandates to be
waived, and explaining the project's impact on program costs, relevant
laws, and beneficiaries." A HCFA review panel recommends ap-
proval, conditioned approval, or rejection of the proposal to HCFA's
Administrator, who decides the matter." Larger projects require ap-
proval by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). OMB
traditionally has required budget neutrality-annual costs no greater
under the waiver than projected under Medicaid.' 9 Imposed to stop
raids on the federal treasury under the guise of innovation, the budget
neutrality requirement deterred state waiver applications.
In 1993, President Clinton sought to reduce barriers to Section
1115 waivers. DHHS streamlined the application process, offering
greater flexibility in policy changes allowed in the projects, and rede-
fined budget neutrality to be assessed over the life of the project,
rather than on an annual basis."w This increased flexibility resulted in
six states, including Tennessee, receiving waivers and seven pending
applications by the end of 1994.''
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1).
174. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at 418.
175. See id. Because one objective of § 1115 waivers is to inform long-term Medicaid policy,
projects are designed for research purposes and must include a research methodology and an
independent evaluation. See id.
176. See id. HCFA is the DHHS agency charged with evaluating the proposal's design,
methodology, objectives, costs, and risks and benefits. See Rosenberg, supra note 170, at 547-48.
177. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK (1993), supra note 37, at 418; see also Allen Dobson et al.,
The Role of Federal Waivers in the Health Policy Process, 11 HEALTH AFF. 72, 77 (1992) (noting
that a technical review panel rates each proposal submitted to HCFA for final approval).
178. These projects of over $1 million in federal funds that affect at least 300 Medicaid re-
cipients also require approval from DHHS' Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget. See
Elizabeth Andersen, Administering Healthcare: Lessons from the Health Care Financing
Administration's Waiver Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & POL. 215, 227-28 (1994).
179. Dobson et al., supra note 177, at 85.
180. Rosenberg, supra note 170, at 549-50 & n.35.
181. Id. at 550.
170 [Vol. 53:125
2000] TENNCARE
2. Tennessee's TennCare Waiver Applications
On June 16, 1993, Tennessee proposed a five-year Medicaid
mandatory managed care demonstration project (TennCare).' The
application asserted that TennCare could deliver quality medical and
mental health care to Medicaid beneficiaries as well as to uninsured
and uninsurable persons for substantially less cost than the Medicaid
program.'" Long-term care (i.e., nursing homes) was expressly carved
out, continuing under the preexisting Medicaid program and under its
system of financing. 4
HCFA approved Tennessee's waiver request on November 18,
1993, for the period January 1, 1994, through December 31, 1998,
then subject to annual renewal." The approval included "Special
Terms and Conditions" ("STCs") that helped define the federal over-
sight role in TennCare." One of the most significant STCs estab-
lished annual FFP spending limits, which HCFA set in absolute dol-
lars, rather than on a per capita or percentage basis.' Although
budget neutrality was to be enforced "over the life of the demonstra-
tion,"''" HCFA defined cumulative annual FFP caps to "ensure that the
182. See McWherter Letter, supra note 7.
183. Some dental services were included for a limited group. TENNCARE WAIVER
APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 19. Program objectives were: increased availability, improved
quality of care, a focus on preventive care, continuity of care, incentives for appropriate utili-
zation, and coverage of previously uninsured employees. See id. at 7-11.
184. See id. A few other items, such as the payment of Medicare premiums for those eligible
under Medicaid, were also excluded from the waiver proposal. See id. The waiver application
included supporting appendices, such as editorial endorsements and letters of support, from a
wide range of organizations including the Tennessee Hospital Association, Legal Services of
Middle Tennessee, the Tennessee Department of Health, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee,
and the Vanderbilt University Medical Center. See id. at Appendices VII-VIII.
185. HCFA Approval Letter, supra note 8, at 1.
186. See id. HCFA defined 35 STCs in the original November 1993 Waiver Approval. Id. at
5-15. On June 21, 1995, HCFA revised these STCs, modifying several of the terms and condi-
tions, withdrawing several implementation-related terms and conditions, and adding new terms
and conditions. The result was a total of 37 STCs, which included: notification and reporting
requirements, quality indicators and measurement, data collection requirements, funding and
budgetary regulations, eligibility and enrollment requirements, requirements for managed care
organization capacity, and specific detailed access criteria. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION,
supra note 14, at App. IX-HCFA Special Terms and Conditions.
187. See id. at 5. Federal Spending Limits (Special Term #16) were as follows:
State Fiscal Year Federal Spending Limits (in millions)
1993-1994 $ 2,108
1994-1995 $ 2,283
1995-1996 $ 2,454
1996-1997 $ 2,594
1997-1998 $ 2,726
TOTAL $12,165
188. See id.
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State does not deviate significantly from the annual caps."1 Those
spending limits, which enforced greater financial responsibility on the
state and minimized the financial risk to the federal government, were
crucial to HCFA's approval. The implication of the annual caps being
in absolute dollars, rather than as a per capita amount or a percent-
age basis, is the greater financial risk that the state must assume. If,
during the period of the demonstration project, the Medicaid situation
were to change-enrollment increases, benefits mandated-the state
was to bear the financial risk and absorb the added expenditures."
On January 1, 1994, six weeks after HCFA's approval, Ten-
nessee implemented TennCare. On August 5, 1997, mandatory Medi-
caid managed care became an institutionalized alternative available
as a matter of statutory entitlement to states that wished to pursue
189. See id. Cumulative Annual FFP Limits were as follows:
Program Year Cumulative Target (FFP in millions)
Year 1 target + 8% $ 2,277
Years 1-2 target + 6% $ 4,654
Years 1-3 target + 4% $ 7,119
Years 1-4 target + 2% $ 9,628
Years 1-5 target $12,165
Id.
190. To reduce the state's financial exposure, TennCare enrollment was originally capped at
1.775 million. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 84, 91. In the Original
Agreement with MCOs, the cap was set at 1.5 million (Contractor Risk Agreement dated Nov. 15,
1993, at 26) and was later decreased to 1.3 million (Amendment #3 to the Agreement dated Nov.
15, 1993, at 1). The cap was subsequently raised to 1.5 million. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
supra note 166, at 14-15. By January 1, 1995, TennCare closed enrollment for the uninsured
because it had reached 90% of its target enrollment. See TennCare Website, supra note 11.
Enrollment remained open for individuals who are Medicaid-eligible and those who are denied
coverage for medical reasons by an insurance company and are determined uninsurable. See id.
Additional enrollment has been opened in four categories: (1) April 1, 1997: re-opened enrollment
in the uninsured category to children under the age of 18 without access to health insurance
through a parent or guardian; (2) May 21, 1997: opened enrollment to eligible dislocated work-
ers-i.e., a worker who had health insurance through an employer and became uninsured
because of a bona fide closure of a business or a plant; (3) January 1, 1998 - March 31, 1998:
opened enrollment for uninsured individuals below the age of nineteen with access to health
insurance whose family income is below 200% of the poverty level schedule in effect for calcu-
lation of TennCare premiums; (4) January 1, 1998: opened enrollment indefinitely for uninsured
children under nineteen who meet TennCare criteria for uninsured. See id.
The uninsurable component of TennCare "has grown rapidly since the program's inception in
1994." See WILLIAM M. MERCER, INC., EVALUATION OF CRITICAL ISSUES FACING THE TENNCARE
PROGRAM-REPORT 3 (1999). For example, from 1995 (when enrollment of the uninsured closed)
to 1997, the number of uninsurables in TennCare increased by 91.4%. See id. During that same
time period, because of the closed enrollment for the uninsured, that category of TennCare
enrollees decreased by 28.9%. See id. The Medicaid TennCare population declined by 1.3%
during that same time period. As a result of these trends, the proportion of TennCare enrollees
who were uninsurable rose from 3.3% in 1995 to 4.8% in 1996 and to 6.7% in 1997. See id. The
financial implications for TennCare are clear since the uninsurable population tends to be more
costly to cover than other TennCare enrollees. See id.
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that approach. In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress codified
the state option to use managed care, providing that, without having
to seek or secure a waiver, 9' "a State may require an individual who is
eligible for medical assistance... to enroll with a managed care entity
as a condition of receiving such assistance. 19. Both a managed care
entity,' 3 defined as an organization that "provides or arranges for
services for enrollees under a contract,"'19 and its contract with the
state must meet certain statutorily defined requirements."' The state
must allow individuals to choose from at least two entities meeting the
requirements," provide notice of termination rights,"' establish inter-
nal grievance procedures under which Medicaid enrollees or providers
acting on their behalf may challenge the denial of coverage of or pay-
ment for medical assistance,' and annually submit comparative
information regarding benefits and cost-sharing, service areas, and
quality and performance.1 The way, therefore, has been paved for
replication of Tennessee's Medicaid managed care program, although
the fiscal arrangements undergirding TennCare-global FFP caps and
FFP for non-Medicaid eligible patients-still remain unique.
191. See Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,022 (1998) ("Prior to the enactment of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, States were required to obtain a waiver of a statutory 'freedom of
choice requirement' in order to operate such mandatory managed care programs ... .').
192. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, tit. H, § 4701(a), tit. XIX, §
1932(a)(1)(A)(i), 111 Stat. 251, 489 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 (1998));
see also Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,022 (proposing rules for implementing the
Medicaid managed care features of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997).
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(1)(B); Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,076 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 438.2) (definition of managed care entity ('MCE') in proposed rule in-
cludes a managed care organization ('MCO") or a primary care case manager).
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(1)(A); Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,077 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 438.6) (regarding contract requirements for comprehensive Medicaid risk
contracts).
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(3)(A); Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,079 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 438.52(b)) (requires choice of at least two MCEs); 42 C.F.R. § 438.52(c)
(provides for exception for rural areas to requirement of choice of at least two MCEs, provided
that a beneficiary can choose from at least two physicians or case managers and that use of out
of network providers is liberally available).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(3)(A); Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,079 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. §438.52(b)).
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(4)(B); Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,079 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 438.56) (regarding enrollee's enrollment and disenrollment rights).
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(4); Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,079 (to be codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. § 438.400) (requiring comprehensive MCO grievance system).
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(5)(C); Managed Care Provisions, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,078, 52,084
(1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 438.10, § 438.318) (proposed Sept. 29, 1998) (regarding duty
of MCE to provide information to enrollees).
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On December 30, 1997, Tennessee applied for a three-year
TennCare extension through December 31, 2001.2' ° The state de-
scribed TennCare as an "extraordinarily effective demonstration
waiver, resulting in combined savings to the federal and state gov-
ernments of over $3 billion during the first four years of the pro-
gram." '' TennCare enrollment had increased by fifty percent, with
nearly 400,000 uninsuredluninsurable patients having been enrolled
in TennCare in addition to the 800,000 Medicaid enrollees served
prior to TennCare.12 HCFA granted the extension on June 30, 1998,
retaining'the thirty-seven STCs 03 and specifying FFP caps, reflecting
"budget neutrality," for the three year extension period' as they were
for the initial five-year period. The annual rate of increase in these
caps is 5.1%. TennCare is therefore now in its extension phase and is
scheduled to extend as an approved demonstration through 2001.
C. Program Structure and Design: The Contractor Risk Agreements
Under TennCare, the state contracts with managed care or-
ganizations ("MCOs") to provide medically necessary services to pro-
gram enrollees. °5 Contractor Risk Agreements ("CRAs"), which com-
prehensively address the TennCare relationship between the MCOs
and the state, oblige MCOs to provide contractually-determined serv-
ices to eligible persons for a set (capitated) payment per enrollee per
200. WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19 (Letter from Theresa Clarke, Assistant
Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Health, Bureau of TennCare, to Sally Richardson,
Director, Center for Medicaid and State Operations, Department of Health and Human Services,
HCFA (Dec. 30, 1997)).
201. Id.
202. See id.; see also infra Table 2.
203. See Letter from Michael Hash, supra note 9.
204. The caps during the waiver renewal period are as follows:
FY 1998-99 $2.865 billion
FY 1999-2000 $3.011 billion
FY 2000-01 $3.165 billion
FY 2001-02 (6 months) $1.663 billion
See id. (STC #16). For the caps during the initial five-year waiver period, see supra notes 187-
89.
205. One of the nine MCOs, Xantus (formerly Phoenix), which had the third largest
TennCare enrollment, was placed into state receivership in March 1999, because it had suffered
substantial losses, faced a large negative net worth, and represented a solvency risk to its
TennCare insureds. In one of life's ironies, Commissioner Sizemore of the Department of
Commerce and Insurance retained David Manning and Manny Martins as private consultants to
take over the operations of Xantus. Manning and Martins had been the public officials respon-
sible for developing, securing the waiver for, and implementing TennCare-Manning as Com-
missioner of Finance and Martins as Director of Medicaid. See Lisa Benavides, State Takes
Control of Troubled HMO to Protect TennCare; Patient Care, Payments to Providers Unaffected,
THE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 1, 1999, at 1A.
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month.' The MCOs are responsible for developing a network of
health care providers and negotiating payment rates with individual
providers.
The CRAs delineate "Contractor Responsibilities" and
'TennCare Responsibilities." ' For example, regarding covered serv-
ices, the CRAs list the benefits provided, 8 establish the required
availability and accessibility of services,' and set minimum functions
that an MCO must perform to "be responsible for the management of
the medical care and continuity of care for all its TennCare enrol-
lees.2.0  TennCare is responsible for the management of the Agree-
ment, ' determining enrollee eligibility,12 processing of applications
and enrollment, ' resolving enrollee grievances,"4 and calculating the
capitation rate.1 5 The CRAs establish guidelines for patients' ability
to change MCOs 16 and include an asymmetrical right of MCO ter-
mination.1 '
206. These CRAs are dated November 15, 1993, and September 11, 1995. The capitation
rates are flat payments per enrollee per month and do not reflect adjustments based on risk
factors likely to increase (or decrease) the costs of providing services. There are different pay-
ment rates based on criteria such as age. See A Contractor Risk Agreement Between the State of
Tennessee, d.b.a. TennCare and (Name of Contractor) (d.b.a. tradename), Nov. 15, 1993, at 37
[hereinafter CRA 1] (on file with author); see also A Contractor Risk Agreement Between the
State of Tennessee, d.b.a. TennCare and (Name of Contractor) (d.b.a. tradename), Sept. 11, 1995,
at 42 (on file with author) [hereinafter CRA IM].
207. See, e.g., CRA I, supra note 206 (outlining the agreement between Tennessee and the
MCO). Contractor responsibilities include Contractor qualifications, id. § 2-2, at 3; bene-
fits/services requirements and limitations, id. § 2-3 at 5; enrollee eligibility, id. § 2-4, at 22; most
aspects of enrollment (including solicitation, open enrollment, caps on overall enrollment,
required disclosures to enrollees, and prohibitions on disenrollment by MCOs), id. § 2-5 through
2-7, at 23-32; grievance and complaint procedures, id. § 2-9, at 33; administrative matters, id. §
2-10, at 34; and reporting and other requirements, id. § 2-11, at 39. For a review of TennCare's
various enrollment caps, see supra note 190.
208. CRA I, supra note 206, § 2-3 at 5.
209. Id. § 2-3.a.3, at 9. There must be an adequate number of providers, no enrollee should
have to travel more than 30 minutes one way to a primary care provider, and specialists should
be available on a referral basis.
210. Id. § 2-3.i, at 15.
211. Id. § 3-1, at 50.
212. Id. § 3-2, at 50.
213. Id. § 3-7, at 52.
214. Id. § 3-8, at 52.
215. Id. § 3-10, at 52-53.
216. An enrollee's ability to change MCOs has gone through several iterations. Originally
confined to periods of open enrollment if the enrollee had been enrolled for at least one year,
amended CRA I limited the date to October 1, but withdrew the one-year requirement. See
Amendment #3 to CRA I, supra note 206, at 1-2. CRA II added a 12-month minimum require-
ment unless good cause could be shown. See Amendment #2 to CRA II, supra note 206, at 2.
Enrollment changes involve conceptually difficult issues. For patients, choice is an impor-
tant feature of any managed care arrangement. One gives up choice during the course of a
contract term by selecting an MCO, but that choice can be altered during re-enrollment periods.
Patient choice also is important as a form of market discipline on MCOs and their providers.
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The procedures for complaints and grievances has spurred con-
troversy in TennCare as it has in managed care generally. CRA I gave
an enrollee the right to request an informal review by TennCare,
followed, if necessary, by a formal hearing with the Commissioner of
Health whose final decision was binding on an MCO. 218 CRA II gives
enrollees the right, through a grievance process binding on the MCO,
to request a "state level review" of an MCO's decision. 1 '
The grievance/appeals process was restructured following a
successful legal challenge. In 1996, in Daniels v. Wadley,' Medicaid-
eligible TennCare enrollees sought to prevent denial, delay, reduction,
suspension, or termination of medical assistance without a timely fair
hearing. The 1996 case was a continuation of a 1979 class action in
which pre-TennCare Medicaid recipients alleged deprivation of proce-
dural due process rights." At issue was the automatic termination of
Just as patients seek some assurance that, during a contract period, they have some form of
redress over various MCO determinations through a grievance procedure-a form of "voice"-
patients must have the ability to exercise an exit option to switch plans if an MCO or its
providers do not perform appropriately. This exit option, a hallmark of a vibrant economic
market, is essential for market discipline. For a discussion of exit and "voice," see generally
ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE & LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). The problem comes from the perverse incentive for long-
term preventive care that arises from patients exercising their exit option. For example, if it
takes an MCO a number of years to benefit from a child innoculation initiative, that MCO is
likely to under-invest in that service when patients who receive that service remain healthier but
are enrolled in another plan.
217. MCOs can terminate only once per year and are required to maintain operations for at
least 180 days from the date of the written notice of termination. See CRA 11, supra note 206, §
4-2.f, at 69. An MCO may only terminate upon written notice on the twelve month anniversary
of each beginning effective date, and the last day of operation must be at least 180 days from the
date of the written notice. See id. § 4-2.f, at 69. TennCare may terminate an MCO for conven-
ience, giving the MCO thirty days written notice, id. § 4-2.e, at 68, or for cause, which requires
more elaborate procedures. See id. § 4-2.3, at 66. For 1999-2000, MCOs for the first time can
leave TennCare by giving six months notice rather than having to stay in the program for the
entire contract year. See Bill Snyder, Blue Cross Gives State 6 Months; Insurance Giant Nego-
tiates TennCare Escape Clause, THE TENNESSEAN, July 31, 1999, at IA; see also infra note 386.
Blue Cross, the largest MCO, exacted this concession because of concerns about the profitability
of its TennCare MCO. See id.
218. See CRA I, supra note 206, § 2-9, at 33-34.
219. CRA 11 requires an MCO to provide any information TennCare determines necessary to
conduct the review and allows TennCare to establish corrective action plans if it determines the
MCO did not comply with the grievance guidelines. CRA H1, supra note 206, § 2-9, at 39. CRA H
draws a distinction between a "grievance," which applies when an MCO attempts to deny,
reduce, terminate, or suspend coverage, and a "complaint," which is defined as "an enrollee's
right to contest any other action taken by the Contractor or service provider" including omis-
sions. See Amendment #3 to CRA II, supra note 206, at 8-10. See also infra text accompanying
notes 226-36 (appeals process litigation).
220. Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
221. See Daniels v. Tennessee Dep't of Health & Env't, No. 79-3107, 1985 WL 56553, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 1985).
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Medicaid, without prior re-determination of Medicaid eligibility, upon
the state's notification by DHHS that AFDC or SSI benefits had been
terminated.' The court held that the automatic termination proce-
dures violated federal regulations, which required states to re-deter-
mine a recipient's eligibility for Medicaid and provide Medicaid bene-
fits pending that re-determination.'
In September 1992, the court approved a Second Consent
Decree that the parties had negotiated.' That Decree required the
state to provide Medicaid recipients: 1) "written notice upon denial of
either their requests for medical assistance pre-authorization or their
providers' claims for reimbursement," and 2) "administrative hearings
to review such denials. '
At issue in the 1996 case were TennCare coverage disputes and
its appeals process. Prior to Daniels,"s the appeals process took up to
90 days to reach an impartial hearing officer and 120 days total, and
allowed for discontinuation of benefits during the appeal." The court
held that the TennCare appeals process for disputed health coverage
decisions violated the Medicaid Act and due process.' The appeals
process violated the statute because it did not maintain benefits
pending resolution of the coverage dispute and did not provide suffi-
ciently timely resolution.' The appeals process violated due process'
because 1) it deprived enrollees of a predeprivation hearing when
Medicaid required continuation of benefits pending hearing or resolu-
222. See id. at *10.
223. See id. at *13.
224. See Daniels v. Menke, No. 96-5887, 1998 WL 211763, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 1998).
225. Id.
226. Daniels, 926 F. Supp. 1305.
227. Id. at 1310-11.
228. See id. at 1307.
229. Enrollees could be forced to wait over ninety days, violative of 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(f)
(1997) (stating that an agency must take a final administrative action within ninety days).
230. For there to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, there
must be a finding of state action. The district court in Daniels held that the MCOs were state
actors and that their conduct in making benefits determinations was therefore subject to consti-
tutional scrutiny under due process. Daniels, 926 F. Supp. at 1311. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
vacated the judgment of the district court on the state action issue but affirmed the district
court's judgment on statutory grounds. See Daniels v. Menke, No. 96-5887, 1998 WL 211763, at
*2 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 1998). This leaves unsettled the state action status of TennCare MCOs with
respect to other TennCare determinations. For a case holding that Medicare risk-contracting
MCOs are state actors,-see Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated and
remanded, _ U.S. , 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999). For further discussion and consideration of the
state action issue, see infra Part V.F.
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tion, and 2) TennCare failed to require that the proceedings be pre-
sided over by an impartial hearing officer."'
The state agreed to establish a more robust grievance process
and did not appeal the merits of the district court's statutory ruling
(although it did appeal the holding that TennCare MCOs are state
actors). 2  Effective October 28, 1996, Tennessee restructured
TennCare to provide for limited continuation of benefits during the
appeals process 3 and to assure enrollees timely access to a state
administrative law judge or hearing officer if the MCO or TennCare
Bureau failed to resolve the concern to an enrollee's satisfaction." In
addition to new grievance rules for coverage issues, Tennessee
adopted more procedures, including an expedited appeals process, 5 to
handle complaints... about consumer coverage and provider payment.
231. This ruling applied to Medicaid-eligible TennCare enrollees. See Daniels, 926 F. Supp.
at 1312.
232. The district court's state action holding was vacated. See supra note 230.
233. An MCO generally must notify an enrollee in writing 10 days before it stops or cuts care
an enrollee has been receiving. An enrollee has 30 days to file a grievance with the MCO. To
qualify for continuation of benefits already being received during the grievance process, an
enrollee must file a grievance within ten days of that notification. Otherwise, an MCO may
discontinue benefits already being provided during the grievance process. See TENNCARE
NEWSLETTER, Vol. 1, No. 1, Oct. 1996, at 3; WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19, at 83-
86. Grievances involve attempts to deny, reduce, terminate, or suspend a covered service. See
supra note 219.
234. For a description of the TennCare appeals process regarding adverse decisions, see
Appeal of Adverse Decisions, Bureau of TennCare Rule 1200-13-12-.11.
235. Where a physician "determines that the care is urgently needed and will write a letter
saying so, a grievance is handled on an expedited basis." WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra
note 19, at 81 (Letter from Judy Regan, Deputy Medical Director, Tennessee Department of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation, to BHO Medical Directors and Grievance Coordinators,
October 28, 1996). In such circumstances, MCOs must "reconsider and render a written decision
within 5 calendar days of receipt of the grievance" and "the entire case must be concluded within
31 calendar days." Id. While the Regan letter covered Behavioral Health Organizations, a
similar letter was sent from Theresa Clarke, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of TennCare, to
MCOs. See id. at 77. For a diagram of the expedited appeal process, see id. at 88. The TennCare
appeals process and termination policies are again being challenged. The class action asserts
that TennCare "routinely denies applications, terminates eligibility and assesses excess pre-
miums without affording individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard." See TennCare Faces
Class-Action Suit for Allegedly Dropping Members, WASH. HEALTH WK., July 20, 1998; Making A
Federal Case Out of TennCare, THE TENNESSEAN, July 13, 1998, at 12A. A revised consent
decree, entered in October 1999, provides far-reaching and potentially costly procedural re-
quirements for TennCare appeals. See Grier v. Wadley, Civ. Action No. 79-3107 (M.D. Tenn.
1999) (unpublished opinion on file with Professor Blumstein, Vanderbilt Law School) (Consent
Decree).
236. For the distinction between complaints and grievances, see supra note 219. For a de-
scription of the administrative appeals process, see WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19,
at 77-78. Between September 1, 1997 and November 30, 1997, there were 269 administrative
appeals-232 provider payment and 37 consumer reimbursement issues. Of those appeals, 243
were resolved at the time of the Waiver Extension Request. See id. at 78.
TENNCARE
The above aspects of TennCare's structure and design are
summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Before
Daniels
BEFORE TENNCARE AFTER TENNCARE
After
Daniels
After 2nd
Consent Decree
Before
Daniels
After
Daniels
Pre-Deprivation No Yes Yes No Yes
Hearing
Interim Coverage No Yes Yes No 10 days
of Benefits (with
option to
extend)
Time: Contractor 30 days 21 days
Denial of Claims
Time: File 30 days
Grievance
Impartial Hearing No Yes
Officer
Time: Hearing > 90 days 90 days
Before Impartial
Hearing Officer
D. TennCare: Fiscal Rationale and Assumptions
Under TennCare the state contracts with MCOs for the provi-
sion of services to covered beneficiaries-both Medicaid-eligible
patients and other uninsuredluninsurable state residents. MCOs
organize the provider network, manage the provision of care to
enrolled beneficiaries, and assume financial risk for the provision of
services since they are paid on a capitated per-enrollee basis.
In determining the level of payments (the capitation rate) to
MCOs, the state's methodology started with a determination of a
global budget-the total amount to be expended in TennCare. Ten-
nessee made an initial determination that the funds already contrib-
uted by state and local government sources were adequate to provide
services under TennCare. That was not an empirically tested
20001
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hypothesis but rather a going-in assumption." The payment per
enrollee was a derived number, based on an estimate of program
enrollment.s
In developing the capitation rate, the state deducted 5% from
aggregate Medicaid expenditures as an estimate of uncompensated
charity care already being furnished that would be compensated by
TennCare."9 The state's rationale was that the level of uncompen-
sated care would dramatically decrease because TenCare would
provide increased coverage to the uninsured."0 Since providers would
presumably receive compensation for patients who in the past would
have been treated on an uncompensated basis, the state reasoned that
the front-end 5% reduction in levels of compensation actually held
providers harmless financially.241
To induce HCFA to approve TennCare, Tennessee proposed a
global cap on FFP. As discussed above, under normal Medicaid fund-
ing federal matching responsibility is unlimited. Once a state's Medi-
caid program receives federal approval for services provided and bene-
ficiaries eligible, the federal government is obligated to match (at the
appropriate statutory matching formula) all qualified state program
expenditures. In this way, state decisions regarding eligibility, com-
pensation, scope of benefits, and levels of utilization automatically
trigger FFP. No limits on the magnitude of FFP exist once the provi-
sions of a state Medicaid program are federally approved and qualified
state Medicaid expenditures are made. The federal government basi-
cally is a passive check-writer in that process, with state and local
decisions associated with program administration having direct and
automatic federal financial implications. This federal fiscal auto-
matic-pilot feature inheres in the nature of a cooperative-federalism
entitlement program.42
TennCare alters this traditional financial arrangement. For
the federal government, Tennessee offered to establish a global ceiling
237. See supra note 165. In this regard, the fiscal assumptions underlying TennCare were
quite different from those used by Oregon in its demonstration. See generally Blumstein, supra
note 164.
238. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 79-97.
239. See id. at 82 ("State studies estimate uncompensated care at 11 percent of total
charges .... [S]ince not all uninsured persons will enroll in TennCare initially, TennCare is
premised on capturing only five percent, or slightly less than half of the total charity care being
provided in Tennessee.").
240. Given the geography of Tennessee, with cities such as Chattanooga and Memphis ad-
joining other states, this theory was always subject to some limitation since uninsured indigent
patients from out-of-state would always be a reality for the major hospitals of those cities.
241. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 82.
242. See supra Part II.
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on FFP under TennCare" Instead of facing an open-ended federal
commitment, the federal government could limit in advance its annual
fiscal responsibility for TennCare" Correlatively, the state agreed to
assume the financial risk if total expenses exceeded the FFP cap. 5
Thus, the state was financially at risk for unanticipated increases in
the number of program beneficiaries or in the costs of treating
TennCare patients.
Tennessee's Medicaid enrollment rose from 611,993 in fiscal
1989 to 878,961 in fiscal 1992 (and an estimated 1,000,000 in fiscal
1993)," s a compound growth rate in the Medicaid caseload over that
four-year period of approximately 12.8%." In addition to an increas-
ing Medicaid patient population, Medicaid had a considerable cost-
growth per capita of 8.7% per year based on actual prior (pre-
TennCare) experience." Thus, Tennessee was able to posit that, in
the absence of TennCare, overall costs for Medicaid would rise by
more than 17% per year as a result of cost and caseload growth. With
approval of TennCare, Tennessee estimated that, by the last year of
the demonstration, program spending levels would increase by about
5% per year. 9
Guidelines governing the granting of Medicaid waivers
required budget neutrality.' For TennCare, HCFA agreed to calcu-
late budget neutrality over the entire five-year demonstration, rather
than to examine each year separately. 1  With the three-year
243. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra 14, at 79 ("Rather than requesting a federal
matching share or fixed federal contribution per capita, Tennessee is seeking a total federal
dollar budget for the program.').
244. The total five-year FFP amount agreed to was $12.165 billion. See id. at 115. The first
year FFP cap (for Tennessee's fiscal 1993-94) was set at $2.108 billion. For calendar 1994, the
first year of the TennCare program, FFP was capped at $2.227 billion. The difference reflects
the fact that TennCare covered only the second half of Tennessee's fiscal 1993-94. For Tennes-
see's fiscal 1994-95, the FFP cap was set to rise by 8.3% to $2.283 billion. For the next three
years, the FFP cap was set to rise by 7.5%, 5.7%, and 5.1% respectively. See id.
245. See id. at 79 ('Tennessee is assuming substantial [financial] risk for the TennCare pro-
gram, a risk it is willing to take because of its belief in the potential for the program's success.');
id. at 81 ("Because of the nature of the federal dollar commitment sought, it is most critical that
the Year One estimates be valid. The federal government is protected thereafter through the
control on total spending growth.').
246. The estimated Medicaid enrollment for fiscal 1994, in the absence of TennCare, was
1,128,399. See id. at 95.
247. See id. at 83.
248. See id. at 88.
249. See id.
250. See Suzanne Rotwein et al., Medicaid and State Health Care Reform: Process, Programs,
and Policy Options, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. at 105, 118 (1995).
251. See WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19, at 55 (STC 16); see also supra note
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TennCare extension, the budget neutrality calculation was extended
to cover the entire eight-year period.252
Implementing the concept of budget neutrality requires an
agreement on a hypothetical issue-what a state's Medicaid expendi-
tures would be if a waiver is not approved. This requires estimation of
a baseline of projected expenditures. The typical next question was
what expenditures would be projected to accrue under the demon-
stration. Tennessee's proposed global FFP cap obviated the need for
this question, at least from the perspective of the federal government,
since, under TennCare, the state was financially at risk if expendi-
tures were to exceed projections.
Agreeing on the baseline of expense for TennCare's first year
was particularly important since subsequent years would be based on
projected levels of increase from the first year. Tennessee sought a
"commitment from the federal government to contribute in Year One
what it would have contributed under the present system, and a com-
mitment to increase its contribution in the remaining years of the
project by no more than the per capita cost increase historically ex-
perienced in the Medicaid program (8 .3 %). ' This "current services"
approach to calculating the base line sets the base year without-
waiver expenditures equal to what would be necessary to finance the
state's Medicaid program on the assumption that pre-existing state
laws and policies that were in place remain in effect. Under this
approach, the federal government need not determine which Medicaid
costs a state would likely have maintained or inaugurated in the
absence of the proposed waiver. This approach apparently is advo-
cated by the General Accounting Office"u but has been criticized in
general by the Clinton Administration. 5
An alternative approach to calculating budget neutrality, the
"current law" approach, establishes neutrality by projecting likely
expenditures in a state under current federal law, which allows states
to expand and contract their Medicaid programs. Accounting for such
potential state-based changes requires a judgment on the part of fed-
eral officials of likely state behavior in the absence of a waiver. This is
the kind of dynamic projection that federal budget officials engage in
252. See Letter from Michael Hash, supra note 9 (STC 16) (approving three-year TennCare
extension).
253. TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 80. The 8.3% historical rate of in.
crease in per capita Medicaid expenditures had apparently risen to 8.7% in the most recent three
pre-TennCare years. See id. at 88.
254. See GAO, MEDICAID: SPENDING PRESSURES DRIVE STATES TOWARD PROGRAM
REINVENTION 41 (1995).
255. See id. at 70-73 (Clinton Administration's response to draft GAO Report).
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on a nationwide basis in estimating (and budgeting for) the aggregate
national levels of FFP, which are controlled by state Medicaid pro-
grammatic decisions.'
In practical terms, the current law methodology would mean
that Tennessee's future plans, absent a waiver, would be evaluated by
the federal government in determining budget neutrality. A dynamic
political analysis rather than a static straight-line projection would be
used in forecasting future without-waiver Medicaid state expenditures
in Tennessee. HCFA would have asked whether Tennessee could have
maintained Medicaid spending at historical levels beyond fiscal 1994
or whether it could have sustained historical levels of growth in the
program for five additional years. For example, some consideration of
the effect of MVCPTA 7 and of OBRA '93,' which restricted the ability
of states to make DSH payments to hospitals and which was enacted
before TennCare was approved, would have been required. In addi-
tion, HCFA would have taken into account the likely effect of state
plans to cut back on Medicaid expenditures, as reflected in the
appointment and deliberations of the Governor's Medicaid task force,
charged with recommending program cuts in the range of $750 million
to meet the projected revenue shortfall in the Medicaid budget for
fiscal 1995.9 Under a current law approach to setting a budget-
neutral baseline, statements in the waiver application that the then-
recent historical rate in Medicaid growth was unsustainable" would
have been prejudicial to the state.
HCFA's acceptance of the current services approach to estab-
lishing the baseline for purposes of calculating budget neutrality
meant that Tennessee received approval of the amount in its fiscal
1994 budget as the baseline for budget neutrality under TennCare.
This reflected a significant increase in FFP for the first year of
TennCare, an increase of 17% in program allocations over Tennessee's
previous fiscal year (1993)." Since all increases in expenditure were
based on the first-year FFP level, the federal government's assent to
256. See id. at 71-72.
257. See id. U.S.C. §1396b(w) (1994); see also supra Part LI.B.
258. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(g).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
260. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 1 ("For the past several years,
the cost of [Medicaid] has grown so steeply that it threatens the viability of all other functions of
state government. The growth of the Medicaid program has far exceeded the ability of the State
to sustain through normal methods of State revenue generation.'); id. (Letter of Governor
McWherter to Donna E. Shalala, June 16, 1993, stating that in the absence of TennCare, "the
current Medicaid program threatens the viability of Tennessee's health care system and the
financial stability of the entire state government).
261. See id at 81-82.
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the current services methodology for establishing the baseline amount
was critical for Tennessee's fiscal stability (and for providing a cushion
to allow expansion of the scope of coverage, a clear federal goal).
In approving TennCare, effective January 1, 1994, halfway
through Tennessee's fiscal 1994, HCFA agreed that the FFP neu-
trality cap would increase by 8.3% in Tennessee's fiscal 1994-95, from
$2.108 billion to $2.283 billion, and by 7.5%, 5.7%, and 5.1% in the
remaining years of the demonstration." For the three-year TennCare
extension period, the budget neutrality cap was set at an annual rate
of increase of 5. 1%.2' This conforms remarkably closely to Tennessee's
original projection that, through TennCare, it would reduce the rate of
overall program expenditure increase to 5% per year.' Whereas FFP
was capped at $12.165 billion over the five-year TennCare demonstra-
tion, Tennessee projected in its TennCare extension application that
FFP for the entire five-year demonstration period would be $10.567
billion, a reduced expenditure of $1.6 billion compared to the approved
five-year budget neutrality cap."
Ironically, Tennessee did not secure a commitment to a fixed
level of FFP as a percentage of qualified state funds expended. Under
the statutory formula, FFP varies with a state's relative wealth.' At
the outset (for state fiscal year 1994), FFP absorbed 66.98% of total
program cost. Non-federal sources covered the rest."7 In subsequent
years, as Tennessee's relative economic status improved, the FFP rate
decreased, and the state faced an unanticipated funding shortfall.'
TennCare has reduced the enrollment cap from an original
estimate of 1.775 million to 1.3 million before program implementa-
tion and then back to 1.5 million.69 On January 1, 1995, one year into
the demonstration project, TennCare closed enrollment for the unin-
sured to assure fiscal stability.27 Enrollment had reached 90% of its
262. See WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19, at 55; see also supra notes 187 & 189.
263. See Letter from Michael Hash, supra note 9, (STC 16) (approving three-year TennCare
extension and noting that 5.1% budget neutrality cost increase was consistent with the dictates
of § 4757 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and § 1115(e)(7) of the Social Security Act); see also
supra note 204.
264. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 80, 88.
265. See WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19, at 115.
266. See supra note 40.
267. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 81.
268. Duren Cheek, Taxing Services May Not Help State: Economist Says Plan Isn't Answer to
Revenue Problems, THE TENNESSEAN, Aug. 3, 1999, at BI; Interview with John Ferguson,
Commissioner of Finance, in Nashville, Tenn. (Dec. 17, 1996).
269. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 29, 83-84; supra note 190.
270. The state may not close the program to the group who would have been eligible to par-
ticipate in the state's Medicaid program. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 166, at 2-
3.
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target.271 Since under the waiver the state was financially at risk for
unanticipated increases in program costs beyond the FFP cap-
whether from enrollment increases or increases in per-patient costs of
treatment-the state was cautious in managing enrollment to allow
for an unexpected increase in Medicaid eligibles for whom TennCare
coverage was mandatory. When enrollment for the uninsured was
closed, the state estimated that 95% of its population had some form of
private or government-sponsored health insurance.72 While Ten-
nessee generally closed enrollment in TennCare for non-Medicaid
patients in 1995, TenCare has remained open for those deemed unin-
surable27 and has re-opened for four other specific categories.Y By the
end of May 1999, TennCare enrollment exceeded 1.3 million,75 above
the original CRA cap. 6 From June 1996, to May 1999, the demo-
graphic composition of TennCare evolved significantly. The number of
more expensive uninsured/uninsurable patients rose from 334,382 to
492,544 while the number of Medicaid-eligible enrollees fell from
846,067 to 816,637. Uninsureduninsurable patients rose from 28% to
38% of total enrollment during that period.2"
271. See TennCare Website, supra note 11.
272. See TennCare Website, supra note 11. The state has been much less cautious (or at
least less successful) in enrollment management since the approval of the TennCare waiver
extension. See supra notes 11-13.
273. See Bill Snyder, Patients Plead for Care: TennCare Is Only Option, Officials Told, THE
TENNESSEAN, Apr. 17, 1999, at IA, 2A. In preparing his budget for fiscal 2000, Tennessee
Governor Sundquist announced a major reassessment of eligibility for persons denied insurance
by private carriers. The state faced a substantial increase in the state share of TennCare, see
Keith Snider, Hospitals Backing Reforms to Save TennCare Despite Cost, THE TENNESSEAN, Feb.
12, 1999, at 1A, 13A, and was concerned about abuses that raised costs considerably.
274. See supra note 190.
275. See supra note 11.
276. See supra note 190.
277. See supra notes 11-13. Those enrolled in TennCare through other than mandatory
Medicaid eligibility categories and who have incomes above 100% of the poverty level pay a
premium based on a sliding scale. For a description of the sliding scale concept, see TENNCARE
WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 19-27. This money is channeled back into the TennCare
budget and qualifies (based on a formula) for FFP as state expenditures. See Letter from Bruce
Vladeck, supra note 8, (STC 14) (allowing 90% of first $75 million, 80% of next $50 million, 50%
of next $50 million, and 20% of all additional premiums collected to qualify for FFP).
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V. TENNCARE'S PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION:
A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
A. Institutional Design Considerations: The Triumph
of Pragmatism Over Ideology
Tennessee formulated TennCare while the nation was debating
comprehensive national health care reform. The design of TennCare
can be seen as the triumph of pragmatism over ideology. It achieved a
bold access agenda through Medicaid cost containment and market
improvement reform while avoiding the ideological pitfalls that helped
sink the comprehensive Clinton Administration reform proposals.
Health care reform means different things to different people
with different agendas, so reform really has three different and quite
distinct faces. One emphasizes improving access to medical services
for the uninsured and the underinsured. This was the clear focus of
the Clinton Plan."' A second stresses cost containment of public pro-
grams such as Medicaid and Medicare. When Republicans gained
control of Congress in 1995, they shifted the focus of reform from
access (the Clinton agenda) to containing Medicaid and Medicare
costs. The denouement was President Clinton's veto in 1995 of budget
legislation that reduced the rate of increase in public spending on
these programs."' A third face of health care reform is institutionalist.
This theory of reform seeks to identify areas in which the health care
marketplace is not functioning properly and warrants some form of
corrective action. It then attempts to formulate a strategy of inter-
vention."
1. The Unitary vs. Pluralistic Issue
To avoid characterization as taxation, the Clinton access-driven
plan included all persons within a geographic region. The Clinton
278. The Clinton proposals evolved; initially they were aimed, at least in part, toward im-
proving the functioning of the market--"to solve the problems small groups had in purchasing
health insurance." See Alain Enthoven, A Good Health Care Idea Gone Bad, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7,
1993, at A18. For a discussion of the "shifting agenda pursued by the Clinton Administration,"
see Blumstein, supra note 6, at 27-29.
279. See Robert Thompson, Clinton, Gingrich Continue to Fight for Power, THE WASH. POST,
Dec. 31, 1995, at 12 (discussion of budget politics).
280. See Blumstein, supra note 6, at 17. ("Regulation-oriented analysts tend to view market
imperfections as a justification for substituting a system of government regulation for an imper-
fectly functioning market .... In the face of market defects, market-oriented analysts first seek
to develop policies designed to improve the functioning of the market... [f]or example, [through]
enforcement of the antitrust laws.").
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Plan would have placed in a single purchasing alliance those privately
insured, those on public medical benefits programs (e.g., Medicaid),
and those uninsured. The government would have asserted jurisdic-
tion over the entire health care marketplace and focused on creating a
unitary health care system (as opposed to allowing a pluralistic mar-
ket-based industry to exist). The premiums would be set by deter-
mining the projected cost of providing mandated services for all citi-
zens of a particular geographic area."' To the extent that cost savings
could be obtained in private health insurance plans, those savings
would be channeled into funding the care provided through an
alliance.'
Since rechanneling cost savings from private health insurance
programs to fund its access agenda was critical to its reform proposals,
the Administration had to focus on comprehensive reform. Its plan
included all citizens in a single, unitary system. Therefore, the
Clinton Administratiom expressed a governmental interest in cost con-
tainment not only with regard to public programs-which is under-
standable since that directly affects public budgets-but also with
regard to private medical insurance. Yet, traditionally the govern-
ment plays a small role in determining how resources are to be allo-
cated in the private marketplace.'
The comprehensive approach to reform was driven, in part, by
the need to encompass private medical insurance within the single
unitary system (the alliances) in order to recapture the cost savings
from the private medical insurance market and reallocate those sav-
ings to the funding of medical care for the uninsured and the under-
insured. It was also driven, however, by ideology.
Critics of the American health care scene have traditionally
contended that the only legitimate basis for allocating scarce medical
resources is the criterion of medical need.' As one of us has discussed
elsewhere, that "assumption obliterates the distinction between gov-
ernment's need to ration public funds and its questionable role in
281. See id. at 44.
282. Proponents sought to reassure private medical insurance beneficiaries that their cover-
age would not deteriorate, even though savings from private insurance would fund access to care
for the uninsured and underinsured. "Any reform that seeks to ensure security cannot ask
Americans to step down to a lower level of coverage than they now have." Starr, supra note 5, at
1670.
283. Blumstein, supra note 6, at 21-22; see also James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical
Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1347-48 (1981).
284. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59
TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1411 (1981).
TENNCARE2000] 187
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
rationing private funds."" For critics, "this distinction in governmen-
tal role is... unacceptable" because they "view all medical resource
utilization decisions as within government's area of responsibility.
Whether a patient pays for medical care with private funds... or
public funds,... government has an obligation to obliterate distinc-
tions other than those based on medical need."" In essence, that posi-
tion means that the "consumption of all medical resources, by pri-
vately and publicly funded patients alike, is implicitly viewed as a
rationing decision on the part of government for which government is
responsible." 7 However, in a pluralistic market economy, resource
allocation decisions are decentralized to households and firms and are
not made in a conscious, collective sense." "[G]overnment does not
have an independent interest in limiting private spending if the sys-
tem of decisionmaking is unbiased and the aggregate levels of spend-
ing reflect unbiased, unsubsidized private choice."8
9
Thus, the Clinton proposal for comprehensive health care
reform was embraced for practical considerations-stealth cross-sub-
sidization of the uninsured and the underinsured by the privately
insured-and because of ideology-regarding government's appropri-
ate role in health care regulation.' But, by focusing on compre-
hensive reform and providing for expensive comprehensive benefits,
which made the cost of cross-subsidization even larger," the Clinton
Plan ran into ideological cross-currents and headwinds that ultimately
sank it.
The TennCare proposal, which received remarkably wide-
spread contemporaneous political support, differs strikingly in broad
concept from the Clinton Plan. TennCare does not place direct gov-
ernment regulation or controls on the private health insurance mar-
ketplace. Instead, its exclusive focus is on TennCare itself, its benefi-
ciaries, and MCOs and providers, which are under contract for the
provision of medical care services to TennCare enrollees.
The Clinton proposals contemplated a unitary system for all
beneficiaries, folding into the same purchasing alliances persons who
already had private health insurance, public beneficiaries, and those
with inadequate or without health insurance. TennCare does not ex-
285. James F. Blumstein, Distinguishing Government's Responsibility in Rationing Public
and Private Medical Resources, 60 TEX. L. REV. 899, 906 (1982).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 906-07.
288. See Blumstein, supra note 283, at 1347-48.
289. Blumstein, Distinguishing Government's Responsibility, supra note 285, at 910.
290. See Blumstein, supra note 6, at 34-38, 42-45.
291. For discussion of the comprehensive benefits issue, see id. at 34-38.
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tend its reach to privately insured Tennesseans. It only covers Medi-
caid-eligible and uninsured or uninsurable enrollees, allowing a pri-
vate, pluralistic health care marketplace to remain in effect and to
flourish.
2. The Equality vs. Adequacy Issue
The TennCare benefits package is defined through a process of
political negotiation and accommodation. It is not inherently 2 linked
to benefits packages available to private-sector insureds 3 and does
not, at least directly, aim to level down non-TennCare patients by
restricting their ability to purchase whatever coverage might be avail-
able in the marketplace. Savings to finance health care coverage for
the uninsured are derived, at least nominally, from the overall group
of public beneficiaries. Economies in an existing program (Medicaid)
expand access to that program, leaving privately covered patients out
of the regulatory or financing mix."
As a distinct government-sponsored program for expanding
access to medical care within a pluralistic health care marketplace,
TennCare avoided another ideological pitfall. It successfully steered
292. One of TennCare's goals was to offer a "standard package of health care benefits com-
parable to that offered in the private sector." McWherter Letter, supra note 7.
293. The benefits package was in fact patterned after the health plan offered to state em-
ployees through Blue Cross, but more generous for children under twenty-one as the require-
ments of EPSDT for children's health were retained. See infra notes 294 & 350; TENNCARE
WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 19-20. The state asserted that the scope of benefits
under TennCare were "more generous than those offered under Medicaid." Id. at 19.
294. Three qualifications are important here. First, the secrecy of the initial program-for-
mulation negotiations and the blitzkrieg administratively-based implementation of TennCare
short-circuited the normal political process. Advocates for Medicaid and uninsured patients were
on the inside at the negotiating table, providers were not. Further, those advocates had political
leverage with the federal government, which was simultaneously seeking to provide universal
access to health care insurance and which had to approve TennCare. See infra Part V.C.2. For
the McWherter Administration and patient advocates, economies from TennCare were seen as
coming from reduced provider revenues, not from lost patient benefits. Second, the political
leverage allowed patient advocates to insist on a very generous benefits package, more generous
than available in many conventional private-sector plans customarily purchased in Tennessee.
Therefore, while there might not be a unitary system, there would be no substantial risk that
TennCare beneficiaries would fare more poorly than privately covered patients in the health care
marketplace. Third, Blue Cross held the state contract for providing benefits for state (and
many local government) employees. About half of TennCare patients enrolled in the Blue Cross
TennCare plan. Blue Cross insisted that providers in its network for public employees also
provide services to TennCare enrollees folded into that network. This reduced the risk, from the
perspective of patient advocates, that TenCare patients would be outside the mainstream
medical system. Although that remained a possibility for patients who chose a TennCare-only
MCO, the availability of the integrated Blue Cross plan and the ability to switch MCOs annually
could reasonably be expected to discipline the quality provided by TennCare-only MCOs in the
marketplace.
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clear of the equality vs. adequacy debate that swirled around the
Clinton Plan and around all other attempts at expanding access to
medical care through government programs. 5
In discussions about the role of government in promoting im-
proved access to medical care, there traditionally has been a good bit
of "symbolic, rhetorical posturing about an amorphous 'right' to medi-
cal (or health) care."' Those seeking broader access to medical care-
access egalitarians-have typically advocated equality as the goal. 7
But in its influential report, the President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search declined to adopt equality as the conceptually/ethically appro-
priate objective in pursuing the goal of improved access to medical
care. 
2 8
Analytically, equality can be achieved only by leveling down,
which is coercive, or leveling up, which is expensive, or some combina-
tion of both, which can be both coercive and expensive. The coercive
aspect of leveling down-restricting those who choose and are able to
expend large sums of money on medical care from spending their own
funds on medical services-is troubling as a matter of principle, and
some of the most potent criticism of the Clinton Plan stemmed from
concerns about its coercive leveling down dimensions. ' 9 The expense
of leveling up-and its questionable rationality from a resource alloca-
tion perspective-makes that alternative politically unappealing. As
we have argued in more detail elsewhere, it should seem "self-
evident.., that the goal of equal utilization of medical services is an
unrealistic and probably unwarranted policy aspiration."'
295. See generally Einer R. Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449
(1994) (discussing the difficulties associated with maximizing limited health care given the
diverse medical needs of any given group).
296. James F. Blumstein, Providing Hospital Care to Indigent Patients: Hill-Burton as a
Case Study and a Paradigm, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
94 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986).
297. Equality can mean equality of access, equality of actual utilization of inputs across in-
come groups, need-adjusted equality of inputs, or equality of outcomes. See PRESIDENT'S COMM.
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE
AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 11-35 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM. REPORT].
298. See id. at 18-19.
299. See, e.g., Elizabeth McCaughey, No Exit, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 7, 1994, at 21-25
(discussing coercive limits on out-of-plan coverage under Clinton Proposal).
300. James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in Health Care: Is
a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849, 866 (1981); see also
Clark C. Havighurst, Controlling Health Care Costs: Strengthening the Private Sector's Hand, 1
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 471, 491 (1977) (noting the unreasonableness of demanding absolute
equality in medical services distribution).
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The President's Commission adopted "adequacy" not "equality"
as the appropriate normative standard for determining the nature and
scope of public responsibility in assuring access to medical care."' In
defining the term "adequacy," one does not ask what level of care are
nonindigents getting.' Rather, as explained elsewhere, the analytical
inquiry focuses on "what a decent level of care is-a level that we, as a
state or nation, feel would both satisfy our social obligations and deal
adequately with the special characteristics of the indigent patient's
need for medical care. ''n3
In the context of TennCare, the benefits package for benefici-
aries was set politically through a negotiation process.' It was not
inherently related to private plan coverage' and made no pretense at
restricting availability of medical care to non-TennCare patients. The
straightforward issue was what benefits should TennCare provide to
its enrollees, and could providers reasonably perform those services
with funding levels established in TennCare.'
Of course, one way of finessing the adequacy vs. equality
issue-avoiding the value confrontation while reducing the signifi-
cance of the issue from a pragmatic perspective-is to define adequacy
very generously. This reduces the disparity between health care bene-
fits provided at public expense and health care services that can be
purchased in the private market. This was ultimately the strategy
used by TennCare program designers-the adoption of pragmatism
and the sidestepping of ideology.
This issue had its counterpart in the national health care
reform debate. Noteworthy by its absence was rhetoric from the
Clinton Administration about equal access to medical care. Propo-
nents of managed competition used terms such as "core benefits pack-
301. For precursors of the position advocated by the President's Commission, see James F.
Blumstein & Michael Zubkoff, Perspectives on Government Policy in the Health Sector, 51
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.: HEALTH & SOc'Y 395, 411 (1973); James F. Blumstein & Mchael
Zubkoff, Public Choice in Health: Problems, Politics and Perspectives on Formulating National
Health Policy, 4 J. HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 382, 405 (1979).
302. James F. Blumstein, Thinking about Government's Role in Medical Care, 32 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 853, 862 (1988).
303. Id. 'The adequacy standard allows for the consideration of trade-offs between medical
care and other needs and encourages efficiency, rewarding cost effectiveness with alternative
benefits from the savings accrued." Blumstein, supra note 6, at 34.
304. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
305. See id.; see also Jean I. Thorne et al., State Perspectives on Health Care Reform: Oregon,
Hawaii, Tennessee, and Rhode Island, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 121, 129-30 (Spring 1995)
(noting that a political goal was to have benefits comparable to those in private plans; the state
employee plan satisfied that objective).
306. In the absence of some type of bidding process, there is ground for skepticism whether
there is an appropriate match between resource availability and the provision of specified
services. See infra Part V.B.
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age" to describe the kind of plans that would be made universally
available. Government would require payment for "cored services.
But that very notion, akin to the adequacy concept embraced by the
President's Commission,' contemplates opportunities for supplemen-
tation-and supplementation recognizes the role of a pluralistic mar-
ketplace in which levels of service available to consumers will vary.
That notion is clearly inconsistent with at least a hard version of equal
access.
But the ideological commitment to equal access, relinquished
theoretically when the focus is on public responsibility to assure
access to core benefits, was in fact "boiling just below the surface" of
the debate surrounding the Clinton Plan and emerged in "different
rhetorical garb."' To narrow the range of permissible differences in
access, the Clinton Plan subtly shifted from promoting access to a core
benefits package, to advocating a comprehensive benefits package.
The movement from core to comprehensive benefits reflected the
reemergence of the access egalitarian ideal but without the equality of
access ideological baggage."°  Thus, in advocating universal coverage,
the Clinton Plan sought to avoid the conceptual/ideological problems
associated with the equal access rhetoric. It learned from supporters
of the adequacy approach that the honest political issue is what con-
stitutes an acceptable level of adequacy.31
These ideological issues were never far from the surface in the
development of TennCare. The waiver application asserted that
TennCare would establish a standard benefit package for enrollees
that would set a "benchmark of sufficient coverage."... This sounds
very much like a core or adequate package of benefits for public bene-
ficiaries. Yet, the TennCare application also asserted that the "re-
formed system must be unitary; those who have traditionally been the
responsibility of public programs should have access to the same level
and quality of health care as others covered by the reformed system." "
By its nature, TennCare was not designed as a unitary system, despite
the rhetoric in the waiver application. It only covered a select group of
public beneficiaries and did not claim authority over the private
health care marketplace. TennCare did eliminate some class distinc-
307. See supra notes 299-306 and accompanying text.
308. Blumstein, supra note 6, at 35.
309. See id.
310. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 300, at 866.
311. TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 3.
312. Id. at 2. Noting the careful balance, the waiver application asserted that "the public
cannot be asked to provide publicly-supported citizens a greater level of health care than it can
secure for itself." Id. at 2-3.
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tions in medical care, as the waiver asserts, "[b]y combining the pub-
licly-supported groups with other uninsureds.3 3 For TennCare bene-
ficiaries who enrolled in the Blue Cross MCO, TennCare also
eliminated class distinctions between public beneficiaries enrolled in
TennCare and state and local government employees covered in that
Blue Cross network which, as a TennCare MCO, would include
TennCare beneficiaries.
From a structural perspective, the assertion that TennCare
would promote a unitary system314 was erroneous-a rhetorical flour-
ish. But in a pragmatic way, advocates for Medicaid and uninsured
patients were able to work towards that goal despite the structure of
TennCare, which focused only on public beneficiaries. Critics of
TennCare have complained that the benefits package is too generous.
The plan actually offers more comprehensive benefits than most pri-
vate insurance plans in Tennessee, but that was a pragmatic strategy
to narrow the range of difference between public beneficiaries and
private purchasers by raising the level of benefits in the public pro-
gram.315 Provided that public levels of expenditure could be main-
tained at politically sustainable levels, with savings accruing from an
existing public benefits program (Medicaid), the TennCare program
was able to secure wide initial support which led to its rapid imple-
mentation.
Concerns about the generous level of benefits in TennCare
reflect a political complaint about the nature and scope of an adequate
or sufficient benefit package. If the political climate changes or if
costs become again (as they seem to be) a political and economic chal-
lenge to available revenue streams, then the political deal may be
revisited either by raising taxes (as Governor Sundquist urges) or by
benefits cutbacks."6 From an analytical/ideological perspective, how-
ever, TennCare asks the correct question-what is the appropriate
("adequate") scope of benefits given the resources available to the
state, the other claims on those resources, and the priority for pro-
viding medical care to Medicaid eligibles and non-Medicaid
uninsureds?
313. Id. at 4.
314. See id. at 2.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 304-13.
316. In addition to seeking more revenues, the Sundquist Administration has expressed con-
cern about the rising cost of TennCare and has proposed reassessing enrollment guidelines and
scope-of-benefit issues. Predictably, this has elicited cautionary protests from patient advocacy
groups. See Snyder, supra note 273.
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3. The Entitlement vs. Obligation Issue
When "[a]ny individual who meets the prescribed standards for
the subsidy enjoys a legal right, enforceable in a courtto receive it, 317
a public subsidy program creates a legal entitlement. Entitlements
respect the dignity of individuals and restrain the exercise (and poten-
tial abuse) of discretion by government officials and institutions.318
They are legally enforceable, allowing for redress on the part of pro-
gram beneficiaries and providing for a measure of accountability for
the fair administration of a benefits program. Entitlements qualify as
"property" and cannot be administratively taken away by government
without the procedural requirements of due process.319 Politically, en-
titlements "persist without regard to the annual appropriations
process.""32
A drawback to an entitlement approach is the lack of budgetary
control. The definitions of eligibility and scope of benefits are built
into the fabric of the programs, and the political default rule is the
reverse of other political situations. Ordinarily, in the absence of
agreement on its details or contours, a program is not enacted or
renewed. The political burden is on program advocates. With regard
to an entitlement program, the political burden is on advocates of
program cutbacks since the result of stalemate is perpetuation of the
program in its existing configuration. Thus, since entitlement pro-
grams customarily remain on automatic pilot and are funded based on
estimates of expenditures needed to satisfy projected program costs
under existing criteria, it is more difficult to introduce a "sense of
trade-offs... into decisionmaking. '' .2'
Under an obligation approach, a person may be eligible for a
program's benefits but not entitled to that benefit as a legally enforce-
able matter."n There is a clear distinction between eligibility for and
entitlement to a benefit.3" Persons or programs that satisfy the pro-
gram criteria or guidelines qualify for program participation, but
317. Peter H. Schuck, Designing Hospital Care Subsidies for the Poor, in UNCOMPENSATED
HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 72, 83-84 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986).
318. See Blumstein, supra note 6, at 39.
319. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972) (holding due process safe-
guards apply only where government deprives a person of a liberty or a property interest);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-64 (1970) (finding that a public benefits entitlement is
protected by due process).
320. See Schuck, supra note 317, at 84.
321. See Blumstein, supra note 296, at 96.
322. See Schuck, supra note 317, at 84.
323. See Blumstein, supra note 6, at 39. A block grant with criteria of eligibility would be an
example of an obligation approach.
194 [Vol. 53:125
TENNCARE
eligibility for a program's benefits provides no assurance that any in-
dividual or institution must receive funding.
Under an obligation approach, political control over resource
allocation is asserted in determining the overall level of a global
budget. This allows the political system to consider trade-offs in the
budget context and to exert some overall fiscal restraint. In an en-
titlement program, budget levels are derived from a technocratic esti-
mate of the costs of fulfilling the demands created by the previously
defined right or entitlement. No real balancing of alternatives arises
in the appropriating process. Any decision to appropriate less than
required by the automatic pilot features of an entitlement program
necessitates a revision of the terms of the underlying entitlement it-
self. In the health care arena, the President's Commission rejected a
right or an entitlement to medical care, instead proposing that gov-
ernment shoulder an "obligation to ensure that everyone has access to
adequate care without being subject to excessive burdens."324
TennCare is a hybrid, reflecting features common to an en-
titlement program but also with features more associated with an
obligation approach. The core entitlement is that all Medicaid-eligible
persons are entitled to enroll in and receive the benefits of TennCare.
However, by setting a global budget cap on FFP, TennCare places an
upper limit on total federal funding. Since the state is entirely at risk
financially once the FFP limits are met, it has been reluctant to run
the program to the point where the federal cap is foreseeably reached.
Thus, TennCare closed the program to new eligibility by the unin-
sured (but not the uninsurable) so as to remain within budgetary
guidelines. When re-opening the program to certain children,
TennCare did seek to fit eligibility criteria to projected budgetary allo-
cations available, but what has been striking (at least until recently)
has been the state's willingness to act aggressively to stay within
fiscal parameters. The mindset has been that the non-Medicaid com-
ponent is a capped entitlement, subject to budget restrictions. And
since, beyond a certain point, the state is entirely at risk financially
for program costs, the state has taken measures to curtail TennCare
expenditures on non-Medicaid eligibles, although these curtailments
have been subject to the kind of political restraints that exist on any
cutback in an annual appropriations process. But no legislative rede-
fining of an entitlement is required. Administratively, as long as
HCFA approves, the state can just suspend new sign-ups for non-
Medicaid TennCare participants. Thus, TennCare can be seen as a
324. PRESIDENT'S COMM. REPORT, supra note 297, at 22.
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hybrid between the entitlement approach and the obligations ap-
proach-a "capped entitlement."
4. Summary
TennCare reflects a subtle compromise of ideological and
pragmatic issues. Unlike the Clinton approach, which would have
established government hegemony over a unitary system, Tennessee
adopted a more modest pluralistic system that allows the private
market to continue to function without additional governmental over-
sight. TennCare established a standard benefits package, but only for
TennCare's beneficiaries. The program does not affect the level of
benefits otherwise available in the private health care marketplace
and does not link its scope of benefits in any direct way to a stan-
dardized private sector benefits package imposed by government.
Tennessee did model its benefit design on the plan available for state
employees, but again did not purport to level up or level down the
privately covered non-TennCare population. Further, TennCare con-
tinued the entitlement approach for Medicaid eligibles but experi-
mented on a capped entitlement approach for non-Medicaid partici-
pants seeking to enroll in the program.
On structural, conceptual, and ideological grounds, TennCare
seems at odds with the access-oriented health care reform agenda
promoted by the Clinton Administration. Yet, TennCare won support
from' the federal government and from advocates for Medicaid and
uninsured patients in Tennessee. The question is: What accounts for
TennCare's political success in securing backing from groups normally
committed to the ideal of comprehensive reform and establishment of
a unitary system of health care with equal benefits for all individuals
within that unitary system?
The key to understanding the answer to this question is a
recognition of the triumph of pragmatism over ideology. Having es-
sentially lost the ideological battle, patient advocates recovered in the
political backroom what they had lost in the conceptual design of the
program. Sophisticated pragmatism, coupled with political leverage of
patient advocate groups in the program-design process, achieved
broad health care access goals. While not directly controlling private
health care benefits plans, the state was able to assure advocates for
Medicaid and uninsured patients that TennCare's benefits would be
very generous-more generous than many private plans in the state
and explicitly more generous than before under Medicaid. Further,
[Vol. 53:125
TENNCARE
Medicaid cost-savings would be re-allocated to expand coverage to
uninsured/uninsurable patients."u And the promise of Blue Cross
offering TennCare patients participation in the network that served
state employees provided assurance that quality would be accept-
able." Finally, the prospect of either a significant reduction in Medi-
caid enrollment or a cutback in benefits was a distinct possibility, and
TennCare (realistically) seemed like a reasonable and attractive
alternative.
B. Fiscal Rationale and Assumptions: The Conceptual/Political
Background Associated with Setting the Level of Expenditures
Underlying TennCare's development was concern with the
rapidly expanding state Medicaid program whose cost escalation state
officials considered fiscally unsustainable.' The state's fiscal goal
was to avoid either having to raise substantial tax-generated funds or
to avoid substantial program cutbacks. To the extent that overall
access to medical services could be improved by covering non-Medicaid
patients, that would be an additional benefit of the projected cost
savings from mandatory Medicaid managed care.
Tennessee made an initial determination that funds already
contributed by state and local government were adequate, along with
FFP, to provide services under TennCare.3" As discussed above, that
was not an empirically tested hypothesis but a basic a priori assump-
tion. In this way, TennCare's fiscal assumptions were quite different
from those used by Oregon in its demonstration.
1. Oregon's System for Setting Expenditure Levels
Relying on the expertise of physicians in the state, Oregon de-
veloped a set of condition-treatment ("CT") pairs, relating specific
conditions of illness to a course of treatment. Through a complex and
controversial process, the state then determined what value to assign
325. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 2, 6.
326. Id. at 8, 19. See also Thorne et al., supra note 305, at 129-30 ("Crucial to the State's
effort to meet the access requirement was a policy linking TennCare to the State employee
insurance plan.").
327. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 1 (escalating Medicaid program
cost "threatens the viability of all other functions of state government").
328. See supra Part IV.D; TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 2 ("There are
sufficient resources now in the overall public-supported health care system to provide an accept-
able level of quality care both to the needy who have been the traditional clients of public
programs and those who are not covered by health insurance through their employment or
otherwise").
2000]
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
to specific conditions of wellness and illness as a basis for prioritizing
CT pairs. Medicaid resources were allocated to CT-pairs that received
the highest priorities-those services and associated illnesses (CT
pairs) above a "pay" line to be determined through the legisla-
tive/political process were covered under Medicaid while those CT
pairs below that pay line were not covered.
To secure financing data, Oregon planners retained an actuar-
ial firm to estimate the costs of funding specific CT pairs for Oregon's
Medicaid population."n This allowed Oregon to estimate the costs of
covering specific levels of service above the pay line in its prioriti-
zation process.' Political decisionmakers would know the cost of
funding a certain level of CT pairs, and the legislature could be in-
formed what CT pairs would be above or below the pay line for any
given level of fiscal appropriation. Since Oregon already was a mature
managed care market, the reduction of costs through adoption of
managed care was not an independent objective.331
2. -Tennessee's System for Setting Expenditure Levels
Unlike Oregon, Tennessee's health care market faced low levels
of managed care. Cost savings from mandatory managed care were a
clear objective of TennCare."2 Since systemic change was a critical
part of the TennCare agenda, precise estimates of projected cost sav-
ings were inherently more problematic and perhaps unknowable ex
ante.333 In any event, the initial level of expenditure for TennCare was
assumed as a given based upon existing spending levels.
The level of expenditures, therefore, was an administered
price-a political parameter established by the state, not an economi-
cally-based price derived from either an Oregon-style estimate of costs
or a market-validated price derived from a competitive bidding
process. In a market, a party can establish a budget constraint (a
329. See Gold, Insights from Oregon and Tennessee, supra note 22, at 645.
330. For a brief description of how Oregon went about costing out its program, see id.; see
also Blumstein, supra note 164, at 547. For an overall analysis and evaluation of the Oregon
experiment, see Lawrence Jacobs et al., The Oregon Health Plan and the Political Paradox of
Rationing: What Advocates and Critics Have Claimed and What Oregon Did, 24 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 161 (1999).
331. See Thorne et al., supra note 305, at 124 (noting that "[t]wo-thirds of the AFDC popula-
tion were included in prepaid plans prior to... implementation" of the Oregon Medicaid experi-
ment and that "Oregon traditionally had heavy managed-care penetration in the private sector").
332. See, e.g., TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14, at 87-88 (discussing the rea-
sonableness of expecting "substantial savings" under managed care because of the reduction in
the use of hospital care).
333. See id at 84-88.
[Vol. 53:125
TENNCARE
price) and seek bids on levels of service, or it can establish (e.g.,
through a bid specification) a level of service and seek bids on price to
provide that service. TennCare established a budget constraint and
derived a price (the per enrollee capitation rate paid to each MCO)
from that overall budget sum.33 Under economic theory, a market-
validated process would have left the specification of services to puta-
tive bidders in the market. However, the state also specified the
TennCare benefits package with considerable particularity. 5 Tennes-
see could have used an Oregon-style system of cost estimation to sub-
stitute for a market-validated bidding process, but it did not do that.336
As a result, Tennessee set both terms of the contract-the price and
the services to be provided. It may have gotten the price right,33 but,
in the absence of a market-based bidding system or an administra-
tive/actuarial cost estimation, Tennessee had no assurance that
TennCare set the proper price for the specified services.
Thus, while proponents described TennCare as a market-based
proposal, that was only partly true. It used private networks (MCOs)
to organize, take responsibility for, and assume the financial risk for
the provision of medical care to TennCare patients. However, both the
price (the MCOs' capitation rate) and the scope of benefits were ad-
ministratively (i.e., politically) determined. Tennessee derived the
TennCare capitation rate by assuming that then-current levels of
spending were adequate. Further, the scope of benefits was based on
Medicaid requirements and political bargaining with patient advo-
cates who had considerable influence with HCFA in the waiver-review
process.
Whether the price level was appropriate for the level of services
specified in the CRAs was therefore not market-validated. If
resources were inadequate, TennCare proponents could contend that
334. Id. at 84 ("Because the TennCare program is founded on a global budget, per capita
spending is tied to the budgeted amount and caseload estimates.').
335. See supra Part IV.C.
336. Tennessee acknowledged that it had "no direct way to know the precise cost of caring for
the expanded population under a capitated system." TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note
14, at 85. Tennessee compared the proposed initial TennCare capitation rate of $1,641 with per
capita costs of the state's Medicaid program and its public employee health plan. See id. It also
compared Medicaid experience across regions and compared the age and sex demographics of the
uninsured with those of the Tennessee Medicaid population and of Tennessee's state employee
population. See id. at 84-88. Based on these rough comparisons, Tennessee concluded that the
proposed capitation rate was adequate. Except for the Tennessee state employee experience, the
comparisons did not account for possible differences in benefit packages. The TennCare benefit
package was patterned on benefits provided to state employees. See id. at 85. The adjusted per
capita cost of the state employee health benefits program tracked "almost exactly" the capitation
rate projected for TennCare's first year if all eligibles were to participate. Id. at 86.
337. See supra note 336.
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some dissavings were appropriate to eliminate excess capacity. How-
ever, there was no market-validated way of knowing at the outset
whether the level of resources committed to the program was suffi-
cient to pay for the level of benefits prescribed or whether, if there
were to be dissaving, the level of dissaving would be appropriate to
achieve economic efficiency or whether it would result in excessive
reductions in quality of care for beneficiaries.338
For some, TennCare could be defended as a way of using gov-
ernment purchasing power as a monopsonist to achieve redistributive
goals-reducing provider compensation and redistributing those re-
sources to serve the medical care needs of TennCare beneficiaries-
and to benefit general taxpayers. It may be that resources can be ex-
tracted from providers to benefit TennCare beneficiaries without the
sacrifice of excessive and measurable health-care quality standards.
But at some point, resources (capital and personnel) will leave the
TennCare market if compensated at non-competitive rates. So even
the redistributive story has constraints.339
C. TennCare's Access Agenda: The Broader Political Implications
The design and implementation of TennCare have important
political implications. Advocates for indigent and uninsured patients
supported the TennCare waiver, thereby accepting some restrictions
on patient choice in the Tennessee Medicaid program. Provided that
the savings from mandatory managed care in Medicaid were pre-
served for funding access to uninsured patients, those advocates have
been prepared to accept the restrictions necessarily resulting from
managed care for Medicaid beneficiaries. This section analyzes that
political dynamic.
1. TennCare Design: Political Realities and Constraints
In the development of TennCare, the drafters of TennCare
made an important political choice regarding the use of funds to be
saved by the adoption of mandatory managed care for Medicaid-
those savings would not relieve the state's Medicaid budget, thereby
338. Over time, there can be a process of learning with mid-course corrections made. This
has in fact occurred as Tennessee debated, for fiscal 2000, what measures to take to cope with
projected increases in TennCare costs. See Bonna M. de la Cruz, TennCare Chief Will Offer List
of Cures, THE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 6, 1999, at A-1.
339. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Resource Allocation in Health Care: The Allocation of Lifestyles
to Providers, 65 MILBANK Q. 153 (1987). For empirical evidence on these concerns, see infra Part
VI.
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freeing up funds for other state priorities such as public education,
which, as a result of a state Supreme Court decree, required the infu-
sion of hundreds of millions of state-level dollars."' Instead, the
money saved would remain in the medical care system to increase
access for uninsured non-Medicaid patients. This choice, driven by
state and national political considerations, became an important com-
ponent of TennCare and provides insight into a new political dynamic
of limiting public benefits entitlement programs.
The political environment in which TennCare was formulated
had two distinct components-state and national. At the state level,
rapidly escalating Medicaid expenditures dictated cost restraintsY1 In
addition, the provider tax, which had become a major source of reve-
nue for financing the state share of Medicaid expenditures, was at risk
both politically and legally because of restraints on state provider-tax
levies imposed by MVCPTA."2 Nationally, the Clinton Administration
had come into office promising comprehensive reform -of the national
health care systems and emphasizing expanded access to medical care
for the uninsured."3
Under the circumstances, HCFA would not likely have ap-
proved a Medicaid demonstration that focused exclusively on cost
savings without addressing access issues. This gave considerable
political leverage to state-level advocates for Medicaid and uninsured
patients, whose support was deemed by the state to be critical in
securing Clinton Administration support for TennCare3 " An essential
sweetener in the TennCare formulation stage for Medicaid patient ad-
vocates was an understanding that savings from managed care in
Medicaid would be applied not only to finance medical services for
Medicaid patients but also to fund medical care for other uninsured
Tennesseans by expanding TennCare coverage beyond its Medicaid
base-all without substantial increases in state expenditures. This
would increase the proportion of Tennessee residents who had medical
340. See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that
inequality in per pupil expenditures across school districts violated the state constitution and
required increased state expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars per year to reduce per
pupil spending disparities across districts).
341. See supra Part III.A.
342. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w) (1994); see also supra Part III.B.
343. For a discussion of various aspects of the Clinton Plan, see generally Symposium, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1994).
344. The state was also wary that Medicaid cutbacks not supported by advocates for Medi-
caid patients could result in litigation. See, e.g., Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1306-08
(M.D. Tenn. 1996) (noting pre-TennCare class action regarding Medicaid grievance procedures
and the Second Consent Decree entered to settle that case).
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insurance, consistent with Clinton Administration health access
objectives.
D. Constraining Entitlement: The Significance of an
Either/Or Rather Than a Yes/No Perspective
The structure of decisionmaking and the perception of that
structure influence the behavior of participants in a political or an
economic marketplace. Where economic or political trade-offs are at
issue, decisions can either be framed as "yes/no" or "either/or." A
yes/no decision confronts a decisionmaker with a choice of deciding
only whether, for example, to consume (beneficial) medical services or
to forgo use of those services. If the consumer answers "yes," then he
or she receives the services and benefits from them. If the consumer
answers "no," then no services are received. In such a situation,
whether the d cisionmaker can recapture and reallocate ("R & R") re-
sources derived from economizing is critical in determining whether
economic or political trade-offs will be fairly balanced in the decision-
making process.
Where R & R does not apply, a decisionmaker has an incentive
to say "yes" to consumption of beneficial services irrespective of cost.
Trade-offs are difficult to consider when a decisionmaker confronts
uncertainty and lack of control over alternative expenditures-i.e.,
when decisions are not viewed as "either/or." The incentive to say "no"
is therefore diminished when a decisionmaker cannot consider
whether a putatively more attractive alternative expenditure might be
preferable to the one at issue. Only when decisions are perceived as
being "either/or"--either the benefit under consideration by the deci-
sionmaker will be obtained (by saying "yes") or the decisionmaker can
choose a higher-priority, more desirable alternative by declining the
benefit under consideration (by saying "no')-can a properly func-
tioning decentralized process for considering trade-offs emerge."5 As
we have argued in detail elsewhere, "[t]he ability of private decision-
makers to benefit from choosing not to consume an item is critical to
the effective functioning of... private choice. Given a certain budget,
decisionmakers in the private market face 'either/or' rather than
'yes/no' choices-selecting one good or service means foregoing an-
other."3 '6 But this system only works when decisionmakers can "re-
capture and reallocate ("R & R") resources derived from econo-
345. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 300, at 857-59.
346. Blumstein, supra note 288, at 1350.
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mizing.3 "' In the absence of R & R, "decisions are seen not as
'either/or' but as 'yes/no,' and a private decisionmaker will be prone to
say 'yes' to a given consumption opportunity because he will not gain
anything by saying 'no' to any outlay of funds." 8
The insight about the difference between an "either/or" and
"yes/no" decisionmaking framework applies to the political environ-
ment surrounding TennCare. Historically, advocates for Medicaid
beneficiaries opposed any cutback in benefits. Politically, these issues
were framed in "yes/no" terms-i.e., does one support or oppose a par-
ticular proposed cutback in services. From a broader perspective, all
such political choices have an "either/or" dimension, but in the context
of determining whether to support or oppose a particular cutback, ad-
vocates for Medicaid beneficiaries-access egalitarians-routinely
opposed such cutbacks.
In the TennCare context, access egalitarians had an important
political chit to play. Since the Clinton health reform plan was de-
signed to expand access to medical care, the Clinton Administration
was not likely to approve a waiver proposal that impaired access to
care. Access egalitarian opposition to a TennCare waiver could have
jeopardized or slowed down approval of the TennCare waiver. Under
such circumstances, the state's securing support from the well-organ-
ized access egalitarian community was politically important."'
Governor McWherter's Administration was able to shift the
decisionmaking paradigm for access egalitarians from "yes/no" to
"either/or." The state administration assured patient advocates that
savings from TennCare would be recycled into the health care system
to improve access for uninsured Tennesseans who were not eligible for
Medicaid. This transformed the debate. Instead of facing a decision
in a "yes/no" framework, access egalitarians were in a position to
recapture and reallocate savings from Medicaid managed care to
addressing the broader goal of improving overall access to medical
care for a group that would not otherwise receive health care benefits.
In this light, the potential stringencies from managed care were offset
by substantial progress toward another fundamental goal of access
egalitarians-universal medical care coverage."
347. Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 300, at 857.
348. Blumstein, supra note 288, at 1351.
349. It is noteworthy that the leverage of access egalitarians is now diminished since states
have a statutory right to adopt mandatory managed care in their Medicaid programs. See supra
text accompanying notes 191-99.
350. The political deal for mandatory Medicaid managed care was further sweetened in three
ways, all of which suggest that the price on Medicaid beneficiaries exacted by TennCare would
not be substantial. First, Blue Cross, which had the only statewide provider network, agreed to
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Restructuring the TennCare debate resulted in a shift in per-
ception from that of a "yes/no' potential takeway to that of a trade-off'
mechanism for achieving alternative (related) objectives.35" ' As an en-
titlement program was modified, with flexibility to deny enrollment to
some (non-Medicaid) categories of eligible patients, the "either/or"
nature of the debate-the ability to recapture and reallocate savings
from managed care to achieve other access egalitarian health care
goals-changed the political climate between the state and access
egalitarians.
E. TennCare: Government by Contract
Under TennCare, the state uses its purchasing power to
achieve economies in its Medicaid program. In place of a system of
regulation governed by principles of administrative law, TennCare is a
system of regulation governed by contracts, known as CRAs, which
oblige MCOs to provide medically necessary services to TennCare
enrollees. Medical necessity decisions adverse to a patient that are
not resolved to the patient's satisfaction through an MCO's grievance
process can be appealed to a state-level TennCare review, which is
binding on MCOs"
State and federal law control MCOs, and the CRA is amended
automatically and without action by the parties whenever required by
include TennCare beneficiaries in its state employee network, assuring TennCare patients of
mainstream quality medical care on a par with that provided to state employees. See supra note
294; Thorne et al., supra note 305, at 129-30. Second, Blue Cross agreed to require providers
who were members of the network serving state employees to accept TennCare patients (even
though the financial terms would be different). See Thorne et al., supra note 305, at 130. Since
physician participation levels in Medicaid had always been a concern, this held out the prospect
of improving accessibility to mainstream providers. See id. Third, the benefits package for
TennCare was generous, in particular retaining the specialized services required for children
under the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Testing ("EPSDT") program. Under
EPSDT, a state's Medicaid program must provide any service that Medicaid covers and a physi-
cian deems "medically necessary" even though the state might not provide -that service to adult
Medicaid beneficiaries in the state's program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (1994). See generally
Flippen, supra note 24, at 685 (discussing the challenges that EPSDT poses to Medicaid man-
aged care).
351. In February 1999, Governor Sundquist proposed temporarily restricting access of unin-
surable non-Medicaid beneficiaries to TennCare, essentially on cost grounds as program costs
had begun to pose budgetary problems again for the state. One can predict that support for
TennCare among access egalitarians will diminish as savings from managed care are used more
to reduce budgetary pressures and less to achieve access goals for non-Medicaid uninsureds. But
see Jon Yates, TennCare Supporters Speak Up, THE TENNESSEAN, Mar. 10, 1999, at 4B.
352. CRA II, supra note 206, § 3-8, at 61. This state-level review was implemented as a re-
sult of and in settlement of litigation. See Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305 (M.D. Tenn.
1996), vacated on other grounds sub nom Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir. 1998).
changes in state or federal law." The state reserves the right to inter-
pret, clarify, and apply all federal and state laws, regulations and poli-
cies that affect the CRAs.' In important ways, then, the state has
unilateral authority to change MCO obligations under the CRA-by
determinations of medical necessity and by exercise of authority to in-
terpret, clarify and apply federal and state laws. And that unilateral
power to impose obligations on MCOs does not impose additional costs
on TennCare, at least in the short run, creating an opportunity for
cost externalization or decisionmaking moral hazard. Government
can achieve program enhancements by mandating their implemen-
tation by MCOs and, at least in the short run, without added state-in-
curred program costs."s How much effect this "unfunded mandate"
potential has had on discouraging MCO entry into the market is diffi-
cult to ascertain, but it is true that the major national managed care
firms have not entered the TennCare market.
1. The Medical Necessity Issue
Traditionally, decisionmaking authority in medicine has rested
with doctors who have dominated the field." This professional para-
digm' 7 is justified as a response to perceived market failure in the
market for medical care. For a market to function smoothly, infor-
mation must be available to decisionmakers. Because an asymmetry
of information exists between physicians and patients-doctors have
scientific expertise, consumers lack such knowledge -- the pro-
fessional model would bypass the market by substituting the judg-
ment of the physician for that of the patient."
The professional model transfers enormous authority from con-
sumers, whose judgment controls in a traditional market setting, to
professional providers. The ostensibly scientific foundation of medical
training and practice provides the justification for professional
353. CRA H1, supra note 206, § 4-9, at 74.
354. Id. § 3-4, at 60.
355. An example of this type of "unfunded mandate" arose in the context of TennCare's man-
dated method of treatment of HIV. Recommended AIDS treatment changed in 1996, following
the approval of new drugs in December 1995 and February 1996, from AZT alone to a three-drug
combination therapy. TennCare obliged MCOs to provide the new AIDS treatment but did not
take on additional financial responsibility. See Julie Bell, HIV Drugs Hold Hope, High Costs,
THE TENNESSEAN, Sept. 18, 1996, at Al.
356. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 226-27 (1982).
357. See James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care:
Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1463-66 (1994).
358. See ARROW, supra note 45.
359. See Blumstein, supra note 357, at 1464.
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empowerment. Surrogate (and necessarily paternalistic) decision-
making by professionals substitutes for the control that consumers
exercise in the market where they are sovereign.' Professional
empowerment leads to physician control of costs and output. By
shifting control from consumers to physician fiduciaries, the profes-
sional model insulates the medical services market from economic
trade-offs."' Decisions, in theory at least, are made on the basis of
science, not economics.
The term "medical necessity," found in most medical insurance
contracts,36 2 conforms to the ideology of the professional paradigm. It
focuses on medical criteria, delegates decisionmaking authority to pro-
fessional experts (physicians),' and deemphasizes traditional eco-
nomic considerations (such as balancing cost and benefit in con-
sumption decisions). Although some physicians urge incorporation of
economic factors in medical decisionmaking protocols," the traditional
understanding of the term "medical necessity" is that it relies exclu-
sively on medical criteria and omits economic considerations from the
decisionmaking calculus.365
On the accompanying figure (Figure 1), which shows a benefits
curve and a cost line, the point at which the slope of the cost line and
the slope of the benefits curve are the same reflects the point where
marginal cost equals marginal benefit-where incremental cost is pre-
cisely equal to incremental benefit. This is designated as point "o" for
optimality. Beyond point o, the level of benefits continues to increase,
360. Id. at 1465.
361. See id. at 1466.
362. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 4, at 125 (noting that" 'medical necessity' is ubiquitous as
a criterion governing the obligation of the plan to pay for particular services); Timothy S. Jost,
The American Difference in Health Care Costs: Is There a Problem? Is Medical Necessity the
Solution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 1 (1999) (same).
363. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, &
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 66 (1997) (noting that "historically, courts have been
unreceptive or outright hostile to insurers' attempts to interfere in clinical discretion for any
reason, including safety and effectiveness concerns, let alone on account of cost/benefit trade-
offs").
364. See David M. Eddy, Balancing Cost and Quality in Fee-for-Service Versus Managed
Care, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 162, 172-73.
365. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that the 'Medical necessity" test requires
doctors to prescribe only that which is medically beneficial for a patient); Einer Elhauge, The
Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L. REV. 1525, 1531-33
(1996) (arguing that "medical effectiveness," which is the basic goal of health care and which is
defined as providing only that care which benefits a patient, is separable from "cost effective-
ness'); see generally Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992) (examining whether courts should allow health care
costs to be controlled by insurers' denials of payments for specific services based on judgments of
"medical appropriateness).
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but the level of benefits is exceeded by the additional costs incurred to
pay for those benefits. At point x, the benefits curve turns flat-this is
the "flat of the curve" or zero-benefit medical care. At point y, the
benefits curve turns down, showing that additional care can be harm-
ful. The medical necessity standard, with its exclusive focus on medi-
cal criteria, pushes levels of utilization to point x on the benefits curve,
where benefits turn flat.
Traditionally, reflecting the medical necessity concept, health
insurers only addressed the question whether proposed treatments
were "safe and effective," that is, "whether, on balance, the procedure's
medical benefits outweigh[ed] its medical risks."' Insurers did not
ask "whether a beneficial result might be obtained more cheaply, let
alone whether a marginally increased benefit is simply too expensive
to be worth the cost." 7 The medical necessity standard has required
"only that some medical benefit be demonstrated, however slight,""8
pushing levels of utilization to point x on Figure 1. Under that
regime, decisions regarding the "choice of less versus more effective
and less versus more expensive modalities" of treatment were left up
to the doctor and, acting on the doctor's advice, the patient. 9
The movement toward managed care reflects an attempt to
introduce economic considerations into medical care decisionmaking,
to push the level of utilization from point x back towards point o on
Figure 1. This reflects a challenge to the traditional professional
paradigm "under which health care is not regarded, even at the mar-
gin, as a consumer good" subject to economic tradeoffs and, conse-
quently, "health care providers.., prescribe for patients everything
that may be beneficial-and nothing but the best.""37 The introduction
of economic considerations into decisionmaking suggests that, instead
of adopting a purely professional model in response to the market
failure of asymmetric information-a strategy of market substitu-
tion-an appropriate alternative is adoption of a strategy of market
improvement to improve the functioning of the market by increasing
access to understandable information."'1
366. HALL, supra note 363, at 67.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. HAVIGHURST, supra note 2, at 15.
371. Blumstein, supra note 357, at 1464.
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FIGURE 1
THE OPTIMAL LEVEL OF HEALTH CARE SPENDING
lo Inputs
Source: Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost
Tradeoffs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 6, 17 (1975).
While managed care aims to balance medical and economic fac-
tors in decisionmaking, its retention of the term medical necessity
hampers that effort because of its communication that medical criteria
continue exclusively to control decisionmaking, that professionals
retain exclusive authority to make coverage determinations, and that
utilization should approach point x on Figure 1 (the point of zero bene-
fits). As a practical matter, a medical necessity standard assures
coverage of any reasonable medical treatment decision unless it is
deemed "experimental."3" If a procedure or treatment is medically
372. And even treatments conventionally seen as experimental because of insufficient data
on efficacy have been ordered to be covered by courts. See, e.g., Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1990) (rejecting "experimental" label based on testimony of
treating physician as to theory of treatment and refusing to require empirical evidence of
effectiveness). Where a health plan deviates from professional norms in its view of medical
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beneficial and recommended by a treating physician, the medical
necessity standard provides little opportunity for a plan to deny cover-
age. Managed care, to be effective in introducing cost factors into
medical decisionmaking, must find a third category-medically bene-
ficial but excessively costly under the circumstances or insufficiently
beneficial given less expensive available alternatives.3"
In a private benefits program (and for non-indigent patients), a
health plan's coverage decision that reflects economic factors need not
always correspond to an ultimate decision regarding treatment-
whether a patient will purchase a medical service. A plan may not
cover a service, but an informed patient with different risk preferences
or different levels of resource availability might choose to purchase a
service even if the plan does not cover it."
In TennCare, the state uses an appeals process to determine
whether a particular diagnosis or treatment is medically necessary,
thereby binding the MCO. For Medicaid beneficiaries, the medical
necessity coverage decision will nearly always be coextensive with the
actual treatment provided. If the decision is left to the MCO, there
exists a risk of conflict of interest on the part of the MCO, which re-
ceives a fixed per-patient capitation rate. A decision to provide a
benefit under such circumstances, at least in the short run, is made at
an MCO's financial peril."5 At the same time, a decision by the state
imposes costs not on the state itself, at least not in the short run, but
externalizes those costs to private entities (TennCare contracting
MCOs), a form of potential political moral hazard.
The political moral hazard problem is exacerbated by the deci-
sionmaking context. The decision is not framed in statistical terms as
a resource allocation issue. The health of an identifiable individual is
necessity, courts may impose professional standards of medical necessity on the theory that a
contractual standard at odds with the professional standard frustrates the justified expectations
of insureds. See Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 263 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1989).
373. In recognition of the problem of the "medical necessity" standard in the managed care
context, TennCare administrators proposed to define "medical necessity" as "the most cost-
effective alternative among courses of treatment that, for practical purposes, are equivalent in
effectiveness and safety." See TennCare Re-Examining Proposed Rule that Would Determine
Covered Care, THE TENNESSEAN, Oct. 15, 1999, at 3B. Advocates for TennCare patients resisted
that definitional clarification because of the fear that "when MCOs determine what is most 'cost-
effective,' it's likely to mean 'cheapest' as opposed to what's the least expensive way of achieving
the best outcome." Id. As a result of that opposition by patient advocates, the Sundquist ad-
ministration withdrew the proposed definition for further review. Id.
374. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding physician has duty to
disclose economic conflict of interest regarding referral and holding that patient has right to be
informed of other treatment alternatives even if not covered by an ERISA plan).
375. See, e.g., Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (stating that,
under TennCare, MCOs "have financial incentives to deny enrollees health care even when such
health care is medically appropriate").
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at issue. In such circumstances, a governmental decision to say "no"
to medical care bumps into long-held symbolic values regarding the
value of health and of life itself."' The more visible and more directly
accountable the government becomes, the more likely that the result
of the process would be a subtle form of institutional blackmail, in-
ducing society to spend more resources in this area than it might
otherwise choose."' Institutional blackmail linked to political moral
hazard suggests that the state-level review of medical necessity, a
term itself that connotes no economic constraints, can produce a
strong incentive for requiring, through contract administration, ex-
tensive and expensive coverage by the MCOs.
2. The Interpretation of Federal and State Law Issue
By clarifying, interpreting, and applying state and federal law,
the state has implicit authority to impose conditions on MCOs. An
example is the state's settling TennCare lawsuits imposing additional
grievance-procedure obligations on MCOs,"' or adopting compliance
standards and procedures for MCO implementation of EPSDT
requirements."9 Although their interests as at-risk contractors are
376. See James F. Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affect-
ing Human Life and Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 250 (1976).
377. See id. at 252; see also Havighurst et al., supra note 30, at 140-45. An example of the
link between the medical necessity standard and the identifiable life context arose in the context
of a claim by a TennCare beneficiary for MCO approval of a liver/bowel transplant. See Hinds v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., No. 3:95-0508 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (on file with author, unavailable
on-line and not reported). The court held that the procedure was medically necessary and not
experimental and therefore had to be paid for by the MCO. See id. In determining whether the
procedure was safe and effective, the court weighed risks and benefits, noting that the procedure
was the plaintiffs only real hope and that greater risk was warranted. See id. The court's unit
of analysis for the risk/benefit calculation was the patient. No consideration was given to the
opportunity cost of the expenditure-the other possible systemic claims on the MCO's resources.
See id. The court implicitly rejected any interpretation of medical necessity that included
alternative uses of the resources, focusing exclusively on the benefits and risks to the patient
herself. See id. Clearly, the court viewed the issue in yeslno rather than either/or terms. See id.
Interestingly, the state sided with the MCO, seeing the possible drain on MCO resources if the
principle were generalized and the risk to the fiscal integrity to TennCare that could result.
378. See Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting Tennessee's consent to a
modification in claims denial procedures after a district court finding that existing procedures
violated due process and further noting the state's failure to appeal that decision). A subsequent
consent decree in that litigation acknowledged that the far-reaching procedures adopted ex-
tended beyond those required under medical regulations. See Grier v. Wadley, Civil Action No.
79-3107 (M.D. Tenn. 1999) (unpublished opinion on file with Professor Blumstein, Vanderbilt
Law School) (Consent Decree).
379. See 42 U.S.C.§§1396a(a)(43), 1396d(a), & 1396d(r) (1994); John B. v. Menke, Civ. Action
No. 3-98-0168 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (unpublished opinion on file with Professor Blumstein, Vander-
bilt Law School (Consent Decree). For a description of EPSDT, see supra note 350.
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clearly at stake, MCOs were not formally parties to the litigation.
Whether MCOs would have agreed to the same terms (or whether
those precise terms would be mandated by HCFA) is unknown, but
MCOs reportedly have been concerned about the (purportedly) un-
anticipated financial obligations of the EPSDT consent decree."
When changes are not the result of interpretation of state or
federal law, they are not contractually binding unless consensual.38'
Such modifications must be mutually agreed upon in writing by the
MCO and TennCare and be incorporated as a written amendment to
the CRA prior to their effective date. 2 While an informal negotiation
process may occur between the state, the MCOs, and patient advo-
cates," formal administrative processes need not be followed. "'
The ability to modify and revise the CRAs gives the state tre-
mendous leverage since the MCOs face a purchaser negotiating for 1.3
million lives covered under TennCare. This leverage is enhanced by
the asymmetry of the contract termination procedures. TennCare can
terminate its contract with an MCO at will by providing thirty days
written notice. There is no "for cause" requirement.3" On the other
hand, an MCO is subject to much more stringent termination
requirements. An MCO may only terminate its CRA with TennCare
upon written notice on the twelve-month anniversary of each begin-
ning effective date, and the last day of operation must be at least 180
days from the date of written notice.3" The CRA sets out detailed ter-
mination procedures,38 ' and requires that a terminating MCO submit
its final invoice for payment to TennCare within 120 days after the
termination. Failure to comply with this time restraint results in for-
feiture of payments. The terminating MCO must also continue to
380. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 166, at ix (noting that a "significant con-
cern among TennCare MCOs is the EPSDT 'consent decree' ").
381. See TENNCARE WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 14.
382. See id.
383. See, e.g., Complaint, at 51, Newberry v. Menke, Civ. Action No. 3-98-1127, (M.D.
Tenn) (Complaint filed Dec. 7, 1998).
384. Although HCFA has not exercised its authority formally to refuse to approve a proposed
change, it does have the right to review and approve changes in the CRA, assuring considerable
protection for patient-beneficiary interests. See HCFA Approval Letter, supra note 8 (STC 1);
Interview by Jennifer Shorb with Steve Hopper, TennCare Official, Nashville, Tenn. (Nov. 10,
1997); see generally Complaint, Newberry v. Menke, supra note 383, 33 (noting federal gov-
ernment's power to review and approve any change in the "amount, duration, and scope of
services to be provided to TennCare beneficiaries" and the lack of approval regarding the alleged
changes in home health care services challenged in that litigation).
385. See CRA H, supra note 206, § 4-2.e., at 68; see also supra note 217.
386. See CRA II, supra note 206, § 4-2.f., at 69-70. But see Snyder, supra note 217, at 1A
(allowing MCOs to leave TennCare during 1999-2000 with six months notice).
387. See CRA 1I, supra note 206, § 4-2.g.
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serve and arrange for the provision of services to enrollees for forty-
five days after termination or until they can be enrolled in other plans.
Thus, the state has a lot of leverage over the MCOs since con-
tract termination is the only complete exit strategy for an MCO,3" and
that is an extremely costly approach. Since the capitation rate paid to
MCOs need not be adjusted to fit new demands imposed by the state,
the state has a considerable incentive to impose additional terms or
conditions. This financial disjunction provides a ready target for
patient advocates, who can plausibly claim, at least in the short run,
that the state can improve the quality of services or access to services
provided by MCOs without incurring additional state costs. Given the
high costs of termination for MCOs, the state may be tempted to push
its negotiating advantage to the maximum, mindful, however, that it
has an interest in maintaining the financial integrity and solvency of
the MCOs and their ability and willingness to stay in the TennCare
market. Notably, there has not been entry into the TennCare market
by national MCOs, presumably because of the leverage possessed by
the state' and because of the uncertain risk MCOs are being asked to
absorb.
There are examples of the state acting out of concern for the
potential fiscal liability of MCOs."8' In Newberry v. Menke, TennCare
beneficiaries challenged the home care policies of MCOs as approved
by the state. Plaintiffs alleged that MCOs provided home health
services "for only a few diagnoses, and only for brief periods," exclud-
ing from coverage beneficiaries who suffer from long-term chronic
conditions and are in need of "custodial [home health care] services"
that would therapeutically benefit them." In addition, plaintiffs
alleged that Blue Care (Blue Cross' TennCare MCO) denied "home
health coverage to any beneficiary who does not meet the MCO's
requirement that they [sic] be 'homebound.' .....
According to the Complaint, the home health care restrictions
were imposed at first informally, then in written communications
between Blue Care and the state.392 Plaintiffs complained that the
388. An MCO could call a moratorium on enrolling new TennCare patients as Blue Cross did
in July 1996. However, in 1998, Blue Cross agreed to a contract amendment that required
MCOs to be open for new enrollment in any area in which they are qualified to serve during the
year. Blue Cross re-opened for new enrollment in February 1998. See TennCare Website, supra
note 11 (Department of Health News Release, January 28, 1998).
389. See Hinds v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. No. 3:95-0508 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (on file
with author, unavailable online and not reported)
390. See Complaint, Newberry v. Menke, supra note 383, 44-47.
391. Id. 48.
392. See id. 49-52.
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denial of custodial home health services and the requirement that
TennCare beneficiaries be homebound in order to qualify for home
health care were in fact changes in the CRA and required HCFA ap-
proval, which Tennessee had not sought or obtained. That would
violate the terms of the TennCare waiver. For plaintiffs, the custodial
care and homebound requirements were additional terms beyond the
medical necessity standard in the CRA.
The state's position seems to be that the policies regarding
home health care are not in addition to, but part of, the state's deter-
mination of medical necessity in the context of long-term chronic care.
As part of its determination of what is medically necessary, the state
may make a judgment about the appropriate type of service to meet a
patient's medical needs. In this regard, the state says that 'TennCare
beneficiaries who need long term care may not obtain such care from
an MCO, but must seek such care from other sources."'93 That is,
nursing home services are TennCare's method for responding to the
chronic-care needs of beneficiaries, and those services have been ex-
cluded from MCO responsibility.39 '
The home health dispute nicely shows that the state recognizes
some restraints on its ability to impose additional obligations on
MCOs when the MCOs can make a credible threat that they will
either leave the market entirely or, as Blue Care did, suspend new
enrollment. At the same time, Newberry demonstrates the impetus
for patient advocates to lean on the state to mandate an expansive
interpretation of MCO obligations under the CRA since "the cost to
the state of the plaintiffs TennCare coverage is the same ... whether
or not he receives home health care.3 95 And it also shows that patient
advocates view the requirement for HCFA approval of all CRA
changes as a critical political point of influence for patient interests.96
F. Fraud and Abuse (Antikickback) Issues
In a fee-for-service ("FFS") health care market, financial incen-
tives often result in overutilization because they stimulate increased
use of services.397 To combat the problem of financially-motivated
393. Id. 1 53.
394. See id. 1 39-40.
395. Id. 1 73.
396. The Newberry case may also determine to what extent state flexibility to interpret and
clarify program requirements are subject either to HCFA/Medicaid oversight or subject to
restraints under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which is one of the causes of action pled in
Newberry. Id. 11 129-33.
397. See James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 205 (1996) (stating that
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overutilization, the federal antikickback law prohibits the knowing
and willful use of financial incentives ("remuneration ''i"r) in federal
health care programs " to solicit"® or to induce"1 referrals of future
business.4°  Since the Third Circuit's decision in United States v.
Greber,03 courts have interpreted the antikickback provision broadly. u
Greber held that if one purpose of a payment was to induce future
reciprocal referrals, the payment violated the antikickback law, even
if the payment was also intended to compensate for professional serv-
ices (actually) rendered. 5 The court in Greber "assumed that the
services were needed, medically appropriate, and reasonably priced. 41
As the federal enforcement agency-the Office of Inspector
General ("OIG") of the federal Department of Health and Human
Services-has recognized, ' the breadth of. Greber is quite stunning. It
calls into question all market-driven behavior involving federal health
care programs, ' even where such conduct is valuable in rationalizing
the delivery of medical services. Lack of harm to anyone-govern-
ment, providers, program beneficiaries-is not a defense to an anti-
kickback law prosecution.4 ' The law therefore targets competitive
FFS system); see also Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost
Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6, 15-20 (1975-76).
398. The term "remuneration" includes but is broader than "kickback, bribe, or rebate." The
"remuneration" can be "in cash or in kind" and can either be paid or received "directly or in-
directly, overtly or covertly." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1) & (2) (1994).
399. Id. § 1320a-7b(f)(1) (Supp. 1997) (defining what qualifies as "federal health care pro-
grams").
400. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1).
401. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
402. Violation of the antikickback law is a felony. See id. § 1320a-7b(a). It can also result in
a civil monetary penalty of $50,000 per act of violation. See id. § 1320a-7a(a)(7) (Supp. 1998).
403. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
404. The Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") at the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS") has enforcement oversight for the antikickback law, shared in the criminal
arena, of course, with the Department of Justice. OIG has acknowledged that the antikickback
law, as construed, has extraordinary reach and scope (and sometimes can even have perverse
effects):
Since the statute on its face is so broad, and the court has recognized its full breadth,
concern has arisen among a number of health care providers that many relatively
innocuous, or even beneficial, commercial arrangements are technically covered by the
statute and are, therefore, subject to criminal prosecution. This section [requiring
regulations setting forth safe harbors] reflects the generally accepted view that the
language proscribing remuneration that induces referrals is so broadly written as to
encompass many harmless or efficient arrangements as well.
54 Fed. Reg. 3088, 3088 (1989) (not codified in C.F.R.).
405. See Blumstein, supra note 397, at 212 (citing Greber, 760 F.2d at 72).
406. Greber, 760 F.2d at 71.
407. See supra note 404.
408. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b()(1) (1994).
409. See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996). Jain, which involved a criminal
prosecution for violation of fraud and abuse (antikickback) and for mail fraud, is especially
214
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behavior aimed at securing improved market share in the same way
that it (properly) targets the use of financial incentives that are likely
to result in overutilization. On its own, then, Greber poses a substan-
tial potential obstacle to the use of competitive market forces to con-
tain costs and promote quality in an evolving health care market
environment.""
At the time of TennCare's approval, the antikickback law ap-
plied equally to health care environments characterized by FFS and
capitation. Since a substantial component of TennCare's agenda was
a shift in the way health care institutions were organized and medical
care services were delivered, the antikickback fraud and abuse law
potentially stood as an inhibitor in the evolution of the TennCare
marketplace."1"
poignant in this regard. Id. at 438. Dr. Jain, a psychologist, was found to have solicited and
received from a psychiatric hospital "remuneration" for referring patients. See id. at 439. In the
district court, he was convicted of violating both the Medicare/Medicaid fraud and abuse law, 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b), and the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. See id. The fraud and abuse
conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals. See id. at 438. However, the mail fraud convic-
tion was reversed because an essential element of that charge, according to the court, was that
the defendant's act caused "some demonstrable harm or injury to the government, a federal
beneficiary, or someone else." Id.; CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY:
READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIONS 475 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining Jain's holding and stating that
Jain emphasizes the unusual position of fraud under the antikickback law). Since 'Dr. Jain
provided quality psychological services," since "[e]ach hospitalized patient required hospitaliza-
tion," since the facility to which Dr. Jain referred his patients "was as good as or better than any
alternative facility and provided his patients with proper care," and since overall "there was no
evidence that any patient suffered tangible harm," the Court of Appeals reversed the mail fraud
conviction. Jain, 93 F.3d at 442. Thus, while Dr. Jain's mail fraud conviction was overturned,
his fraud and abuse conviction was sustained even though the Court of Appeals noted that 'Dr.
Jain intended to provide and did in fact provide his patients with the highest quality psychologi-
cal services." Id. For a criticism of Jain, see Gregory D. Jones, Note, Primum Non Nocere: The
Expanding "Honest Services" Mail Fraud Statute and the Physician-Patient Fiduciary Relation-
ship, 51 VAND. L. REV. 139, 173 (1998) (arguing that a breach of a physician's fiduciary relation-
ship to a patient occurs when the physician fails to disclose an economic conflict of interest, such
as a kickback, that could influence a medical decision and that such a breach of fiduciary duty,
in depriving a patient's right to "honest services," causes harm enough to trigger a violation of
the mail fraud statute).
410. See James F. Blumstein, Rationalizing the Fraud and Abuse Statute, 15 HEALTH AFF.
118, 119 (1996).
411. There are many appropriate payment arrangements that may be considered fraud and
abuse violations. Hospitals purchase physician practices and make payments to recruit physi-
cians. Such arrangements may enable a hospital to compete with another hospital on price and
quality. Nevertheless, such practices may be interpreted as fraud and abuse violations since a
goal is to develop a flow of patients for the hospital. Another activity that could be inhibited is
the integration of various health care providers into larger organizations. The primary goal of
such integration might be to deliver a broad continuum of care and thereby to compete for
managed care contracts. This type of competition among health care providers, which could
promote price competition and encourage the formation of organizations to deliver efficient
managed care, might enhance efficiency and reduce costs. In the long run, that should be
beneficial to third-party payers and to consumers. Such beneficial results, however, are not
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While the antikickback law has an important role to play in
discouraging overutilization in an FFS environment, and the policy
objective in that setting is to reduce the overbreadth of the statute's
reach, not to eliminate its application entirely," the policy calculus in
a capitated environment is altogether different. TennCare's system of
managed care imposes considerable financial risk on MCOs, which
receive fixed (capitated) payments per enrollee per month. MCOs
organize the network of providers for their beneficiaries and assume
responsibility, under contract with the state, for the delivery of speci-
fied health care services to those TennCare beneficiaries. Under capi-
tation, the MCO and perhaps providers are at risk financially for the
provision of contracted-for benefits to enrollees. Accordingly, MCOs,
facing a fixed budget have a financial incentive to underserve (not
overserve) their beneficiaries since cost savings to particular patients
reduce an MCO's overall financial risk from the aggregate pool of capi-
tated payments.' In short, unlike an FFS approach, which rewards
additional utilization with additional payment, a capitated payment
methodology constrains overutilization and other costly practices. "
Despite the fundamental differences in incentives for utiliza-
tion between FFS and capitation, both types of payment systems were
equally subject to the antikickback law when TennCare was imple-
mented."'" Yet, in a capitated environment, the government's financial
defenses to a fraud and abuse prosecution if the inducement of future referrals is even a part of
the motivation. Id. at 121.
412. See, e.g., id. at 126 (recommending that, through adoption of a safe harbor, a putative
defendant be able to establish as an affirmative defense that particular conduct, even if involving
remuneration to induce future referrals, be protected from the antikickback law if (a) federal
program costs are reduced without significant, unacceptable decreases in quality of care, or if (b)
federal program quality or choice is improved at no increased program costs).
413. See, e.g., Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (MCOs 'have
financial incentives to deny enrollees health care even when such health care is medically
appropriate").
414. See Blumstein, supra note 397, at 205 (stating an FFS system's financial incentives
stimulate increased service use resulting in overutilization; a capitated health care system's
payment system inhibits overutilization).
415. The antikickback law contains no private cause of action. It is enforced by federal
authorities, both in its criminal and civil dimensions. There is authority, however, for allowing
private whistleblower actions under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§
3729(a), 3730(b) (1994), to pursue violations of the antikickback law. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Thompson v. ColubiaHCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 900-01 (5th Cir. 1997) (over-
turning lower court's holding that private plaintiffs qui tam action could not be brought under
the False Claims Act); United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care Ctr., Inc., 797 F.2d
888, 893 (10th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging availability of False Claims Act suit "in the context of
federal-state jointly funded programs such as Medicaid"); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Ameri-
can Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1508 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (declining to dismiss plaintiffs
qui tam action under the False Claims Act for failure to state a claim). For a comprehensive and
cogent critique of the use of the False Claims Act to enforce the antikickback law, see Lisa
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obligation is set by the capitation payment to an MCO. Any other
arrangements that might create an incentive for increases in utiliza-
tion could affect the MCOs, but not, at least in the short run, the
governmental payor. The concern expressed by the antikickback law
about overutilization and escalating program costs, linked concep-
tually to FFS, seemed out of place in a capitated payment environ-
ment.41 In managed care financed on a capitated basis, the risk of
fraud on the state stems primarily from the systematic underprovision
not overprovision of services."' Since the state's financial responsi-
bility is established by the capitation payment, any fraud that may be
perpetrated on MCOs does not, at least directly and in the short run,
affect the state financially. "8
In 1996, during the initial TennCare demonstration period,
Congress recognized the analytical significance of the capitation pay-
ment methodology for the application of the antikickback law. The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA'
but often referred to as the "Kassebaum-Kennedy" bill) 9 created a
statutory safe harbor from coverage of the antikickback law for any
individual (such as a provider) or entity (such as an MCO) that is "at
substantial financial risk for the cost or utilization of the items or
services... which the individual or entity is obligated to provide."4
Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling Off the Bounty Hunters: Discrediting the Use of Alleged Anti-
Kickback Violations to Support False Claims Actions, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1003 (1998).
416. See Blumstein, supra note 397, at 211 (noting that the antikickback law was somewhat
anachronistic in its continued application to a capitated payment environment and labeling the
failure to adopt some form of safe harbor for a capitated payment situation, when MCOs or
providers are at financial risk, "a case of hardening of the intellectual arteries").
417. Fraud can also arise from false reporting of sign-ups, either from persons who have not
in fact signed up or from persons who sign up but who are not eligible for TennCare. For a
comprehensive description and discussion of areas of fraud and abuse in a managed care envi-
ronment, see Sharon L. Davies, & Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo or Wonder
Drug for Health Care Fraud and Abuse?, 31 GA. L. REV. 373 (1997). In the early stages of
TennCare, there were stories of MCOs signing up transients who left the state but whose
capitation payments continued. This problem was substantially curtailed when, in January
1995, TennCare stopped accepting new enrollees (the uninsured) unless they received certifi-
cation of uninsurable status (the uninsurables). For discussions of these issues, see id. at 388-
89.
418. Of course, fraud that resulted in MCO insolvency could have substantial financial impli-
cations for the state, but the requirements for HMO financial safeguards protect against a good
bit of that risk. In Spring 1999, the third largest MCO went into receivership, with the state
agreeing to pay claims incurred after the date of the onset of the receivership but, at least
initially, declining to pay previously incurred claims. See supra note 205.
419. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-76 (Supp. 1997).
420. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(F).
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As a result of the "financial risk" safe harbor,"" activities of
MCOs and their providers are not subject to the strictures imposed by
the antikickback law, leaving MCOs free to use financial incentives to
develop more efficient struciures and relationships within the market-
place. The safe harbor places responsibility on MCOs to monitor their
providers to assure that the MCOs and their beneficiaries receive the
benefits for which the MCO has contracted.4"
G. The Status of the TennCare MCOs:
State Action and Its Implications
MCOs that contract with TennCare are nominally private enti-
ties. Unless they are deemed state actors (acting under color of state
law), MCOs are not subject to constitutional constraints imposed on
governmental decisionmakers by the Fourteenth Amendment."' The
critical question in state action analysis is what "private" conduct is
"fairly attributable" to the state."
1. The Cause for Concern: Some Policy Considerations
The state actor status of the TennCare MCOs is important be-
cause a finding that they are state actors would invoke an array of
constitutional doctrines that can have a significant effect on their
421. Congress manddted the implementation of this "financial risk" safe harbor through a
negotiated rulemaking, Pub. L. No. 104-191, §216(b), 110 Stat. 1936, 2007-08 (1996), in which
parties likely to be significantly affected by a rule participate in developing the rule through
negotiation. See 5 U.S.C. § 561 (Supp. 1997). After an intense process of consultation and
negotiation, a negotiated rule was agreed to and announced in early 1998. In summer 1999, the
negotiated rule had not been promulgated, but the statute went into effect despite delay in the
adoption of the negotiated rule. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-76.
422. Based on the literature of reputation from the securities industry, there is some reason
to believe that private entities such as MCOs or other independently-developed intermediaries,
which have the flexibility and can develop the experience and the expertise to monitor and
measure hard-to-detect elements of fraud, can successfully combat poor quality and outright
fraud, particularly in a market such as that for medical care where relationships can remain
long-term and there is a pattern of repeat business. See generally Stephen Choi, Market Lessons
for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 920 & 924 (1998) (discussing the process of quality
monitoring and certification and the role of purchasers and "certification intermediaries" in
supplying purchasers "with a means of distinguishing between products containing otherwise
unobservable quality differences"); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (discussing elements that lead to and limit market
efficiency); Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J.
2225, 2227 (1999) (noting the potential importance of "privately instituted sanctions that operate
either partially or wholly apart from the legal system").
423. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948)).
424. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
operation. For example, advantages might accrue in combating fraud
from the flexible and informal monitoring available to private parties
in dealing with providers and suppliers.4" Contractual remedies es-
tablished in the marketplace govern such private-sector relationships.
If MCOs.were to gain a public character as state actors, consti-
tutional principles would apply, adding not just a certain degree of
protection to providers and suppliers, but also complexity, red tape,
and inflexibility. The financial relationships with providers and sup-
pliers are only one example of the potential for more cumbersome
constraints on MCOs if they are deemed state actors. In addition,
such matters as physician credentialing, physician de-selection from
MCO provider panels, and disputes with beneficiaries regarding cov-
erage issues become potential constitutional lawsuits.
Exposure to liability for damages and, probably more signifi-
cantly, attorneys' fees,4 poses potentially serious concerns for MCOs
that seek, for example, to hold the line on benefits determinations for
individual patients, to act aggressively to assure quality by de-select-
ing providers (physicians or hospitals), to contract selectively with
preferred providers to assure access for patients at affordable prices,
or to restrain costs either by limiting payment levels for pharma-
ceutical products or by limiting drug formularies. In each of the fore-
going examples, a cost-containment or a quality-assurance decision
could be the subject of a constitutional or statutory challenge that
could result in increased cost, reduced flexibility, and imposition of the
overall bureaucratization that characterizes governmental entities-
freedom from which is purportedly a virtue of privatization. Further,
this increase in cost would be imposed on an industry that typically
measures efficiency in claims processing in terms of pennies per claim.
This would be an environment in which expensive procedures and the
potential for extensive constitutional or federal statutory liability
could take a high toll and further deter entry of MCOs into the
TennCare market (and divert resources from the care of patients).27
Aside from the remedial advantages associated with a civil
rights cause of action (damages and attorneys' fees), it is questionable
425. See supra note 422.
426. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
427. There is also a question whether using a civil rights cause of action would be feasible as
a regular method of adjudicating TennCare coverage disputes. See Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F.
Supp. 1305, 1309 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Daniels v. Menke,
145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting the desirability of a hearing before "an Article III judge"
because of his or her impartiality but also recognizing that "such hearings are not plausible"
because of the "speed with which disputes regarding health care coverage must be resolved in
order to prevent harm to an enrollee').
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whether due process fairness advantages would accrue for patients
from a finding that MCOs were state actors. As a regulatory matter,
Medicaid itself imposes on states the responsibility for maintaining a
"hearing system" that comports with the maximalist constitutional
due process standards set forth in Goldberg v. Kelly," which is cited
by name in the Medicaid regulations." The TennCare waiver does not
apply to Tennessee's "obligations to provide for review of coverage
disputes," so the state must comply with the federally mandated fair
hearing procedures spelled out in the Medicaid program."' However,
the state action status of the TennCare MCOs remains uncertain."3'
428. Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that due process requires an ade-
quate hearing before welfare benefits are terminated).
429. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.205 (1998). The Medicaid regulations require that an opportunity
for a hearing be granted whenever any applicant requests one "because his claim for services is
denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness." Id. § 431.220. The Medicaid regula-
tions apply to TennCare, absent a waiver. See Daniels v. Menke, No. 96-5887, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7973, at *6-7 (6th Cir. 1998). A finding of state action and of a constitutional violation is
not necessary in order for a court to apply the due process requirements of the Medicaid regula-
tions. See id. (holding that the district court did not have to decide whether MCOs are state
actors or whether the MCOs' conduct violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights).
In Perry v. Chen, 985 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (D. Ariz. 1996), the court faced a procedural due
process challenge to Arizona's managed Medicaid program. Like Tennessee, Arizona operates its
Medicaid program under a federal waiver. The state contracts with health plans to provide
covered health care services to program beneficiaries. See id. at 1199. The court in Perry noted
that federal Medicaid regulations require the state to "provide a fair hearing" which meets
constitutional due process standards. Id. at 1201. However, the court went on to conclude that
the constitutional standards embodied in the Medicaid regulations would only apply to the
health plans (comparable to TennCare MCOs) if the plans were state actors. See id. As a
constitutional matter, that is correct. However, as the Sixth Circuit found in the Daniels litiga-
tion, see infra note 431, the federal Medicaid regulations can be applied to the MCOs either
because of contractual obligations or because of a duty imposed by the regulations themselves.
This seems to be the conclusion of the district court in the Daniels litigation. Daniels, 926 F.
Supp. at 1307-10.
430. Daniels, 926 F. Supp. at 1307.
431. In the Daniels litigation, which challenged the TennCare grievance and appeals proce-
dures, the plaintiffs and the state entered into an agreed order regarding hearing procedures
after the district court held that the TennCare procedures violated Medicaid and due process.
See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text. The state did not appeal the agreed order but did
appeal from the holding that TennCare's MCOs were "state actors" and therefore subject to
constitutional due process constraints regarding grievance procedures. Daniels, No. 96-5887,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7973, at *6. In vacating the state action holding, the Court of Appeals
noted that plaintiffs did not oppose vacating the district court's state action holding provided
that the provisions of the agreed order (consent decree) remained in effect. See id. at *8 n.4. In
essence, the position of the Daniels plaintiffs, regarding the vacating of the district court's state
action holding, reinforces the position in text that Medicaid regulations provide extensive due
process protections to patients in the grievance process, reflecting a maximalist view of constitu-
tional due process requirements. Indeed, the result of the district court's due process ruling in
Daniels was essentially to impose Medicaid regulatory standards on administration of
TennCare. Daniels, 926 F. Supp. at 1313-14 & n. 11; see also supra notes 220-36 and accom-
panying text.
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2. The State Action Issue: Are MCOs State Actors?
In Grijalva v. Shalala, the Ninth Circuit held that health
maintenance organizations ('lIMOs") that contract with the federal
government to provide medical care to Medicare beneficiaries are
(federal) government actors subject to Fifth Amendment due process
constraints."' There is a clear parallel between Medicare risk-
contracting HMOs, as in Grijalva, and TennCare MCOs, also risk-
contracting HMOs, but under a state's Medicaid program. While
Grijalva has been vacated and remanded,433 the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion is worthy of analysis.
The Ninth Circuit found the risk-contracting HMOs engaged
with the federal government as 'joint participants" in the provision of
medical care to Medicare beneficiaries. The HMOs' failure to provide
adequate notice to beneficiaries of service denials could be "fairly
attributed to the federal government."' The court viewed the dis-
putes regarding provision of services as Medicare "coverage decisions"
that effectively interpreted the Medicare statute. These were unlike
the "medical judgments" by Medicaid-participating nursing homes
that the Supreme Court had found not to constitute state action.35 For
the Grijalva court, "the government cannot avoid the due process
requirements of the Constitution merely by delegating its duty to
determine Medicare coverage to private entities.'
432. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded, _ U.S.
119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999).
433. Grijalva, 119 S. Ct. 1573.
434. Grijalva, 152 F.3d at 1120.
435. See id.; see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008 (1982) (stating that the decisions
concerning discharge or transfer is not made by the state).
436. Griialva, 152 F.3d at 1121; see also Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 113 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that determinations by private, licensed certified home health agencies regarding
the medical necessity and appropriateness of home health services under Medicaid constitutes
state action). Although far from inconsequential, the state-action status of a risk-contracting
Medicare HMO does not pose as significant a policy concern as does the state-action status of an
MCO in TennCare. While the concerns about constitutionalizing benefits determinations are
comparable, the absence of a federal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 mitigates some of the
concerns. Primarily, the absence of an equivalent of the fee-shifting provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 reduces the likelihood and the costliness of adjudicating claims under Medicare. In
addition, the absence of a federal counterpart for § 1983 means that the rule against requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies that characterizes claims under § 1983 would not apply to
the Medicare claims adjudication process. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 512
(1982) (no exhaustion of administrative remedies required in litigation under § 1983). Review
through the Medicare claims-review process might therefore be required. See, e.g., Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756-57 (1975) (holding § 405(h) bars district court federal jurisdiction over
suits seeking to recover social security benefits). Nevertheless, constitutionalizing the service-
denial process does risk rigidification and ossification of a process that, to retain the benefits of
privatized managed care, should remain informal and flexible.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Grijalva accords with the district court decision, both of which
were vacated on appeal, regarding the state action status of TennCare
MCOs.43' The questions now to be addressed are (a) whether
TennCare MCO decisions regarding "medical necessity" are to be
viewed as "medical judgments made by private parties according to
professional standards that are not established by the State,4 . or
whether they are to be viewed as "coverage decisions-interpretations
of the Medica[id] statute!' in which MCOs "are making decisions as a
governmental proxy... deciding that Medica[id] does not cover cer-
tain medical services;""' and (b) what impact the Supreme Court's
most recent foray into the state-action arena, American Manufacturers
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,"' might have on state-action analy-
sis in the MCO context.
In Blum v. Yaretsky,"1 the Supreme Court held that certain
nursing home decisions "to discharge or transfer Medicaid patients to
lower levels of care" did not constitute state action." 2 For the dissent,
the nursing home decisions were part of an administrative structure
established and imposed by government to implement cost-contain-
ment policies. Nursing home determinations regarding discharge and
transfer of Medicaid patients involved scope-of-benefits issues, not
merely scientific determinations derived from independent profes-
sional criteria regarding "medical necessity." For the dissent in Blum,
the state had "delegated administration of the [Medicaid cost-con-
tainment] program to the nursing home operators," and "[w]here... a
private party acts on behalf of the State to implement state policy, his
action is state action.443
In rejecting the dissent's characterization of the circumstances,
the Court in Blum acknowledged that the state required review of
medical necessity in order to contain Medicaid nursing-home costs.
However, adhering to the professional paradigm,4" the Court con-
cluded that physicians making determinations of medical necessity
were "not employed by the State" and, "more important," those private
physicians (albeit paid by Medicaid) "render[ed] medical judgments
concerning the patient's health needs that the State does not prescribe
437. Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), vacated sub nom.
Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d 1330 (6th Cir. 1998).
438. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008.
439. See Grijalva, 152 F.3d at 1120.
440. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977 (1999).
441. Blum, 457 U.S. at 991.
442. Id. at 1012.
443. Id. at 1027 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
444. See supra Part V.D.1.
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and for which it is not responsible.". 5 While patient transfers to less
intensive and less costly nursing home settings were admittedly
driven by concerns about efficiency and costs and thus "not mandated
by the patients' health needs," those transfers only occurred "after an
assessment of those needs."" That assessment, made by private
physicians who were "concededly private parties," was deemed to be "a
medical one, not a question of accounting"" and did not constitute
state action.
In the FFS context of Blum, the Court viewed the government's
role as payor for services deemed by professionals to be "medically
necessary" in accordance with independently established professional
standards. Government had no duty to pay for services that did not
meet a professionally-developed standard. The decision of the private
physician or nursing home regarding medical necessity, therefore,
turned on criteria established by private, independent entities-
standards developed beyond the scope of governmental responsibility
or accountability.
Implicitly, Blum held that a government benefits program
could define its scope of coverage by reference to private professional
criteria. Application of those criteria to particular cases would not
then be attributable to the government. "8 In this regard, the decision
in Blum has much in common with the Supreme Court's subsequent
ruling in NCAA v. Tarkanian."  In Tarkanian, a public university
disciplined a basketball coach (Jerry Tarkanian) for infractions of
rules promulgated by the National Collegiate Athletic Association
('NCAA"). ' The NCAA is an unincorporated national association,
comprised of nearly one thousand public and private members that
conduct major athletic programs, whose mission is "governing the
conduct of the intercollegiate athletic programs of its members. 51
Tarkanian challenged the constitutional validity of the NCAA's rules
as applied to him, contending that the NCAA under the circumstances
was a state actor.52
445. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1006 n.16.
446. Id. at 1008 n.19.
447. Id.
448. The Court in Blum drew an analogy to Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317 (1981),
which held that a public defender does not act under color of law when representing an indigent
defendant in a state criminal proceeding. Although employed and appointed by the state, the
public defender relied on "professional canons of ethics" rather than on "any rule of conduct
imposed by the State." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1009.
449. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988).
450. Id. at 180-81.
451. Id. at 183.
452. See id. at 182.
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The Court in Tarkanian first inquired into the relationship
between the NCAA and the University of Nevada, Las Vegas
( UNLV"), the public institution that disciplined Tarkanian. Noting
that the source of NCAA rules was its "collective membership," the
Court concluded that that collective membership was national in
scope, "independent of any particular state. ' While there might be
de facto authority accorded to the NCAA as a private standard-setting
institution, no official authority had been conferred on the NCAA by
the State of Nevada." Therefore, NCAA was not deemed a state actor
since Nevada did not "create [ ] the legal framework governing the
conduct' 55 and did not "delegate [] its authority to the private actor
[the NCAA]."
The Court in Tarkanian also acknowledged that state action
might exist if the public university "by embracing the NCAA's rules,
transformed them into state rules and the NCAA into a state actor."'57
For example, when a state supreme court adopts and implements
standards formulated and promulgated by the American Bar Asso-
ciation ("ABA"), that state supreme court's enforcement of those rules
constitutes state action. '58 However, "[i]t does not follow... that the
ABA's formulation of those... rules was state action."'.. Therefore,
"UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's standards" is not "sufficient
reason for concluding that the NCAA was acting under color of
Nevada law when it promulgated standards ... ."" On that ground,
the Court in Tarkanian also declined to find the standard-setting con-
duct of the NCAA attributable to Nevada."'
The analysis in Blum is analogous to the subsequent ruling in
Tarkanian. In Blum, the Court viewed Medicaid as adopting the pro-
fessional standards regarding medical necessity established by a
patient's own physician or by nursing home administrators. ' Those
private standard-setting or standard-implementing decisions were not
made by the official entities to which government had delegated
authority-the utilization review committees."' A decision by such an
453. Id. at 193.
454. See id. at 193-94 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,
501 (1988)).
455. Id. at 192 (citing North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975)).
456. Id. (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).
457. Id. at 194 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil, Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1987)).
458. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194 (relying on Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)).
459. Id.
460. Id. at 195.
461. Id.
462. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1007 n.17 (1982).
463. See id.
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officially designated reviewing entity, which is responsible for inter-
preting the scope of and eligibility for governmentally-conferred legal
entitlements, would constitute state action."
In the context of TennCare MCOs, the question is whether
MCO decisionmaking on such matters as medical necessity is the
implementation of private professional standards which government
then chooses to respect, or whether MCO decisions reflect decisions on
coverage delegated to MCOs by state government. In the former
characterization, Blum and Tarkanian suggest that those decisions
would not constitute state action. Decisions of the latter characteri-
zation might, on the other hand, more likely be considered fairly at-
tributable to the state.
The Ninth Circuit in Grijalva found that Medicare risk-
contracting HMOs differed from the FFS context of the nursing homes
in Blum. The physicians in Blum were independent professionals
without financial stakes in the outcome of their independent profes-
sional medical judgment." The HIOs in Grijalva ere "joint par-
ticipants" with the federal government in the administration of Medi-
care."' The federal government was more than a somewhat passive
payor, as in an FFS setting. Under capitation, the federal government
pays risk-contracting Medicare HMOs a set amount per beneficiary
"regardless of the services provided" and "created the legal frame-
work-the standards and enforcement mechanisms-within which
iHMOs make adverse determinations .... ."", These determinations by
HMOs are, therefore, "coverage decisions," in which HIOs act as a
"governmental proxy," and are fairly attributable to the government."
Grijalva viewed HMO coverage decisions as interpretations of
the scope of statutory benefits conferred by Medicare. The court was
unwilling to accept the Blum characterization of decisions regarding
medical necessity as involving independent professional medical
judgments. For the Grijalva court, determinations of medical neces-
sity were not just technical professional judgments under the pro-
fessional paradigm, they represented mixed questions of professional
judgment and economic (cost-benefit) calculations. Medical neces-
464. See American Mfgs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977, 986 (1999)
(stating action by private parties constitutes state action if state law provided such significant
encouragement that the choices must be deemed to be the states).
465. Nursing home utilization review committees "must be composed of private physicians
who are not directly responsible for the patient whose care is being reviewed." Physician mem-
bers "may not be employed" by the nursing home and "may not have a financial interest in any
residential care facility." Blum, 457 U.S. at 995 n.4.
466. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998).
467. Id.
468. Id.
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sity-this admixture of professional and economic considerations-
was deemed a legal standard under Grijalva. Delegation of imple-
mentation could not avoid public accountability. Coverage decisions,
as interpretations of government's legal obligation, were attributable
to government, even when made by private-contracting HMOs. Since
MCOs were financially interested entities and, in the exercise of man-
aged care, do not conform to the pure professional paradigm, Grijalva
found the rationale of the Blum dissent more applicable to the Medi-
care risk-contracting HMO situation.
The analytical impact of American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Sullivan69 is still uncertain. Sullivan was a chal-
lenge to certain provisions of Pennsylvania's workers' compensation
regime. Under a 1993 revision to the workers' compensation law, "an
employer or insurer may withhold payment for disputed medical
treatment pending an independent review to determine whether the
treatment is reasonable and necessary."' An employer or an insurer
may request uilization review"' by a utilization review organization
("URO")4 7 2 and withhold payment of benefits until that review process
determines that the proposed medical treatment is medically neces-
sary.73 Sullivan held that invocation of the utilization review process
by an employer or an insurer, with its attendant delay in the obli-
gation of the employer or the insurer to pay for workers' compensation
medical benefits," did not constitute state action.7 5
469. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977 (1999).
470. Id. at 982.
471. The employer requests utilization review by filing a one-page form with the Workers'
Compensation Bureau of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor. See id. at 982-83. The filing
alone, without any substantive review by any public official, triggers the employer's or the
insurer's ability to withhold payment of benefits until it is determined that the proposed treat-
ment is reasonable and necessary. See id. The Supreme Court held this exclusively ministerial
role of government not to constitute state action. See id. at 987.
472. A URO is a private organization composed of providers who are "licensed in the same
profession and have the same or similar specialty as that of the provider of the treatment under
review." Id. at 983. The objective of the URO is to determine "whether the treatment under
review is reasonable or necessary for the medical condition of the employee" in view of "gen-
erally accepted treatment protocols." Id.
473. Id.
474. The utilization review process must be completed and a determination rendered within
thirty days. See id. If the utilization review is favorable to the employer, the worker may seek
judicial review de novo before a workers' compensation judge, but the insurer is not obligated to
pay for the disputed services unless and until the decision is overturned by the workers' compen-
sation judge or, under judicial review, by the courts. See id.
475. The Court framed the issue as "whether a private insurer's decision to withhold pay-
ment for disputed medical treatment may be fairly attributable to the State so as to subject
insurers to the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court's answer to that question
was "no." Id. at 986.
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The state action inquiry in Sullivan was actually quite narrow,
focusing on the state-action status of an insurer's decision to invoke a
utilization review process authorized by state law.7" While an in-
surer's action to seek independent utilization review was authorized
by and taken pursuant to state law, such private conduct was not
"fairly attributable to the State."4" It was the decision of a private
party, taking advantage of an opportunity afforded under state law in
resolving a dispute with another private party. The state did not
compel the private insurers' conduct and was not "directly involved in
[their] decision.., to withhold payments for disputed medical treat-
ment."''" That state law provided private insurers with a remedy was
insufficient "encouragement"'79 of private conduct "to make the State
responsible for it. '' "w The statutory scheme, which allowed insurers to
withhold medical payment until the dispute regarding medical neces-
sity was resolved against them in the utilization review process, was
"state inaction,... a legislative decision not to intervene in a dispute
between an insurer and an employee over whether a particular treat-
ment is reasonable and necessary......
As in Grijalva, the plaintiffs in Sullivan made a delegation
argument. Plaintiffs characterized workers compensation benefits as
"state-mandated 'public benefits'" whose provision the state had dele-
gated to private insurers and for which the state must take responsi-
bility.' The Court noted that the state may have established a right
on behalf of employees to receive workers' compensation benefits, but
that that obligation was imposed by law on private employers not un-
dertaken by the state itself. Where a state's "constitution or statutory
scheme obligates the State to provide" benefits '---such as "medical
treatment to injured inmates" ---the state may not be able to avoid
476. Id.; see also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (holding that a warehouse-
man's selling of property pursuant to New York Uniform Commercial Code § 7-210 was not state
action).
477. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 982.
478. Id.
479. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
480. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 986; see also Tulsa Profl Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S.
478, 485 (1988) (holding totality of circumstances involved in implementing a notice-of-claim
statute constituted state action).
481. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 987.
482. Id. There was a second component to the delegation argument as well. Plaintiffs also
asserted that Pennsylvania had "delegated to [private] insurers the traditionally exclusive
government function of determining whether and under what circumstances an injured worker's
medical benefits may be suspended." Id.
483. See id. at 988.
484. Id.; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-56 (1988) (holding that physician hired by
State to provide medical services to inmates was acting under color of state law).
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responsibility through delegation. Government cannot absolve itself
from a duty by "contracting out" its responsibility, and those who are
harmed by the regulatory conduct of the delegatee cannot be deprived
of their "means to vindicate" their constitutional rights."' Sullivan
rejects that delegation principle of state action where a state man-
dates a duty on private parties but has not assumed responsibility
itself for the provision of benefits.
In the TennCare context, the delegation principle seems inap-
plicable to disputes between MCOs and either providers or suppliers.
Those relationships do not involve the state's provision of services, and
the relationships do not appear to involve the kind of encouragement
that Sullivan would require. The state-action status of MCOs in the
context of services disputes with beneficiaries is a closer question. It
does seem, however, that Sullivan would support a finding, consistent
with Blum," that partial delegation of decisionmaking to MCOs, at
least in the first instance, would not be sufficient "encouragement" to
result in attributing MCOs' interpretations of medical necessity to the
state. MCOs are private entities staffed by private individuals, not
government officials, and, while the state has incurred an obligation to
pay for medical care services, it has not undertaken to provide those
services itself under either Medicaid or TennCare.
A total delegation of the determination of medical necessity to
MCOs might qualify the conduct of MCOs as state action, because the
state has undertaken to create an entitlement for which it pays. Dele-
gation of final decisionmaking in those circumstances might well vest
such traditional governmental power in private hands that the state-
action non-delegation principle might attach-even though the state
does not itself undertake to provide the medical services to program
beneficiaries. Sullivan suggests this when it analogizes decisions of
the workers' compensation UROs to a decision of a "judicial official,"
and notes that the decision of the URO itself "may properly be con-
sidered state action." '87 This strongly suggests that a total and final
decisionmaking delegation to a private entity regarding eligibility for
a public benefits program would be considered state action, even when
485. West, 487 U.S. at 56. West involved a state's contracting out to a private party the pro-
vision of medical services to prisoners in state custody. The Court held that the state could not
avoid its constitutional responsibility to prisoners by entering into contracts for the provision of
medical services with private parties. Id. at 54-56. If this were not the case, the state would be
"free to contract out all services which it is constitutionally obligated to provide and leave its
citizens with no means for vindication of those rights, whose protection has been delegated to
'private' actors, when they have been denied." Id. at 56 n.14.
486. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
487. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 987.
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there is no tradition of public provision of services. This would con-
stitute delegation of a matter about which government had an af-
firmative duty-determination of who qualifies and for what benefits
regarding public programs.
This interpretation of Sullivan is consistent with Blum. Blum
distinguished between patient transfers and discharges initiated by a
patient's physician or by the nursing home itself, and patient transfers
or discharges initiated by URCs charged with assessing the medical
necessity of continued patient stays in a nursing home facility." At
the Supreme Court, Blum did not involve "patient transfers to lower
levels of care initiated by [URCs]." That matter had been resolved
by a consent decree and was not still at issue."'
Blum, therefore, dealt only with "transfers initiated by the
patients' attending physicians or the nursing home administrators
themselves,"9" and the Court found that those decisions were not fairly
attributable to the state. The state-action status of nursing home
URC assessments of medical necessity-an ongoing obligation im-
posed on nursing homes by federal law 9 2-- was not at issue in Blum.
But an analogous URC in Sullivan, charged with assessing medical
necessity, acted under color of state law.9' Read together, therefore,
Blum and Sullivan seem to recognize that a governmentally-imposed
formal assessment process-even of a technical term such as "medical
necessity"-constitutes state action when that determination reflects a
delegation by government to a private entity to interpret the "cover-
age!' (scope of benefits) under a public benefits or governmentally-
mandated benefits program.
Given this conclusion, the question arises whether, on remand,
Grijalva can stand in light of Blum as refined by Sullivan. Catanzano
v. Dowling9" provides a useful analogy. In Catanzano, New York
required that home health services under Medicaid be provided by
certified home health agencies ("CHHAs"). 9 New York required each
CHHA to undertake a four-step analysis-a fiscal assessment-to
determine "whether and how much home health care should be pro-
vided to Medicaid applicants and recipients.""M If the projected period
488. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1007-12.
489. Id. at 1007 n.17.
490. See id.
491. Id.
492. See id. at 994-95 & 995 n.4.
493. See supra note 484 and accompanying text.
494. Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1995).
495. Id. at 115.
496. Id.
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of home health care is less than sixty days, the fiscal assessment
consists of only two steps. First, the CHHA decides whether the pro-
posed home health care is medically necessary and whether it can be
provided safely at home. Second, the CHHA considers the economic
factors-whether appropriate but less expensive alternatives exist
than the proposed course of treatment.49 ..If the CHHA determines, as
a result of its inquiries under steps one or two, that the patient should
receive no home health care, that decision is final and is implemented
without administrative review or a hearing."49
Where the proposed home health care is likely to last for longer
than sixty days, the CHHA must engage in two additional inquiries.
First, it must determine whether the cost of the proposed home health
care is excessively costly when compared to the cost of institution-
alization. If the answer is yes, then the patient will be institution-
alized unless, in the final analytical step, the patient qualifies for one
of the exceptions to mandatory institutionalization."
For home health care treatment of less than sixty days, the de-
cision on eligibility rests entirely with the CHHA, a private entity that
reviews the proposed service for medical necessity, appropriateness,
and cost effectiveness. For treatment of over sixty days, "fair hearing
rights" exist only when a local government official (the director of
social services) "disagrees with the determination made by the
CHHA," in which case the matter is referred to an independent local
physician for evaluation. That person (the "local professional direc-
tor") decides whether "to deny or reduce the amount of care prescribed
by the treating physician."' Unless a government official, therefore,
disagrees with the decision of the CHHA, no review is triggered.
The Second Circuit concluded that the CHHA reviews consti-
tuted state action, in part because there was no provision for "review
or ratification of' the CHHA determinations."' At least in the context
of the shorter-term course of treatment, the "decisions of the CHHAs
'effectively' deny or reduce care." 2 The state's delegation of that final
decisionmaking authority over a public benefits program did not ne-
gate the existence of state action.5"
497. See id. at 115-16.
498. Id. at 116.
499. See id.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 119.
502. Id.
503. See id. at 120 ("[T]he CHHAs are not independent actors doing business with the state,
but are entities that have assumed the responsibility for [the State's] mandated health care
duties.') (citation omitted).
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Applied to the TennCare MCOs, the analysis in Sullivan, when
informed further by that in Catanzano, suggests that MCOs' decisions
regarding the provision of services to beneficiaries are not final deter-
minations of eligibility.' As a result of the settlement of litigation,
TennCare beneficiaries (or providers on their behalf) may file a griev-
ance within the MCO and may appeal to a state-level official through
a state-administered process.' If the TennCare beneficiary files a
grievance within ten days of a service denial, the level of service is
maintained during the grievance process. As a result, there is not the
kind of total delegation that was at issue in Catanzano, and deter-
minations of the MCOs' internal grievance process would not seem to
have the same impact as the decisions of the UROs in Sullivan. No
state-run administrative process followed determinations of the
UROs; review of URO decisions was through appeal to a workers com-
pensation judge and then to a court for judicial review. Further, if the
URO decided in favor of the employer, no payments for medical treat-
ment were required unless the decision of the URO was overturned
either by the workers compensation judge or by a court. If appealed in
a timely manner (within ten days), the decision of an MCO not to pro-
vide treatment does not stop treatment, which continues until the
state-level process is completed.'
In sum, the state action issue is a close one. The Ninth Circuit
in Grijalva believed that the Medicare H1MOs under review were
"making decisions as a governmental proxy... deciding that Medicare
does not cover certain medical services."'' If that were indeed the
case, then Grijalva would fall within the state action doctrine that we
infer from Sullivan and Catanzano. The question we raise with
respect to Grijalva is whether it accurately perceives the situation
regarding Medicare eligibility since appeal to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services is available."s8 The Grijalva court does not ana-
504. Blum itself is a bit ambiguous on this finality point since the decisions of the URCs were
not at issue and the Court viewed the decisions made by the private physicians and nursing
homes to be based on independent professional medical standards for which government did not
have responsibility. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005-12. The state disclaimed authority to review
"medical necessity" decisions by physicians or nursing homes on individual patients, but there
was a process for administrative review by state officials of these assessments. See id. at 1010.
In fine, the Blum Court believed that these determinations of "medical necessity" were not
"influenced in any degree" by the State's cost-containment objectives but were made, along
entirely separate technical (not policy-related) lines. Id.
505. See Daniels v. Menke, 145 F.3d 1330, 1330 tbl.1 (6th Cir. 1998); see also supra Table 1
and accompanying text.
506. See WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19, at 77-89.
507. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998).
508. Id. ("Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs may appeal an HMO's adverse determi-
nation to the Secretary, who has the power to overturn the HMO's decision.').
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lyze the question that we deem determinative-whether the private
entity is in fact a "governmental proxy," making final determinations
on delegation from government regarding eligibility for a public bene-
fits program. In view of the terms of the Grijalva remand, which
specifically calls attention to revisions in HHS' review guidelines, it is
likely that the Supreme Court agrees with this analysis.' To the
extent that government exercises authority, triggered by the initiative
of the beneficiary (or the provider on the beneficiary's behalf), to
review on substantive terms the preliminary decisions of MCOs on a
case by case basis, then MCOs should not be seen as exercising the
final delegated power as "governmental proxy" and should not be seen
as acting under color of state law.
As long as government is accountable for its own decision-
making process, as it would be, then there is no need to attribute to
the state the conduct of the MCOs. In that sense, the government is
not depriving public beneficiaries of their "means to vindicate" their
constitutional or federal statutory rights by delegating or contracting
out its responsibility.1 Since Medicaid and the federal consent decree
mandate a full due-process hearing at the state level for MCO griev-
ances, a finding that MCOs are not state actors would not impair the
fairness of the process to which beneficiaries are entitled (although it
might alter the remedies that might be available).
3. Some Basic Legal Considerations Other Than State Action
Governing § 1983 Litigation Against MCOs
Nominally private parties acting under color of state law are
subject to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 This would
mean the constitutionalization of contractual relations for MCOs. As
the law under § 1983 has developed, some protections for defendants
have emerged, but, to a remarkable extent, those protections apply, if
at all, with much less force to private entities such as MCOs. This
subsection considers some of these issues as they could arise in a
§ 1983 action against an MCO.
509. See Shalala v. Grijalva, 119 S. Ct. 1573, 1573 (1999).
510. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 & 56 n.14 (1988). See generally NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179 (1988) (holding that NCAA's participation in the investigation and disciplinary process
did not constitute state action).
511. See, e.g., West, 487 U.S. at 49-57 (holding that a doctor employed by the state to work as
a physician at a prison hospital delivered medical treatment "fairly attributable to the state" and
therefore acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983).
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a. The Intentional Conduct Requirement
To make out a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish
that a defendant, acting "under color of state law," has deprived him
or her of a "right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States."" The deprivation of rights cannot result solely from a state-
actor defendant's negligence but must stem from intentional conduct
reflecting intentional governmental policies or choices."1 3 In the con-
text of a services denial dispute or a claim for coverage through use of
an MCO's grievance procedure, it seems clear that an MCO is acting
intentionally. A deprivation that occurs intentionally in that con-
text-that reflects a conscious institutional choice and not just some
inadvertent or negligent act-would seem to satisfy this threshold
intentional-conduct requirement under § 1983.
b. The Eleventh Amendment and § 1988"s "fP]erson"
Requirement
A state is not a "person" under § 1983 and therefore cannot be
sued directly under that provision." ' State officials can be sued in
their individual capacity,"' subject to the qualified immunity they
enjoy,"6 and in their official capacity,"7 but only for prospective in-
512. American Mfgs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 977, 985 (1999).
513. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that due process was not im-
plicated by state official's negligent act); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (holding that
protections of procedural or substantive due process of the Fourteenth Amendment were not
triggered by lack of due care by prison officials).
514. See generally Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that
neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the
meaning of§ 1983).
515. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment provides no shield for a state official who deprives another of a federal right under
color of state law). "Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government
official for actions he takes under color of state law." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985). An award of damages in such an action "can be executed only against the official's
personal assets," id. at 166, and, in such a personal-capacity or individual-capacity action, an
award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 can only be made against the individual official,
not against his or her governmental employer. Id. at 167-68. Punitive damages are available
against an official sued in his or her individual capacity. See generally Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30 (1983) (concluding that punitive damages are available in § 1983 action when defendant's
conduct involves reckless and callous indifference to the plaintiffs federal rights, and also when
defendant's conduct is motivated by evil motive or intent).
516. See infra Part V.G.3.d.
517. See generally Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (holding that finding of hability in official
capacity action did not impose monetary liabilty on the commonwealth); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908) (state attorney general is proper party defendant to a suit for prevention of the
enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute). An official-capacity action "gener-
ally represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which the officer is
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junctive relief.518 No damages remedy lies under § 1983 against a state
when indirectly sued through the vehicle of a lawsuit against a state
official in his or her official capacity. This barrier to the recovery of
money damages against a state is both statutory-the state is not a
"person" under § 1983519-and constitutional-the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars suit in federal court" ° to recover money damages from a
state.5 ' Since Medicaid programs are administered by states, the ban
an agent." Monell v. New York Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). Provided that
the government entity "receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is,
in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Graham, 473 U.S. at
166; see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985) (explaining that, provided that the
public entity has notice and the opportunity to respond, judgment against a public servant "in
his official capacity" imposes liability on the entity).
518. See generally Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (holding that federal court can pro-
vide no retroactive award, but only prospective relief); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars retroactive payment of benefits).
519. See generally Will, 491 U.S. 58 (holding that neither states nor state officials acting in
their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983).
520. The Constitution's structure and history have been construed to limit the ability of Con-
gress, acting under Article I of the Constitution, to require state courts to entertain federal
claims for damages against a state in the absence of a state's express waiver of its sovereign
immunity. See generally Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (holding that Congress could not
subject state to suit in state court without its consent); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (holding that neither the Commerce
Clause nor the Patent Clause provided Congress with authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity).
521. See generally Quern, 440 U.S. 332 (holding that § 1983 does not abrogate immunity of
the states from retroactive awards which require payment of funds from the state treasury);
Edelman, 415 U.S. 651 (holding that a suit by private parties seeking to impose liability payable
from public funds of the state treasury is foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment unless the
State consents to the suit). Declaratory or injunctive relief against a state is available by
"naming state officials as defendants" in their official capacity. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169 n.18.
The constitutional bar under the Eleventh Amendment on a damages action against the state
applies in the case of official-capacity actions since "a judgment against a public servant 'in his
official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents." Brandon, 469 U.S. at 471.
Congress may not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity by exercising authority under Article I
of the Constitution, although it may under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) ("[T]hrough the Fourteenth Amendment, federal
power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore... § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate immunity from suit guaranteed by
that Amendment."). To effectuate an abrogation of a state's sovereign immunity where it is
authorized to do so, the federal government must state its intent to abrogate "unequivocally," id.
at 55, or the state must waive its sovereign immunity by expressly consenting to suit. See
generally College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2219 (holding that sovereign immunity was not
voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce). The Supreme Court "has
held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity."
Graham, 473 U.S. at 169 n.17.
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on the recovery of retrospective money damages applies-only pro-
spective injunctive relief is available."
In a suit against a TennCare MCO, protections afforded state
defendants would be inapplicable. The Eleventh Amendment only
bars recovery of damages from the state itself-or from an arm or
department of state government." It does not bar such monetary
recoveries from political subdivisions of a state such as municipalities
or counties."2 The Eleventh Amendment, therefore, poses no obstacle
to recovery of damages under § 1983 from an MCO. While, as a statu-
tory matter, a state may not be a person under § 1983, cities and
counties are person[s] subject to suit.su Nominally private parties
acting under color of state law have been found subject to liability as
person[s] under § 1 9 8 3 ." Thus, the recovery of money damages from
MCOs would be potentially available under § 1983 whereas such a
recovery would be unavailable against the state as administrator of
Medicaid.
c. The Vicarious Liability Issue
In a § 1983 action, liability does not attach vicariously under a
theory of respondeat superior.27 While a city is a covered person un-
der § 1983,"u a local government "may not be sued under § 1983 for an
injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. '' " Only when "exe-
cution of a government's policy or custom... inflicts the injury" is
government responsible under §1983.' Liability under § 1983 at-
522. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 651; Daniels v. Wadley, 926 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (M.D. Tenn.
1996) (holding that reimbursement of money does not constitute permissible prospective relief
based on the principle of sovereign immunity).
523. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401-03
(1979) (holding that an agency created by a state shares that state's qualified immunity).
524. See id.; see also Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267-68 (holding that a state's sovereign immunity
does not bar suits against lesser entities); Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(finding that local school board was not immune from suit since it was a political subdivision
more like a county or city than an arm of the state). Punitive damages are not available from a
city under § 1983. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (holding that consid-
erations of public policy do not support exposing a municipality to punitive damages).
525. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 662-63 (1978) (holding that
local governments may be "persons" within the meaning of § 1983).
526. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (prison guards employed by pri-
vate firm); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) (private defendants invoking replevin); Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (state officers acting with private creditor to secure
disputed property through garnishment or attachment).
527. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
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taches only if "deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself
is the 'moving force' behind the plaintiffs deprivation of federal
rights.".3' Thus, "a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was
taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a
direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of
federal rights. '3 Liability of a municipality under § 1983 does not
arise when a plaintiff "has suffered a deprivation of federal rights at
the hands of a municipal employee" unless the plaintiff can show the
municipality itself to be directly culpable and to have caused the con-
stitutional or federal statutory deprivation. Otherwise, all a plaintiff
will have demonstrated is "that the employee [rather than the munici-
pality] acted culpably."'33 In short, "[t]he city is not vicariously liable
under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable
when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer."'
The Supreme Court has never addressed the question whether
the bar on vicarious liability applicable to municipalities under § 1983
also applies to nongovernmental entities such as TennCare MCOs
when sued under § 1983. The issue has come up in a number of court
of appeals cases, however, and the courts seem uniformly to have
applied the § 1983 ban on respondeat superior to nongovernmental
entities. In Crawford v. Davis," the Eighth Circuit stated flatly the
generic proposition that "it is well settled that § 1983 does not impose
respondeat superior liability." 6 In Harvey v. Harvey,"' the Eleventh
Circuit stated that "every circuit court to consider the issue extended
the [Monell respondeat superior] holding to private corporations as
well.""8 The Sixth Circuit reiterated that statement in Street v.
Corrections Corporation of America, 9 and the First Circuit seems to
have adopted that position as well." ° Since Street is a Sixth Circuit
case, it would control § 1983 actions against TennCare MCOs unless
overturned.
531. Board of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (holding that a mu-
nicipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor.
532. Id. at 397.
533. Id. at 406-07.
534. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 122 (1992).
535. Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997).
536. Id. at 1284.
537. Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129 (11th Cir. 1992).
538. Id.
539. Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Harvey to
explain that every circuit has extended Monell to private corporations).
- 540. See Lyons v. National Car Rental, 30 F.3d 240, 245-46 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that
Monelrs bar on respondeat superior liability applied to private party § 1983 defendants as well).
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Under Monell and its progeny, TennCare MCOs will not be li-
able vicariously under § 1983 for actions taken by their employees.
MCO liability under § 1983 will arise only for an MCO's own primary
or direct conduct that causes a deprivation of a plaintiffs constitu-
tional or federal statutory rights. A plaintiff must establish that the
MCO "itself is the wrongdoer' ' " by demonstrating "that an officially
executed policy, or the toleration of a custom.., leads to, causes, or
results in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right." 2 The
question becomes "whether there is a direct causal link" between an
MCO "policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.'
And a "policy" would seem to require a conscious, affirmative decision
by an entity such as an MCO: "[L]iability under § 1983 attaches
where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of
action is made from among various alternatives.""
In some limited situations, a § 1983 claim against an entity can
be brought for some types of passive conduct or inaction that amount
to a "custom." For example, in Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court
held that a city's failure to train its police, in some circumstances,
could result in § 1983 liability of the city itself."' But municipal
liability in a failure-to-train context can only attach "where the failure
to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact""' and where the "deficiency in
training actually caused the police officers' indifference to [plaintiffs]
medical needs.""' To be liable, an MCO must have notice or construc-
tive notice of the alleged violation. That is, "[tjhe evidence must show
that the need to act is so obvious" that an MCO's "'conscious' decision
not to act can be said to amount to a 'policy' of deliberate indifference"
to a plaintiffs constitutional or federal statutory rights."
The nature of the analytical inquiry is to determine when an
entity itself has acted (or, through deliberate indifference, consciously
declined to act) and therefore faces direct (as contrasted with vicari-
ous) culpability. In some situations, certain individuals will be con-
sidered to have acted on behalf of an institution. For example, in
Pembaur v. Cincinnati,"' the Supreme Court held that the county was
541. Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that respondent
superior is not available as a theory of recovery under § 1983).
542. Id.
543. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
544. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
545. Canton, 489 U.S. at 378.
546. Id. at 388.
547. Id. at 391.
548. Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996).
549. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 469.
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responsible for unconstitutional actions taken pursuant to decisions
made by the county prosecutor and the county sheriff because they
were the "officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect
to the subject matter in question."4
In sum, for § 1983 liability for inaction to attach to a TennCare
MCO, "an official policymaking body" would have to have a "custom"
that caused and "reflected a deliberate, intentional indifference to" the
underlying violation." Otherwise, § 1983 liability would only attach
where a consciously and appropriately adopted affirmative "policy" of
the institution exists and causes" the deprivation of a plaintiffs con-
stitutional or federal statutory rights.
In § 1983 claims against TennCare MCOs-e.g., for denial of a
service-a plaintiff would have to establish that the MCO had a policy
that, as implemented, deprived that plaintiff of a constitutional or
federal statutory right. In the alternative, a plaintiff might be able to
prevail by establishing that the MCO was deliberately indifferent to
his or her constitutional or federal statutory rights and that that indif-
ference caused a constitutional or federal statutory deprivation.
Since TennCare mandates a hearing process approved by a
federal court, a plaintiff could not likely establish either a policy or
deliberately indifferent inaction that would cause a procedural due
process violation." A claim against an MCO probably would focus on
the substantive aspects of a service denial-e.g., whether the denial
violated applicable Medicaid standards. A systematic policy not to
provide a class of services" might satisfy the policy requirement,
whether adopted formally or implemented informally (but system-
atically) through a utilization review or grievance process. The in-
quiry would then turn on whether that policy or custom caused a
deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right of a putative
plaintiff. Since the state provides oversight of MCO grievance deci-
sionmaking, it is arguable that the MCO's decision does not constitute
a final deprivation; to the extent that an MCO would be delaying
550. Id. at 483-84.
551. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 508.
552. The inadequacy of the policy must cause the injury. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.
553. This would not necessarily be true in procedural due process cases brought by providers
or suppliers, which are not covered by the court decree.
554. This was the allegation in the TennCare EPSDT litigation, which resulted in a consent
decree. See John B. v. Menke, Civ. Action No. 3-98-0168 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). This is also the
contention in Newberry v. Menke, Civil Action No. 3-98-1127 (M.D. Tenn. 1998), which challenges
an alleged failure on the part of MCOs to provide medically necessary home health care and
asserts that the state has improperly channeled long-term-care treatment exclusively into a
nursing-home setting. Newberry v. Menke, Civ. Action No. 3-98-1127 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (court
decision still pending as of January 2000).
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receipt of a benefit, such a delay might be a sufficient injury to trigger
liability.
On the other hand, a decision by a hospital or physician affili-
ated with an MCO and of which the MCO was not aware (or which did
not reflect an MCO policy) might not satisfy the primary liability
strictures of § 1983. Therefore, to the extent that the MCO can push
risk-taking and decisionmaking down the system to providers, and
turn decisions into provider decisions rather than MCO policy judg-
ments, MCOs might be able to avoid culpability under § 1983. But, of
course, MCOs cannot by their inaction be deliberately indifferent to
ascertainable risks to beneficiaries so that that deliberate indifference
causes a deprivation of federal rights.
d. The Qualified Immunity/Affirmative Defense Issue
When sued under § 1983, government officials receive qualified
immunity from liability.' Qualified immunity provides government
officials with immunity for their conduct unless it violates a clearly
established constitutional principle.' At one time, qualified immunity
had both a subjective and an objective element. The subjective com-
ponent focused on whether the public official acted with malice or with
knowledge that his or her conduct was constitutionally wrongful. The
objective component focused on whether the public official reasonably
could have believed that his or her conduct was constitutionally per-
missible. 7 Harlow v. Fitzgerald eliminated the subjective component,
relying exclusively on the objective element." Not just an affirmative
defense, qualified immunity is "immunity from suit" itself;'s denial of
its assertion is immediately appealable.'
In Richardson v. McKnight," the Supreme Court held that
nongovernmental individuals 2 subject to suit under § 1983 do not as a
555. See generally Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (holding U.S. attorney general
qualifiedly, rather than absolutely, immune from liability).
556. See id. Qualified immunity is not a defense in an official-capacity § 1983 action. See
generally Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding no immunity for a munici-
pality under § 1983 action).
557. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975) (holding that school officials were
not immune under § 1983 if they reasonably should have known that their actions would violate
the constitutional rights of the affected student).
558. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982).
559. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
560. Id. at 530; Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1992) (explaining that Mitchell and
Harlow established an objectively determined, immediately appealable immunity).
561. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
562. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 158 (private defendants charged with § 1983 liability do not have
qualified immunity).
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general rule receive the qualified immunity available to governmental
decisionmakers making the same kinds of decisions.' Richardson
dealt with a claim of qualified immunity for prison guards employed
by a private prison management company that operated prisons under
contract with the state. The Court emphasized that, in denying quali-
fied immunity to those privately employed prison guards, it was ruling
"narrowly"' and did not purport to establish a uniform across-the-
board standard.
There is one potentially important distinction between the
TennCare MCOs, which organize provider networks to provide medi-
cal care to public beneficiaries, and the privately managed prisons in
Richardson: the degree of state supervision over functions performed
by the MCOs and their officials. The Court in Richardson noted that
the "context" of the private prison management company involved a
situation with "limited direct supervision by the government," and no
"close official supervision."' Arguably, through the CRAs and
through the state-run grievance appeal process, the state exercises
greater supervision over the MCOs than the private prisons in
Richardson. But the Richardson Court seemed disinclined more
broadly to confer qualified immunity on employees of private firms
"systematically organized to assume a major lengthy administrative
task (managing an institution).., for profit and potentially in compe-
tition with other firms."' The Court contrasted with that ongoing
relationship a situation involving "a private individual briefly associ-
ated with a government body, serving as an adjunct to government in
an essential governmental activity... ."' TennCare MCOs seem
more closely analogous to the private prison management situation at
issue in Richardson than to the short-term consultant or firm retained
by government to perform a specific, narrowly circumscribed task as
an adjunct to a governmental office or agency that the Richardson
Court distinguished. As a result, MCO officials are likely to face
liability without qualified immunity for their conduct, essentially
563. Richardson v. McKnight held that qualified immunity, available to publicly employed
prison guards under Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), is unavailable in a § 1983 claim
against employees of a private prison management company under contract to operate a prison
for the government. See generally Paul Howard Morris, Note, The Impact of Constitutional
Liability on the Privatization Movement, 52 VAND. L. REV. 489 (1999) (arguing that the Court
wrongly decided Richardson v. McKnight and that providers of governmental services in the
private sector should receive the same constitutional scrutiny as the government itself).
564. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id.
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making them potentially personally liable for deprivations of constitu-
tional or federal statutory rights of adversely affected plaintiffs, pro-
vided that they are deemed to act under color of state law in carrying
out their duties on behalf of MCOs.'
While Richardson makes it unlikely that TenCare MCO em-
ployees will receive the qualified immunity available to governmental
officials, the Court left open, as it had in Wyatt v. Cole,"' the possi-
bility that nongovernmental individuals or entities, as defendants in §
1983 cases, might be able to assert "an affirmative defense based on
good faith....""',7  In the Sixth Circuit, which controls Tennessee,
private parties acting under color of law can raise a good faith defense
under § 1983."7' That could provide protection for individual TennCare
MCO employees and possibly for MCOs themselves comparable to the
qualified immunity enjoyed by public employees. 2 As the Fifth Cir-
568. Individual liability would attach to MCO officials only where they deliberately violated
the constitutional or federal statutory rights of a plaintiff. See supra notes 508-09 and accom-
panying text. Unlike governmental officials, public entities such as municipalities do not receive
qualified immunity. See generally Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding
that a municipality has no immunity from liability under § 1983 and may not assert the good
faith of its officers as a defense to such liability). Although the liability of the employees' em-
ployer (Corrections Corporation of Ameriba, the private prison operator) was not directly at issue
in Richardson, the Court seemed to assume that immunity of the firm was at stake, finding no
immunity. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 402-14. Since § 1983 liability does not attach vicariously, an
additional analytical step would be required to determine whether Corrections Corporation, as
distinct from the individual guards, was liable under § 1983. A plaintiff would have to show
direct, primary liability on the part of Corrections Corporation, not just vicarious respondeat
superior liability. See supra notes 523-50 and accompanying text. In any event, given the lack of
immunity under § 1983 for a city as an institution, as distinct from a public official, who has
qualified immunity, and given Richardson, it is unlikely that a TennCare MCO as an entity
would receive qualified immunity.
569. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 169 (1992).
570. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413 (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169).
571. See Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard, Attorneys P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 699 (6th
Cir. 1996) (private defendant retained good faith defense on remand). In Wyatt, the Supreme
Court stated that the Sixth Circuit earlier had "established a good faith defense" for nongov-
ernmental parties sued under § 1983. See generally Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.
1988) (distinguishing between "good faith immunity," which is designed to protect defendants
from the difficulties of defending a suit, and "good faith defense," which is based for the most
part on facts of the case). On remand in Wyatt, the Fifth Circuit held that good faith is an
affirmative defense for private parties who act under color of state law. Wyatt, 994 F.2d at 1120.
572. An important difference between a claim of immunity and an affirmative good faith de-
fense is that the denial of immunity is immediately appealable, whereas a good faith defense
must be asserted at trial. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 529-30 & n.10 (1985) (explaining
that because an immunity ruling is a legal issue that can be decided with reference only to
undisputed facts and in isolation from the remaining issues of the case, it is immediately appeal-
able). The nature of a good faith defense might allow its assertion and resolution by summary
judgment. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 426 (6th Cir. 1996) (Nelson, J., concurring)
(observing that the "courts' increasingly benign attitude toward summary judgment proceedings
may frequently mean that there will be little practical difference between the good faith de-
fense ... and the qualified immunity 'defense").
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cuit stated in its decision on remand in Wyatt v. Cole, "private defen-
dants... should not be held liable under § 1983 absent a showing of
malice and evidence that they either knew or should have known of
the statute's infirmity."'573 'Malice!' in this context refers to the "sub-
jective state of mind" of the state actor "rather than the more
demanding objective standard of reasonable belief that governs quali-
fied immunity."5"4  Thus, under an affirmative good-faith defense, a
showing by a private § 1983 defendant, such as a TennCare MCO or
its employee, that it subjectively believed that its conduct did not
violate plaintiffs constitutional or federal statutory rights would be an
affirmative defense to liability." Despite Richardson, therefore,
MCOs and their employees might well succeed in asserting a good-
faith defense in any putative action under § 1983.
e. Exhaustion of Remedies
As a general principle, the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies does not apply in § 1983 litigation. 8 A putative
§ 1983 plaintiff cannot be required to forgo litigation and to pursue
administrative remedies such as a grievance procedure as provided
under TenCare. Thus, if the other requirements of § 1983 were satis-
fied, a patient facing a service denial could bring a civil rights action
prior to pursuing TennCare's grievance procedures. " Bringing such
an action can result in plaintiff being declared a prevailing party if he
or she ultimately secures relief through the grievance process.78 Fil-
ing the civil rights action, therefore, without proceeding through the
administrative process first could secure attorneys' fees for a litigant
who succeeds through administrative review or even through settle-
ment.579 Strategically, this lack of exhaustion could make defending a
service-denial claim extremely expensive and risky since an MCO loss
in the state-level TennCare appeal process could be construed as
573. Wyatt, 994 F.2d at 1120.
574. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1277 (3d Cir. 1994).
575. The Third Circuit made it clear in Jordan that the defense of "subjective good faith"
should "make it possible to decide the good faith issue on summary judgment in some cases." Id.
at 1276 n.30; see also supra note 568.
576. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982) (concluding that based on the
legislative histories of both § 1983 and § 1997e, exhaustion of state administrative remedies
should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing a § 1983 action).
577. See Daniels v. Menke, No. 96-5887, 1998 WL 211763, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 1998).
578. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (stating that "[p]laintiffs may be
considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue
in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit").
579. See id.
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vindicating the plaintiffs claim and satisfying the requirement of the
attorney fee statute that a plaintiff be awarded fees if he or she is a
prevailing party."
VI. TENNCARE: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ITS EFFECTS
TennCare has resulted in a large increase in coverage as com-
pared to Medicaid. At the end of fiscal 1999, total enrollment stood at
1,312,969, an increase over the previous three years from 1,180,449 in
1996. The overall increase reflects a sharp rise in the unin-
sured/uninsurable category and a slight decrease in the Medicaid-
eligible category. In June 1999, Medicaid-eligible enrollment was
814,181 (62%) and uninsured/uninsurable enrollment was 498,788
(38%). In June 1996, Medicaid-eligible enrollment was 846,067
(71.7%) and uninsured/uninsurable enrollment was 334,382 (28.3%).
From 1996 to 1999, Medicaid-eligible enrollment fell modestly (3.8%)
while uninsured/uninsurable enrollment rose sharply (49.2%)," and,
since enrollment during that period was closed to the uninsured, the
entire increase of 164,406 fell into the more expensive uninsurable
category. The growth in the uninsured/uninsurable category accel-
erated in fiscal 1998, growing by 23.7%, and in fiscal 1999, growing by
an additional 16.9%, while the Medicaid-eligible category was stable
in fiscal 1998, and fell by 3.3% in fiscal 1999." As a result of that
substantial increase in the uninsured/uninsurable category, Governor
Sundquist proposed, in early 1999, temporarily freezing enrollment of
additional uninsurable patients in TennCare.' These statistics are
summarized below in Table 2.
580. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
581. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (stating a plaintiff must be a prevailing party to recover
attorney's fees).
582. See supra notes 11-13 and Table 2.
583. See id.
584. The proposal needed HCFA approval. See Bill Snyder & Keith Snider, TennCare Is
Helping 'Too Many," THE TENNESSEAN, Feb. 10, 1999, at 1A. Trends in TennCare enrollment
have been of particular concern since the uninsurable category is particularly costly to cover.
See id. at 9A.
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TABLE 2
TENNCARE ENROLLMENT
June June Change June Change June Change
1996 1997 '96-'97 1998 '97-'98 1999 '98-'99
Medicaid-
Eligible 846,067 842,207 .- 0.46 842,012 -0.02 814,181 -3.31
Uninsured
/Unin- 334,382 344,867 +3.14 426,757 +23.75 498,788 +16.88
surable
TOTAL 1,180,449 1,187,074 +0.56 1,268,769 +6.88 1,312,969 +3.48
Percent Change, June 1996-June 1999
Medicaid-Eligible -3.77
Uninsured/Uninsurable 49.17
TOTAL 11.23
Sources: Fiscal Review Committee, Report to the 100th General Assembly for the Year Ending
June 30, 1997 (November 24, 1997); TennCare Program at 4; Fiscal Review Committee, Report
to the 100th General Assembly for the Year Ending June 30, 1998 (November 9, 1998); TennCare
Program at 4; TennCare Website.
In its request for a renewal of its TennCare waiver, submitted
on December 30, 1997, Tennessee estimated that FFP for fiscal 1998
would be $2.35 billion, a 5.1% increase from the previous fiscal year
and $376 million below the budget neutrality cap of $2.726 billion.
TennCare expenditures for the five-year demonstration were projected
to save the federal government $1.6 billion over the budget neutrality
projection."u For the three-year renewal period, Tennessee and HCFA
agreed on 5.1% as the budget-neutral annual rate of expenditure
increase.' The recent unanticipated increase in TennCare enrollment
among uninsurables has raised questions concerning whether the
projections regarding cost increases contained in the waiver renewal
request are now realistic. Despite those current uncertainties, there is
no doubt that TennCare serves 61.3% more Tennesseans than would
have the traditional Medicaid-only program. Further, over the course
of the first five-year demonstration, FFP allowed the coverage of many
more people at an expenditure of about $1.5 billion fewer federal
585. See WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19, at 115.
586. See id; see also Letter from Michael Hash, supra note 9, (noting that annual budget neu-
trality trend rate for three-year TennCare extension under provisions of 1997 Balanced Budget
Act was 5.1%).
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dollars than would have been spent in Tennessee's traditional Medi-
caid program. ' So, on both access and cost grounds, when viewed in a
five-year perspective, TennCare has been a notable success story,
although enrollment trends pose a significant financial concern be-
cause of the accelerated growth in the uninsurable category.
There have been recurring questions about whether funding
levels are adequate, and in the budget review process for fiscal 2000,
consultant reports raised questions about the adequacy of TennCare
funding.' These questions persist because TennCare's method of
establishing a global budget is not market-based but rather admin-
istratively imposed.
Appropriateness may be assessed alternatively as (1) effects of
a payment rate on availability of care to the intended recipients-in
this context, the impact on care delivered to TennCare enrollees-or
(2) effects of payments on adequacy of compensation to providers.
Most of our evaluation dealt with the former. Our interest has been in
determining what effects, if any, TennCare (including its funding
levels) has had on such measurable items as utilization of services,
patient satisfaction, health outcomes, physician participation, and
hospital "profitability." This Part will report the empirical evidence
gathered for this project on aspects of TennCare.
A. Effects of TennCare on Utilization of Care
In late 1996 and early 1997, we surveyed residents of Tennes-
see and North Carolina, the latter as a control state, about the quality
of their healthcare.' Our survey was limited to residents who had
been hospitalized for one of three reasons in 1993 or in 1995 in either
587. See WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19, at 115. For fiscal 1995 under the
terms of the original TennCare waiver, TennCare FFP expenditure increases were capped at
8.3%. That percentage fell to 7.5% in 1995-96, to 5.7% in 1996-97, and then to 5.1% in 1997-98.
See id.
588. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 166, at i, ii; WILLIAM M. MERCER, INC.,
EVALUATION OF CRITICAL ISSUES FACING THE TENNCARE PROGRAM-REPORT, supra note 190.
589. The two states are adjacent geographically and once were the same state. In 1996, per
capita income in the two states was virtually identical with Tennessee ranking 36th and North
Carolina ranking 34th among states. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES (1997). Medicaid covered 47% of births in Tennessee and 45% in North
Carolina in 1993; in 1995, the corresponding percentages were 48 and 44. See PETER LONG &
DAVID LISKA, STATE FACTS: HEALTH NEEDS AND MEDICAID FINANCING (1998). In contrast to
Tennessee, North Carolina had virtually no Medicaid recipients under capitated arrangements
in 1995. Primary care case management ('PCCM") had been implemented in some parts of North
Carolina, but the fee-for-service incentive had been retained. PCCM is about the weakest form of
managed care. On PPCM, see Elizabeth D. Schulman et al., Primary Care Case Management in
Birth Outcomes in the Iowa Medicaid Program, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 80 (1997).
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state-(1) obstetrical care (N=986), (2) heart attacks (N=457), or (3) a
head injury (N=248).
We selected these three categories for specific reasons. We
focused on obstetrical care because in Tennessee, as in other parts of
the United States, a relatively high proportion of recipients of obstet-
rical care are enrolled in Medicaid." We selected heart attacks and
head trauma as index conditions for adult care.59 Admission to the
hospital for these conditions is not typically elective, and, absent
TennCare, some patients hospitalized with these conditions would
plausibly have been uninsured. Source of payment for hospital care
was not taken into account.
The main comparison in the empirical analysis was between
TennCare, in which all Medicaid recipients in Tennessee were
enrolled in 1995, and traditional fee-for-service Medicaid, which en-
rolled all Medicaid recipients in Tennessee in 1993, and which en-
rolled virtually all Medicaid recipients in North Carolina in both 1993
and 1995. A few Medicaid recipients in North Carolina were enrolled
in primary care case management, a relatively weak form of managed
care. " Using regression analysis, we controlled the influence of other
variables, such as respondent income, race, education, and clinical
condition, as well as state (Tennessee versus North Carolina) and year
(1993 versus 1995).
1. Obstetrical Care
Overall, during the hospital stay for labor and delivery, utiliza-
tion patterns for TennCare enrollees and for patients with traditional
590. "Although the Tenn~are program covered only 28 percent of the total 1995 population
in the state, 48 percent of 1995 Tennessee births occurred to women enrolled in TennCare."
Raymond H. Phillippi & Karen S. Hamlet, INFANT DEATH AND PRENATAL CARE AMONG
RESIDENTS OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE: A STUDY OF REGIONAL AND MANAGED CARE
ORGANIZATION VARIATION (1997) reprinted in WAIVER EXTENSION REQUEST, supra note 19, at 1,
as Appendix E; see also LONG & LISKA, supra note 589; Wayne A. Ray et al., Perinatal Outcomes
Following Implementation of TennCare, 279 JAMA 314, 315 (1998) (finding that 49.4% of
Tennessee births occurred to women enrolled in Medicaid at delivery).
591. By 'Index condition," we refer to a set of conditions that are representative of conditions
more generally. Obstetrical uses are important reasons for hospital admissions. Heart attacks
and head trauma represent largely unanticipated health events affecting adults. They are also
common reasons for admission to hospitals.
592. See ROBERT E. HURLEY ET AL., MANAGED CARE IN MEDICAID: LESSONS FOR POLICY AND
PROGRAM DESIGN 37-59 (Ronald M. Anderson et. al. eds. 1993). Primary care case management
plans are still important in states with little managed care for their general population. How-
ever, they are being phased out whenever possible. See Holahan et al., supra note 22.
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Medicaid were similar."3 In the following areas of inquiry regarding
obstetrical care, we found no difference between TenCare and tradi-
tional Medicaid: (1) probability of seeing a physician once a month or
more during pregnancy; (2) probability of having a regular prenatal
provider;"' (3) probability of cesarean section; (4) probability of having
a regular doctor or an affiliate of the regular doctor deliver the baby;
(5) incidence of child readmission to the hospital after the initial dis-
charge; and (6) frequency of infant visits for pediatric care after the
initial discharge."
In some areas, such as the important category of prenatal care,
testing was more extensive under TennCare than under traditional
Medicaid. The differences were especially noteworthy for use of ultra-
sounds and for alpha fetoprotein testing. Use of ultrasounds was more
than twice as likely for TennCare than for traditional Medicaid
recipients. Similarly, for alpha fetoprotein, testing was almost twice
as likely for TennCare enrollees than for traditional Medicaid
patients.'
In two respects, pregnant women enrolled in TennCare ob-
tained less care than did those enrolled in traditional Medicaid. First,
TennCare enrollees were 54% as likely as traditional Medicaid par-
ticipants to have been referred to another physician from the provider
from whom such patients received most of their obstetrical care.597
Second, compared to mothers enrolled in traditional Medicaid,
TennCare enrollees were 38% as likely to have initiated prenatal care
593. TennCare mothers were 15% more likely to have stayed in the hospital for one day or
less, but the difference was not statistically significant at conventional levels. See Frank A.
Sloan et al., The Impact of Managed Care on Utilization of Obstetrical Care: Evidence from
TennCare (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Duke University).
594. Among those with a regular prenatal provider, pregnant women enrolled in TennCare
were 34% more likely to have a nurse as the usual provider than were pregnant enrollees in
traditional Medicaid. This difference was not statistically significant at conventional levels, and
this evidence says nothing about outcomes or quality of service (whether better or worse). See
Sloan et al., supra note 593.
595. See Sloan et al., supra note 593.
596. Our analysis showed no reduction in the C-section rate attributable to TeunCare. This
result, however, is consistent with most of the empirical evidence based on comparisons of HMO-
enrolled versus other women. For a review of the literature on HMO effects on utilization of
personal health services, see Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance
since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994). A more recent study using California
data found no effect of HMOs on C-section rates. See Rachel B. Weinstein & James Trussell,
Declining Cesarean Delivery Rates in California: An Effect of Managed Care? 179 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 657, 663 (1998).
597. See Sloan et al., supra note 593. Lower rates of referral to other physicians are a logical
consequence of financial incentives faced by the plans (and perhaps individual physicians) under
TennCare. Our evidence does not purport to establish whether lower rates of referral are
associated with any particular set of outcomes or levels of quality of care.
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during the first trimester of pregnancy."' Other analysis has linked
birth and health records in Tennessee to Medicaid data on all births
for the years 1993-96. Compared to 1993 Medicaid, the percent of
pregnant women receiving prenatal care increased among TennCare
mothers.' However, there was no control state, and no adjustment
for other determinants of receipt of care (e.g., education) was reported.
2. Heart Attacks
TennCare increased utilization of health care services following
a heart attack. TennCare enrollees hospitalized for a heart attack
were as likely as privately-insured patients to have received coronary
bypass surgery or balloon angioplasty (both termed "coronary revas-
cularization' procedures)' and were much more likely to have
received such procedures than were persons enrolled in traditional
Medicaid. 1 The uninsured were also less likely to have had coronary
revascularization than were patients with TennCare, private insur-
ance, or Medicare. Heart attack patients on traditional Medicaid were
far less likely to have had a regular provider of care after their heart
attack than were patients on TennCare or those with private insur-
ance or Medicare.
B. Effects of TennCare on Patient Satisfaction with Care Received
Our patient survey contained several questions designed to
measure satisfaction of care."°3 Overall, patient satisfaction with
598. See Sloan et al., supra note 593. Ray and coauthors also obtained this result using a
different data source. Ray et al., supra note 590, at 315-16. Slower initiation of prenatal care
may have reflected confusion about enrollment procedures in 1994 and 1995. See Gold et al.,
supra note 17, at 156-57.
599. See Pbillippi & Hamlet, supra note 590.
600. Coronary artery bypass is a surgical procedure in which obstructed arteries supplying
the heart are bypassed by attaching either a vein grafted from the patient's leg or a mammary
artery from the patient's chest. Balloon angioplasty is an invasive procedure, performed by
cardiologists, in which a balloon embedded in a flexible catheter is threaded up into the heart
from a blood vessel in the patient's groin and is gradually inflated to relieve obstruction of an
artery supplying the heart. Both procedures are intended to restore adequate blood flow to the
heart muscle and prevent the permanent destruction of heart tissue. "Coronary revascu-
larization" is a general term referring to procedures that affect circulation around the heart. For
further description of these procedures, see ADAM D. TIMMIS ET AL., DISABLED CARDIOLOGY 116-
18 (1997).
601. Frank A. Sloan et al., Impact of TennCare on Patient Satisfaction with Care, 5 AM.
HEART J. MANAGED CARE 765 (1999).
602. See Sloan et al., supra note 601.
603. See Christopher J. Conover et al., The Impact of TennCare on Patient Satisfaction with
Care, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (forthcoming).
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TennCare seems to be quite good, particularly when compared to
patients with traditional Medicaid and to uninsured persons. In some
cases, patient satisfaction among TennCare patients equals that of
Medicare or privately insured patients.
1. Pediatric Care
We asked parents of infants about satisfaction with various as-
pects of their child's care. Parents responded yes or no to the follow-
ing five questions: 'Thinking about the last time you visited the place
you usually take your baby for care, were you satisfied with: (a) all
care you thought you needed; (b) waiting time for an appointment; (c)
waiting time to see the doctor; (d) answers to all of your questions; (e)
the care that you received?" Since the children were at least one year
of age by the survey date, these questions referred to the child's pedi-
atric care.
Satisfaction among TennCare parents with pediatric care was
slightly better than for traditional Medicaid, much better than for the
uninsured, but not as high as for those with private health insurance.
For no measure of satisfaction was the difference between TennCare
and other patients statistically significant at conventional levels.
The foregoing results were based on an analysis that controlled
for many potentially confounding factors, such as education, race, and
income. The results on satisfaction are also instructive when the con-
trols for these other factors are relaxed. They indicate widespread
patient satisfaction with TenCare. Of the five measures of satis-
faction with pediatric care, over 87% of respondents indicated that
they were satisfied with four of the five aspects.' In each of those
four, rates of satisfaction with TennCare were almost identical to
those with private or traditional Medicaid coverage and much higher
than for the uninsured.
2. Heart Attacks/Head Trauma
For persons who had been hospitalized for either a heart attack
or head trauma, we asked about their satisfaction about care overall
604. Over 87% of respondents with children enrolled in TennCare said they were satisfied
with four of the five measures of satisfaction with pediatric care. However, only 77% of respon-
dents with children on TennCare were satisfied with waiting time to see the doctor. Percentages
of respondents who were satisfied with waiting time to see the doctor for the other payer cate-
gories were: 52% for uninsured; 84% for privately insured; and 80% for traditional Medicaid.
Thus, even though satisfaction with waiting was lower for TennCare than for the privately
insured, satisfaction with waiting was much higher than for parents of uninsured children.
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and thirteen separate aspects of care following their discharges for the
index conditions: (1) convenience; (2) hours the physician's office is
open; (3) getting specialists when needed; (4) access to emergency
care; (5) length of time spent waiting in the office to see the doctor; (6)
length of time spent waiting for a new appointment; (7) availability of
advice over the telephone; (8) attention to what the patient has to say;
(9) arrangements for choosing personal physician; (10) amount of time
staff spent during the visit; (11) technical skills; (12) personal manner;
and (13) cost. Responses to these questions were elicited on a five-
point scale: excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor. Again, we used
regression analysis to control for other influences on satisfaction with
care received.
For "satisfaction with time spent with doctor," 26% of
TennCare enrollees said this aspect of their care was "excellent!' in
contrast to 17% for the uninsured, 22% for traditional Medicaid, and
26% for private insurance or Medicare."5 On such indicators as "over-
all rating of medical care," "satisfaction with the cost of medical care,"
"satisfaction with access to specialists," and "satisfaction with access
to emergency care," TennCare enrollees who had been admitted to a
hospital for either a heart attack or head trauma were more likely
than were respondents in any of the other source-of-payment cate-
gories-private insurance, Medicare, traditional Medicaid, or no in-
surance-to have stated that their care was "excellent."
605. With regression analysis, we studied determinants of differences in patient satisfaction
by payer category. Traditional Medicaid was the comparison group. Compared to traditional
Medicaid, there were no statistically significant differences in patient satisfaction with time
spent with doctor for TennCare (versus traditional Medicaid) or for the uninsured or privately
insured and Medicare patients (also versus traditional Medicaid).
606. In addition to our analysis of satisfaction with time spent with doctor, see supra note
604, and accompanying text, we performed regression analysis of satisfaction with care overall
and with three other dimensions of care: cost; access to specialists; and access to emergency care.
If statistical significance is used as a criterion, the only noteworthy difference was for cost. Not
surprisingly, the uninsured tended to be most dissatisfied about the cost of their care. Differ-
ences among the other payer groups, including TennCare, were not statistically significant at
conventional levels.
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C. Effects of TennCare on Health Outcomes
1. Heart Attacks'
Our patient survey measured outcomes of persons who experi-
enced a heart attack using the eight standard scales of the Short-Form
SF-36, a validated survey instrument for measuring health status,
activities of daily living ("ADLs"), and work status at the time of the
survey.' Because these are the standards most directly pertinent to
heart attacks, we selected for analysis the following five of the SF-36
scales: physical functioning; role physical; bodily pain; general health;
and mental health.'
Each SF-36 scale asks respondents to agree or disagree with
statements about their perceived health or rate several questions
relating to their health.61 The components of each scale are then
scored, summed, and inverted to produce a bounded scale across which
607. The outcomes data regarding head trauma did not produce statistically valid results for
three reasons and so are not discussed. First, there were many causes of head trauma (gunshot
wound, automobile accident, fall, etc.). Second, severity of trauma ranged from a relatively
minor injury leading to hospitalization as a precautionary measure aimed at detecting rare
adverse effect of the injury to a permanent brain injury from which the patient remained in a
coma. Third, the number of observations was insufficient to permit detailed analysis.
608. The eight scales of the SF-36 are the following: 1) physical functioning; 2) role physical;
3) bodily pain; 4) general health; 5) mental health; 6) vitality; 7) social functioning;, and 8) role
emotional. See JOHN E. WARE, SF-36 HEALTH SURVEY: MANUAL AND INTERPRETATION GUIDE
(1993).
609. For purposes of our empirical analysis, we excluded SF-36 scales for vitality, social func-
tioning, and role emotional. The elements in the five SF-36 scales we analyzed were:
1) Physical functioning-vigorous activities, such as running, lifting heavy objects, or partici-
pating in strenuous sports; moderate activities, such as moving a table, pushing a vacuum
cleaner, bowling, or golfing;, lifting or carrying groceries; climbing several flights of stairs;
bending, kneeling, or stooping; walking more than one mile; walking several blocks; walking one
block; bathing or dressing yourself.
2) Role physical--cut down the amount of time you spent on work or other activities; accom-
plished less than would like; were limited in the kind of work or other activities; had difficulty
performing the work or other activities.
3) Bodily pain-how much pain have you had in the past 4 weeks?; during the past 4 weeks,
how much did pain interfere with your normal work (including housework and work outside the
home)?
4) General health-in general, would you say your health is excellent, very good, fair, or
poor? I seem to get sick a little easier than other people; I am healthy as anybody I know; I
expect my health to get worse; my health is excellent.
5) Mental health-have you been a very nervous person? Have you felt so down in the dumps
that nothing could cheer you up? Have you felt calm and peaceful? Have you felt downhearted
and blue? Have you been a happy person?
A manual, see WARE, supra note 608., provides the method for SF-36 scoring of each dimen-
sion on specific items that are answered affirmatively and the method for combining the scores
from the subscales.
610. See WARE, supra note 608.
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patients can be compared. The ADLs referred to whether or not the
respondent obtained assistance for various personal activities: walk-
ing across a room; getting up from a chair; getting in and out of bed;
bathing or showering; eating; and dressing. In this analysis, persons
enrolled in private health insurance plans were the comparison group.
Explanatory variables were included for enrollment in TennCare,
traditional Medicaid, and for the uninsured.
In only one of the five regressions for the SF-36 scales did a dif-
ference between TennCare and private insurance reach statistical
significance at conventional levels."' The one category for which there
was a significant difference was for "role-physical," which measures
the person's ability to work and to perform household activities. On
this measure, TennCare enrollees scored worse than privately insured
patients,12 but far better than traditional Medicaid patients. On
ADLs, persons on traditional Medicaid performed worse than did per-
sons in the other payer categories, including TennCare1
2. Birth Outcomes
To assess the effects of TennCare on birth outcomes, we used
data from birth records merged with death records from Tennessee
and North Carolina for both 1993 and 1995. This file contained over
300,000 records. Unlike our patient survey, we did not have data on
the patient's source of payment during pregnancy and labor/delivery.
Thus, we could only examine whether birth outcomes improved or
worsened overall in Tennessee relative to North Carolina after
TennCare was implemented on January 1, 1994. Since we did know
the location of residence of the mother at the time of delivery, we could
identify high poverty areas, which in general and overall are likely to
contain relatively high proportions of TennCare and Medicaid moth-
ers. Any conclusions regarding the effect of TennCare are, therefore,
necessarily inferences from aggregate data that do not distinguish
TennCare from non-TennCare births.
Most importantly, we found no statistically significant differ-
ences in infant mortality, measured at various time intervals61 4 during
611. See Sloan et al., supra note 601.
612. Persons who had low scores on "role physical" were limited in work or other activities.
TennCare heart patients were more limited in their activities than were the privately insured
(p<0.0 4).
613. The analysis held a number of other factors constant. Thus, the observed differences by
health insurance status with regard to "role-physical" were not attributable to such factors as
family income, health before the heart attack, gender, education, or race.
614. The time intervals were at one, two, and twelve months after births.
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the infant's first year of life, when Tennessee in 1995 was compared to
North Carolina or when Tennessee in 1995 was compared to Tennes-
see in 1993 (pre-TennCare). This difference remained when we looked
at a geographically-based "poverty" subsample. Thus, on the whole
and with respect to the "poverty" subsample, infant mortality was not
adversely affected in 1995 after the onset of TennCare. In fact, birth
outcomes overall were largely unaffected in Tennessee in 1995, at
least at the aggregate level at which our data were drawn. For exam-
ple, we found no statistically significant differences in the following
areas of risk: (1) risk of the baby having an abnormal condition at
birth; (2) risk of the baby having low or very low birth weight;"5 or
(3) risk of transfer of the infant to a facility other than the one at
which the delivery occurred."6
As part of our effort to assess the effects of TennCare on birth
outcomes, we examined Apgar scores, which have come to be used as
one tool for judging the success of prenatal and perinatal care and
which have some predictive value in assessing the future health of the
newborn."' When evaluated for the entire Tennessee sample, Apgar
scores did not decline from 1993 to 1995." Our evidence did not
establish any adverse consequences such as low birthweight or higher
risk of an abnormal condition at birth resulting after the implemen-
tation of TennCare in 1995. This was true for both the whole sample
and for a geographically-based "poverty" subsample. Indeed, the
probability of an infant having any abnormal condition 9 decreased,
suggesting improved outcomes under TennCare.
When, instead of focusing on the entire sample, we examined a
sub-group of mothers-those who were not married at the time of the
labor-delivery-we found that the probability of a satisfactory Apgar
score (greater than or equal to 7 at five minutes after birth) was lower
615. 'Very low birthweight" was defined as under 1,500 grams. "ow birthweight" was under
2,500 grams.
616. Such transfers were directly from one hospital facility to another.
617. Developed in 1952 as a standardized assessment tool for evaluating newborns, the
Apgar test is a method for estimating severity of oxygen deprivation at birth done by rating
certain physical signs, including color, heart rate, respiration, reflex response to nose catheter,
and muscle tone. The score is determined at one minute and at five minutes after birth. A lower
score is indicative of a more asphyxiated infant. Those infants with low Apgar scores have a
greater likelihood of having permanent brain damage. See, e.g., Karin B. Nelson & Jonas H.
Ellenberg, The Asymptomatic Newborn and Risk of Cerebral Palsy, 139 AM. J. DISEASES OF
CHILDREN 1031 (1985).
618. The higher the Apgar score, the more healthy the infant is perceived to be.
619. The abnormal outcome measure was a binary variable if any of the following conditions
were reported on the infant's birth record: anemia, birth injury, fetal alcohol syndrome, hyaline
membrane disorder, meconium aspiration, assisted ventilation, seizures, or "other." The prob-
ability of having an abnormal condition decreased after TennCare by 0.11.
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in 1995 in Tennessee than in 1993 in Tennessee or in North Carolina
in either year.62 This was also true for the geographically-based "pov-
erty" sub-sample, however.62
Although one hesitates to make any firm conclusions given the
nature of the data, it seems that the introduction of TennCare was not
associated with lower infant mortality, lower birthweight, or increased
risk of an abnormal condition at birth. For a "poverty" subsample,
there was a reduced Apgar score from 1993 to 1995, but we have no
evidence of what might have eventuated from the reduced Apgar
scores. Many children with low Apgar scores at birth develop nor-
mally. Also, judged on the basis of fewer abnormal conditions evident
at birth, outcomes improved after TennCare was implemented.
Evidence on the influence of managed care on birth outcomes
from other states is, if anything, encouraging and consistent with the
overall findings regarding birth outcomes in TennCare. A recent
study of birth outcomes for Medicaid patients enrolled in managed
care programs compared Medicaid managed care enrollees to others
who remained in traditional fee-for-service Medicaid. Patients in
managed care were more likely to have received adequate prenatal
care.' In another study, researchers found that, measured by birth-
weight, birth outcomes were superior in a Medicaid capitated payment
plan than in a traditional FFS setting. That is, in data derived from
California's Medicaid ("MediCal") program, the probability of lower
birthweight was lower for patients enrolled in managed care as com-
pared to FFS.sn
620. For a sample of mothers located in poverty areas in Tennessee and North Carolina in
1993 and 1995, we estimated that the probability of a good Apgar score was only 0.7 as high after
TennCare was implemented.
621. As noted earlier, see supra notes 594-95 and accompanying text, our study showed that
a lower proportion of women on TennCare in 1995 initiated prenatal care during the first
trimester of their pregnancies as compared to women on traditional Medicaid. This confirms a
study by Ray et al., supra note 590. It may be that the confusion surrounding TennCare's early
implementation may have triggered less intervention in the first trimester of pregnancy, with
some associated effect on Apgar scores. For a discussion of the problems with TennCare's
implementation, see generally David M. Mirvis et al., TennCare-Health System Reform for
Tennessee, 274 JAMA 1235 (1995).
622. See Arik Levinson & Frank Ullman, Medicaid Managed Care and Infant Health, 17 J.
HEALTH ECON. 351, 367 (1998) (stating that Medicaid HMO mothers receive prenatal care that is
superior to that received by Medicaid FFS mothers).
623. See Denise M. Olenske et al., A Comparison of Capitated and Fee-for-Service Medicaid
Reimbursement Methods on Pregnancy Outcomes, 33 HEALTH SERvs. RES. 55, 63 (1998) (stating
that a significantly lower proportion of low-birthweight babies were observed in the MCC group
than in the MFFS group).
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D. Physician Satisfaction and Participation in TennCare
Physician complaints about managed care in general, and
about Medicaid managed care and TennCare in particular, are well
known. However, specific reasons for physician dissatisfaction, actual
rates of physician participation in programs like TennCare, and de-
terminants of the decision to participate have rarely been documented
in previous studies.
For this reason, we conducted a physician survey of physician
satisfaction with and participation in TennCare in mid-1996.6" We
surveyed 300 Tennessee physicians in the specialties of general and
family practice, cardiology, general internal medicine, obstet-
rics/gynecology, neurosurgery, general surgery, and pediatrics. The
survey instrument contained open-ended questions and objective
questions (such as questions about number of years in practice and
about perceptions that could be answered on a five-point scale ranging
from "very satisfied" to "not at all satisfied"). The open-ended ques-
tions were particularly valuable for identifying areas of physician con-
cern that probably would not have been identified had we fully relied
on a fixed-response format.
Overall, Tennessee physicians were dissatisfied with
TennCare. Only two percent of respondents said that they were "very
satisfied" with TennCare. Nearly half said that they were "not at all
satisfied" overall with this program. Interestingly, for any individual
question relating to professional autonomy under TennCare, rates of
dissatisfaction were high but not nearly as high as in their overall
assessment of the program.' The freedom to order tests and proce-
dures whenever needed was the aspect with which physician respon-
dents expressed the highest rates of dissatisfaction. This result,
which reveals physician frustration with controls on their ordering
tests and procedures, contrasts sharply with the findings that show, in
fact, high levels of utilization of specialized procedures under
TennCare.6 '
624. See Frank A. Sloan et al., Physician Participation and Non-Participation in Medicaid
Managed Care: The TennCare Experience, - S. MED. J. - (forthcoming).
625. Forty-five percent of respondents were not at all satisfied with TennCare. Another 27%
were not very satisfied. By contrast, only 10% of respondents were "not at all satisfied" with
their ability to control their own work schedule under TennCare, 18% with their ability to
hospitalize patients who need such care, 21% with their ability to order tests and procedures
whenever needed, and 20% were very dissatisfied with the overall degree of their professional
autonomy under TennCare.
626. See Sloan et al., supra note 593 (finding ultrasounds and alpha feloprotein testing were
more common for TennCare births than for traditional Medicaid); Sloan et al., supra note 601
(TennCare patients with heart attacks were more likely to have been revascularized).
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We asked two questions about the physician's perception of
quality of care under TennCare. First, the survey asked: "All things
considered, what is your impression of the quality of care under
TennCare, as measured by patient outcomes?" Responses varied from
"significantly better" to "definitely worse." Only 13% of respondents
thought that care was better. By contrast, 46% said that care was
worse. Second, physicians were asked: "How is the quality provided to
TennCare patients compared to other patients you treat?" Here fewer
than one percent said that care provided to their TennCare patients
was better. Most physicians said that there was no difference, but
36% stated that the care given TennCare patients by other physicians
was worse than the care those physicians gave to their other patients.
Thus, quality of care problems were more likely to characterize other
physicians' practices rather than their own.
When physician-respondents were asked about what the physi-
cian would change about TennCare, their most frequent suggestions
concerned increasing the level of compensation, reducing the diffi-
culties of obtaining payment, reducing paperwork, and relaxing
TennCare's drug formulary restrictions. The physicians complained
that securing the right medications for their patients was an "absolute
hassle," especially since the formularies differed for the various
MCOs. There were some complaints about the difficulties of referring
patients to specialists, but these were far less frequent than were the
complaints about drugs."7
Another measure of physician satisfaction is actual partici-
pation in TennCare. By this measure, satisfaction was high. Eighty-
nine percent of physicians surveyed (covering the fields of general and
family practice, cardiology, general internal medicine, obstet-
rics/gynecology, neurosurgery, general surgery, and pediatrics) par-
ticipated as of the survey date. This contrasts with a physician-
participation rate in Tennessee's Medicaid program of under 40%
prior to TennCare.6"
627. Twenty-one percent of the physician respondents said that they would change
TennCare's formulary restrictions. By change, respondents meant "relax." Physicians often
complained that obtaining the right drugs for their TennCare patients was an "absolute hassle,"
especially since the formularies for the various MCOs differed. Specific complaints about ability
to make referrals to specialists were far less frequent, with 6% of respondents complaining about
that.
628. See Watson, supra note 55, at 217. For a discussion of the effect of increased Medicaid
fees on rates of physician participation in Tennessee's traditional Medicaid program, see gener-
ally Kathleen Adams, The Effect of Increased Medicaid Fees on Physician Participation and
Enrollee Service Utilization in Tennessee, 1985-88, 31 INQUIRY 173 (1994).
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From another perspective, ease of patient access to medical
care under TennCare may not be as good as the above trends imply.
Stories abound about individual examples of access problems of one
kind or another in one location or another." Such anecdotal accounts
are not necessarily inconsistent with our study's findings about physi-
cian participation in TennCare. In our survey, we defined partici-
pation in terms of accepting patients in any TennCare plan. Physi-
cians would presumably not participate in all such plans. The
anecdotal reports of access barriers do seem inconsistent with results
of our patient survey. TennCare patients overall did not experience
unusual difficulty in obtaining medical care.
E. The Effect of TennCare on Hospitals
1. Hospital Profitability Before and After the
Introduction of TennCare
Using data from the Joint Annual Reports filed with the
Tennessee state government, we computed profit levels for three large
tertiary care facilities and for non-federal short-term general hospitals
in Tennessee as a whole for the years 1990-96. TennCare was intro-
duced on January 1, 1994. The vast majority of hospitals had a Janu-
ary to December or a July to June fiscal year. Thus, 1990 through
1992 are clearly pre-TennCare years and 1995 and 1996 represent
years after TennCare was implemented. We only included the hospi-
tals that filed reports for each of the years. In addition, we dropped
three facilities because of anomalous values for 1994, yielding a total
sample of 119 Tennessee hospitals. These statistics are summarized
below in Table 3.
629. See, e.g., Stuart Schear, A Medicaid Miracle?, THE NAT'L J. 294, 294 (1995) (noting that
the program grew so rapidly that the state froze open enrollment of the uninsured working poor
in January 1995, to ensure adequate funds to cover those enrolled).
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TABLE 3
PROFIT LEVELS AND MARGINS FOR NON-FEDERAL
SHORT-TERM GENERAL TENNESSEE HOSPITALS63
Variable
Profit level (mil $)
1990
1996
Adjustments (mil $)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Adjusted profit (mil $)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Margin (0/)
1990
All Tennessee
1.6 (3.9)
3.6 (8.4)
6.1 (9.5)
7.8 (12.8)
8.7 (13.2)
1.4 (11.0)
2.3 (11.1)
3.0 (9.4)
1.2 (11.8)
0.9 (12.5)
3.4 (10.2)
4.0 (15.4)
Erlanger The Med Vanderbilt
-7.1
-7.7
-13.6
0.8
-5.4
-15.1
-38.2
7.7
7.4
7.4
9.5
11.7
13.2
13.2
0.5
-0.2
-6.3
10.3
6.2
-1.9
-25.0
-5.4
-5.2
-8.0
0.4
-2.7
-8.2
-23.7
1
630. All values are in real 1995 dollars. Mean values reported for All Hospitals. The
sample was constructed by taking all community hospitals that reported Joint Annual Report
data in every year of interest, with three exceptions. Gibson General, Decatur County General,
and GW Hubbard hospitals were excluded due to anomalous values for the 1994 JAR. Shaded
values identify transition years. The adjustments are interest and depreciation expense. The
adjusted profits are profits plus the adjustments. The margin is based on unadjusted profits.
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Mean profit per hospital per year ranged from $1.6 million
(1995 dollars) to $2.1 million during 1990-92 (1995 dollars) [Table 3].
The mean increased to $3.0 to $3.6 million during 1995-96. During
1990-92, mean interest and depreciation expense ranged from $3.2 to
$3.7 million per hospital. This expense increased as well, from $4.8 to
$5.1 million per hospital by 1995-96. Adding interest and depreciation
to profit yields "adjusted profit."' 1 Such adjusted profit also increased
from $4.8 to $5.7 in 1990-92 from $7.8 to $8.7 million in 1995-96. Ex-
pressed as a profit margin ((revenue - expense)/revenue), margins
increased from 1.4% and 2.3% in 1990 and 1991, respectively, to 3.4%
and 4.0% in 1995 and 1996.
The trend toward increasing profitability after implementation
of TennCare was also evident for two of the three major tertiary facili-
ties-Erlanger (Chattanooga) and Vanderbilt (Nashville). The
Regional Medical Center (Memphis) ('The Med"), a major urban public
hospital treating disproportionate numbers of poor and uninsured
patients, experienced increased losses after TennCare was
implemented. Losses grew appreciably worse in 1996." The
generalization of increasing profits did not apply to this hospital that
serves large numbers of indigents.
We also obtained data on revenue, expenses, and profits for all
nonfederal short-term general hospitals in Tennessee for the years
1993 through 1997, from information published by the American
Hospital Association. In constant (Consumer Price Index) 1995 dol-
lars, profit for such hospitals as a whole rose from $203 million in
1993, the year preceding implementation of TennCare, to $519 million
in 1995 and to $599 million in 1997. Between 1993 and 1995, revenue
in constant dollars declined, but revenue rose from 1995 to 1997. The
gain in profit between 1993 and 1995 is attributable to decreased
expense. Between 1995 and 1997, profit rose because revenue in-
creased more than expense increased.
Thus, data through 1997 reinforce the conclusion that profits of
Tennessee hospitals increased after implementation of TennCare. As
the number of years following the implementation of TennCare grows
greater, many factors other than TennCare, such as the federal
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, may affect profit levels adversely. But
631. Interest and depreciation are sometimes added back to profit to provide a better indica-
tion of cash flow to the firm.
632. Gold and co-authors reported that TennCare resulted in a substantial reduction in
Medicaid revenues at this hospital. By contrast, a plan based around the public hospital system
in Minneapolis was "thriving." See Gold et al., Lessons from Five States, supra note 17, at 163.
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attributing such possible trends exclusively to TennCare would be-
come increasingly less appropriate.
2. Other Changes in the Hospital Sector: Comparisons Before and
After TennCare and with Other Parts of the United States
Using published data from 1991, 1993, and 1995 Annual
Surveys of Hospitals, national surveys of United States hospitals con-
ducted by the American Hospital Association, we assessed other im-
pacts of TennCare on the hospital industry in Tennessee. As with
profitability, we limited this analysis to non-federal short-term
general hospitals. This information is summarized in Table 4.
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TABLE 4
PERCENT CHANGES IN UTILIZATION, EXPENDITURES, AND REVENUE
IN SHORT-TERM, GENERAL, NON-FEDERAL HOSPITALS,
1991, 1993, & 1995
Hospital Capacity
hospitals
beds
Inpatient Care
admissions
inpatient days
Hospital Operations
aver. length of stay
surgical procedures
Outpatient Care
emergency room
other
total
Newborn Facilities
bassinets
births
Staffing (full-time
equivalents)
regist'd nurses (FT)
LPNs (F)
total personnel
Trainees
FTE trainees total
Expenses
total labor expense
total expense
total expense
adjusted per
admission
total expense
adjusted per
inpatient day
Labor expense/FTE
Total nonlabor
expense
Revenue
Number of
hospitals
Percent of total
(gross patient rev)
Percent of total
(gross outpatient
revenue)
Net patient
revenue
Net total
revenue
TENNESSEE
East South
Central
1991-1993 1993-1995 Census Div.
-2.3%
-2.5%
-3.7%
-4.8%
0.0%
0.6%
11.5%
33.2%
24.9%
-0.1%
-2.4%
6.0%
-7.0%
3.3%
-14.6%
15.1%
21.7%
19.3%
20.0%
11.4%
28.5%
-2.3%
-5.5%
19.5%
20.4%
-3.1%
-9.0%
-1.0%
-9.9%
-8.8%
0.5%
-9.4%
5.1%
0.1%
-9.6%
0.4%
-2.4%
-12.7%
-3.6%
25.3%
2.6%
-3.9%
-7.6%
1.4%
6.5%
-9.8%
3.1%
-4.1%
11.4%
0.4%
-2.6%
-5.1%
-1.1%
-2.7%
-2.9%
-6.8%
-10.4%
-22.4%
-17.6%
DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCE
North
Carolina
-2.5%
-3.4%
-4.2%
-4.4%
-2.0%
-5.2%
-17.9%
-26.9%
-23.3%
-21.5% -10.1%
0.0% -0.3%
-4.6%
-6.0%
-1.4%
16.7%
-1.4%
-13.2%
-7.1%
-5.1%
-0.2%
-24.5%
-2.6%
1.3%
-4.7%
-8.6%
-14.9%
-12.5%
-5.3%
40.0%
-4.5%
-16.6%
-11.0%
-10.4% -11.4%
0.9%
-28.0%
-2.5%
2.5%
-9.5%
-19.1%
18.6% 1.5% -8.1%
United
States
-1.1%
-2.0%
1.1%
-0.9%
-3.0%
0.1%
-19.3%
-27.5%
-24.2%
-9.8%
3.2%
-6.8%
-13.0%
-4.0%
39.6%
-5.7%
-15.0%
-13.9%
-1.4%
-23.3%
-1.1%
2.3%
-8.8%
-9.9%
-14.8% -6.2%
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To account for the influence of other factors, we used a differ-
ence in difference approach. For example, the number of hospitals in
Tennessee declined at an annual rate of 2.3% between 1991 and 1993.
Between 1993 and 1995, the number of hospitals decreased by 3.1%
annually. Comparing the two percentage changes indicates that the
rate of decline increased by 0.8% per year after TennCare (3.1 minus
2.3). However, the number of hospitals also declined in other parts of
the United States. Thus, we computed rates of change defined as the
difference between the Tennessee rates of change, 1993-95 minus
1991-93, minus the corresponding difference in rates of change for the
same years for a reference group. Using hospitals in all other states
as the reference group, we found that the decline in the number of
Tennessee hospitals was 1.1% per year greater after implementation
of TennCare than in other states of the United States. Using other
states in the East South Central Division (a region containing
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi), we found that the
rate of decline was 2.6% per year higher in Tennessee than in the East
South Central Division region as a whole. Relative to North Carolina,
the rate of decline in hospitals was 2.5% greater in Tennessee after
TennCare was implemented.
With other United States hospitals as the reference group, the
data suggest that TennCare reduced the number of Tennessee hospi-
tals, beds, inpatient days, average length of stay, emergency room
visits,"3 other hospital outpatient visits, newborn capacity as meas-
ured by bassinets, registered nurse and licensed professional nurse
staffing, and total hospital personnel more generally. Labor expense
decreased but not as much as nonlabor expense fell. Patient revenue
net of contractual adjustments to hospitals declined in relative terms
in Tennessee, but not as much as did total expense with the conse-
quence that overall hospital profits increased." '
633. Although visits to emergency rooms ('ERs") decreased for the hospital sector overall in
Tennessee, TennCare could have done better in controlling hospital ER use. Young and co-
authors surveyed TennCare patients at one Tennessee hospital ER in the summer of 1994, and
again in the summer of 1995. Even by 1995, 37% of respondents did not have a primary care
physician ('PCP"). Forty-eight percent had not called a PCP before going to the ER. Sixty-nine
percent did not know that they might be responsible for the bill without their PCP's authori-
zation. Of course, under a traditional FFS, far less than half of the persons who visit ERs may
have contacted their physician before arriving. The study did not have an FFS comparison
group. See generally Carolynn Young et al., Access to Emergency Care Under TennCare: Do
Patients Understand the System? 30 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 281 (1997) (discussing a study
conducted to determine patient understanding of how to properly gain access to urgent and
emergency medical care under TennCare).
634. The only other relative increases in Tennessee were for the number of surgical proce-
dures-a very slight relative increase-and for the number of births. Implementation of
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Using other reference groups (East South Central Census Divi-
sion or North Carolina) does not change the conclusions, although
magnitudes of change are sensitive to the choice of reference group.
On the whole, Tennessee hospitals appear to have become healthier
after TennCare, but evidently not without the pain of some major
adjustments in input use. Averages, however, obscure variation in
performance of individual hospitals, such as the Med. Since one of the
expectations of TennCare was the elimination of excess capacity and
achieving operating efficiencies, this form of rationalization should
have been anticipated. Whether the downsizing was appropriate,
however, in the sense of being market-validated is still unclear since
the level of resources allocated to the TennCare system has been ad-
ministratively determined rather than market-driven. The result is
that, while some level of downsizing of hospital capacity was expected
and desirable, no firm conclusions can be reached about the appropri-
ateness of the precise level of capacity-downsizing and resource con-
straint that have resulted.
VII. CONCLUSION: TENNCARE IN A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
The experience in TennCare provides states and other
stakeholders with important perspectives if they decide to implement
a mandatory program of Medicaid managed care. TennCare started
with promise and became embroiled in controversy from the outset.
Competing tensions have characterized the implementation of the
program and continue to exist. Driven by the need to cope with esca-
lating Medicaid costs and the likely loss of a provider-based tax that
accounted for a substantial component of the state share of the Medi-
caid budget, Tennessee embarked on a mandatory managed care
program in place of its traditional Medicaid program. To secure
approval of that program, the state agreed to re-channel savings from
Medicaid managed care into broadening access to medical care cover-
age for non-Medicaid patients who were uninsured or uninsurable.
The uninsured component of the program has been frozen since Janu-
ary 1995, while the uninsurable component (per capita, the most
expensive) rose by 23.7% in fiscal 1998 and 15.9% more in fiscal 1999.
Governor Sundquist proposed temporarily freezing the uninsurable
component of the program to relieve the cost escalation that was pro-
TennCare may be associated with an increase in the number of births in Tennessee. We are
reluctant to make much of this latter point without further analysis.
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jected for fiscal 2000 and ordered a major review. So, in fiscal/political
terms, the politics of Medicaid in Tennessee are repeating themselves.
TennCare has resulted in health care coverage for over 60%
more patients than under Tennessee's traditional Medicaid program;
the Medicaid-eligible component of the TennCare population has
remained stable for several years while the uninsurable component
has spiked upward. Although it is in jeopardy, the original political
deal has remained intact, with savings that accrue from Medicaid
managed care being rechanneled to improve access to medical care
coverage and to secure a comprehensive package of benefits that is
comparable to those of Tennessee's public employees635 and superior to
Tennessee's traditional Medicaid coverage.' The renewed budgetary
pressure threatens that political understanding.
By proposing to close TennCare enrollment for uninsurable
patients as a cost-containment measure-even temporarily-Governor
Sundquist sought to include the state's taxpayers as partial benefi-
ciaries of the cost reductions from TennCare. That effort places at
risk the perception of patient advocacy groups that economies from
TennCare are to be rechanneled into access-oriented programs for
non-Medicaid-eligible uninsured or uninsurable patients. That shift
in perception would alter the decisionmaking framework from
"either/or" to "yes/no" " and will undoubtedly spur, as it has already, 8
protests and eventually undermine the support of patient advocacy
635. TennCare's benefit package is "essentially identical" to the package of medical care
benefits Tennessee offers to its state employees, although the EPSDT services provided under
TennCare are "more extensive than the preventative services offered to state employees." See
Watson, supra note 55, at 205 & n.140.
Tennessee provides medical care coverage to state employees under a contract with Blue
Cross. Under state law, the state must use a bid process for awarding or renewing that contract.
Blue Cross had agreed to participate in TennCare and to make its provider network for state
employees available to its TennCare enrollees. The state retained Blue Cross as the contractor
for state employee medical care coverage on a sole-source basis without utilizing the statutorily-
mandated bid process. This failure to use the bid process violated the statutory bid requirement.
Cf. USA Managed Care Org., Inc. v. Ferguson, No. 97-2269-rn (Ch. Ct., Davidson County 1997)
(temporarily enjoining state's subsequent use of 'Request-for-Proposal" (RFP") process as not a
"bid" as required by state law). The state did not attempt, in that litigation, to defend its total
lack of compliance with the bid requirement provision of state law in previously maintaining its
contract with Blue Cross without any bid or RFP process.
636. "TennCare eliminate[d] previous Medicaid limits on the number of hospital days, physi-
cian and outpatient visits, and prescription drugs, laboratory and x-ray services." Watson, supra
note 55, at 205. TennCare also "expanded coverage to include outpatient substance abuse
treatment." Id. at 205 n.141.
637. See supra Part V.C.2.
638. For a description of the protests by potentially affected patients and their advocates at a
hearing regarding the proposed temporary closing of TennCare enrollment for uninsurable
patients, see Snyder, supra note 273.
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groups for TennCare. And there is some question whether these re-
strictions will continue to be promoted by the Sundquist Admini-
stration or approved by HCFA.
At the same time, the compromises made by the advocacy
groups in the formulation and implementation of TennCare were more
symbolic than substantive. Formally, they relinquished the Clinton
Administration's ideal of a universal system, which covered all citi-
zens and assured the same medical care services to all. TennCare is
not a universal but rather a pluralistic system. In principle it would
allow for accommodation of the view that public beneficiaries should
receive "adequate" rather than "equal" levels of service with privately
insured individuals."9 However, by guaranteeing a generous level of
benefits and by piggybacking onto the statewide network of providers
developed by Blue Cross to provide services to public employees, the
architects of TennCare sought to assure in fact a level of services for
TennCare beneficiaries that was comparable to (and even better than)
that available to non-Medicaid patients in Tennessee."
So the TennCare program in operation assured a high style of
benefits-comparable to mainstream plans available in the state-and
extended those benefits to uninsured and uninsurable persons who
would not qualify for coverage under traditional Medicaid and who are
likely to be a more expensive patient population to cover. Physicians
and some hospitals have yielded power and resources to facilitate the
process, and now Tennessee taxpayers are faced with the prospect of
absorbing additional costs for the generous benefits and expanded
coverage. Further, the state's contracts with the MCOs have allowed
the state to retain substantial control over interpretations of medical
necessity and of the meaning of federal and state program require-
ments. The result is that the state greatly influences the cost of doing
business for the MCOs and, at least in the short run, does not have to
absorb the additional costs that are imposed on the MCOs. This is a
form of political moral hazard, with the state able, in the short run, to
impose costs on MCOs and to establish benefits for beneficiaries for
which the state is not financially accountable.
The capitation rate paid to MCOs has not been market-tested,
but national managed care companies have not entered the TennCare
market, and most MCOs have reported losing money in 1997 and
639. See supra Part V.A.2.
640. See Snyder & Snider, supra note 584, at 9A (noting that TennCare premiums for the
uninsured/uninsurable are relatively low and based only on income and family size, not sex, age
or health conditions; there is no cap on pharmacy benefits; and there is no lifetime benefit cap).
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1998. 4' This suggests that the state's consultants are correct in con-
cluding that funding levels are marginal for the package of benefits
demanded of the MCOs." And in Spring 1999, one of the largest
MCOs went into state receivership because of large losses and a sub-
stantial negative net worth."3 For fiscal 2000, costs are projected to
increase at more than twice the "budget neutral" rate imposed on the
FFP cap when the waiver renewal was approved. Projected cost in-
creases for fiscal 2000 have been reported at 12%, ' while the "budget
neutral" cap on FFP negotiated as part of the three-year waiver re-
newal was 5.1%."
As TennCare enters the second year of its renewal period, it
faces considerable uncertainty-a bubbling political and economic
stew. This stems from unhappy providers and their potential political
influence," and from the renewal of fiscal concerns that threaten to
unravel the political deal underlying TennCare. That political under-
standing was that savings from managed care exacted both by re-
source economies and production efficiencies and by redistributive
income/wealth take-aways from providers would be rechanneled to
improve access to medical care for the uninsured and uninsurable. As
part of that deal, taxpayers and individuals with private insurance
would be held harmless. The reemergence of fiscal concerns is par-
ticularly potent politically because the state is locked into an FFP cap
so that if TennCare expenses (averaged over the entire eight-year
period of the demonstration) exceed the budget-neutral FFP cap provi-
sions, the agreement is that Tennessee will have to absorb 100% of the
expenditure overage. This creates an extremely strong incentive for
the state to stay within the cap, and the proposals for restraint on
utilization must be seen in that fiscal context. If the mandatory-
coverage Medicaid-qualified population should increase unexpectedly,
the state would be unable to deny coverage to those citizens, so it
641. See id.
642. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 166; WILLIAM M. MERCER, INC., supra note
190.
643. See supra note 205.
644. See Snyder, supra note 273, at 2A
645. See Letter from Michael Hash, supra note 9 (affirming Tennessee's proposed 5.1% rate
of increase in FFP cap under budget-neutrality principle established under BBA of 1997).
646. In contrast, Oregon providers were a critical part of the formulation of the Medicaid
demonstration, and, since Oregon was already a market with significant managed care penetra-
tion, neither production efficiencies nor income redistribution away from providers was part of
the political agenda of the reform effort. See Blumstein, supra note 164, at 546 (noting that the
Oregon plan "very much reflect[ed] a physician's perspective," that the plan "reflect[ed] the
medical professional model" and had "physician-based origins," and therefore that non-medical
economic considerations "were not part of the ... process").
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understandably needs some cushion as the cap levels approach. The
prospect of a 12% spending increase combined with a 5.1% FFP cap
rate increase would be a natural signal for precautions in and
restraints on program spending.
Nevertheless, despite all the recurrent uncertainty, it is unde-
niable that TennCare has resulted in major strides in improving
medical care services coverage within the state. It also has slowed the
rate of growth from the budget-neutral caps on expenditure negotiated
with HCFA at the outset; and those caps assumed continuation of the
traditional Medicaid program, not an increase of over 60% in program
coverage. So, costs have been reduced considerably on a per capita
basis from previously projected levels, and coverage has been ex-
panded. In addition, our evidence shows that quality has not suffered,
at least in the areas we investigated. And the final element of the
political coalition-state taxpayers and citizens with medical cover-
age-has not been called upon to fund TennCare beyond its normal
(slower) rate of growth. 7
The provider community in general and physicians in particu-
lar, however, remain unhappy and, in general, implacable foes of
TennCare. Reducing hospital resources in the state is not an easy
task, and TennCare's invisible hand has had a role to play in ration-
alizing the hospital sector. 8 This is not a painless prescription for the
industry, which confronts MCO pressures for lower pricing. And the
absence of market-validation for the overall MCO rates raises the
question whether there will be long-term overdoing of fiscal con-
straints on, and downsizing of, hospitals. Through 1997, overall hos-
pital profitability in Tennessee did not suffer, but certain hospitals
(e.g., the Med in Memphis) that serve large volumes of TennCare
patients are exceptions to that generality with potential political and
economic significance to the future of TennCare.
Traditional physician grievances against managed care-
insufficient funding and loss of autonomy-are surely present
regarding TennCare. Indeed, they are exacerbated because physicians
647. Some would contend that privately insured patients, at least indirectly, are called upon
to subsidize TennCare patients through cost shifting-i.e. providers increasing revenues from
privately insured patients to make up revenues lost from the stringent level of TennCare pay-
ment. But, over time, cost-shifting strategies are unstable and most likely unworkable, particu-
larly in a competitive market with well-informed pro-active payors. See MICHAEL A. MORRISEY,
COST SHIFTING IN HEALTH CARE: SEPARATING EVIDENCE FROM RHETORIC (1994) (noting insta-
bility of cost shifting and providers' inability to implement such a policy in a competitive market
with well-informed, aggressive payors); Blumstein, supra note 357, at 1480-81 & n.91 (noting
that cost shifting can only succeed in the absence of competition and in the face of "apathy or
ignorance" on the part of a "passive payor community).
648. See supra Part VI.E.2.
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were largely excluded from the initial TennCare formulation and
implementation process. When linked to the financial stresses asso-
ciated with increased reliance on managed care, that initial power-
lessness has continued to alienate the physician community from
TennCare.
Economically rationalizing the way that medical care is deliv-
ered-altering the "production function" 9 of the industry-is not a
painless process. It upsets standard practice and incurs substantial
transactions costs, even if eventually successful in achieving econo-
mies through improved efficiency.
Physician discontent is probably the largest source of political
instability regarding TennCare. Our physician survey showed that
Tennessee physicians feel coerced. The state's use of market power to
enforce an administered price on MCOs and indirectly on physicians
may smart and it may reflect an imprudent degree of coercion if the
supply of physicians unduly contracts.
The redistributive issues that tend to be so poignant for the
physician community-loss of income-are potential political motiva-
tors. What level of physician incomes is appropriate or fair is a matter
of political significance, but there are few productive normative
guides. We do note, however, that physician availability is superior to
what it was under Tennessee's traditional Medicaid program, and
patients seem satisfied with availability of physicians' services. So, in
the current time frame, at least, the pain for physicians may be felt by
them, but it has not had a measurably adverse effect on the system as
yet. Whether physicians will secure the additional funding and
autonomy they seek and whether physician dissatisfaction will even-
tually translate into de-participation in TennCare is unknowable at
this point. The recent experience that physicians and hospitals have
had with an MCO going into receivership and seemingly defaulting on
obligations owed to providers may move providers in the direction of
de-participation.
As for the future, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ('BBA")
allows states to implement mandatory managed care in their Medicaid
programs without seeking a waiver.' Unlike the TennCare waiver
process, the BBA does not impose an obligation on a state to provide
medical care benefits to non-Medicaid-eligible patients as a political
649. A production function describes the way that different inputs (e.g., capital and labor) are
combined to produce a product or to deliver a service. When those inputs are combined in a way
to produce an outcome at an overall reduction in the use of resources (i.e., in lowering costs),
economic efficiency is achieved.
650. See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text.
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quid pro quo. And, while the BBA and its proposed implementing
regulations provide guidance about what qualifications managed care
entities must have, there is not as much federal supervision of the
relationship between a state and an MCO as there is in the TennCare
waiver.
This tight oversight by HCFA of the MCO-state relationship
provides advocacy groups an important point of political leverage
under TennCare that would be largely unavailable under the provi-
sions of the BBA. Under the BBA, states can implement a strategy of
Medicaid cost containment through managed care, capturing the
savings for any state priority, not only for expanding access to medical
care for the uninsured or uninsurable. This suggests that the take-
away or redistributive dimension regarding the provider community
would be somewhat less draconian in a state making use of the BBA.
It might also mean that projected Medicaid savings would in part
accrue to fund other state priorities such as education. Further, use of
the BBA managed care provision does not alter the traditional method
of calculating FFP, so there would be no FFP cap as there is under
TennCare. That would relax some of the political impetus for keeping
program costs in check since a state's qualified share of spending
would receive unlimited FFP. There might even be an impetus for a
state under the BBA to use a market-validated process for setting
MCO capitation rates through a system of price competition (e.g.,
bidding) 65
Under a BBA managed care regime, however, FFP would only
be available for Medicaid-eligible beneficiaries. That would circum-
scribe the availability of federal financial support for TennCare's
uninsured/uninsurable enrollees who would not qualify under a
maximally generous Medicaid program eligibility expansion. Under
TennCare's global FFP cap arrangement, the state receives FFP for
non-Medicaid-eligible enrollee expenditure to the point of the FFP cap.
Beyond the cap, no FFP exists. The TennCare arrangement allows
the state to economize on its Medicaid program and then to rechannel
those dollars to support TennCare enrollment for the uninsured and
uninsurable not otherwise eligible for Medicaid. In the absence of
such an arrangement, economies from Medicaid would reduce overall
FFP, as Medicaid expenditures would decrease. Any state decision to
651. See Bonnyman, supra note 167, at 311 n.26 (noting that "managed care organizations in
Arizona's Medicaid equivalent compete on price" in contrast to TennCare's MCOs). For discus-
sion of Tennessee's mandatory bidding system for state-funded medical care for public employ-
ees, see supra note 635.
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rechannel those funds to cover the uninsured or uninsurable popula-
tion would not trigger additional FFP.
From the perspective of achieving improved access to medical
care for non-Medicaid-eligible beneficiaries, the managed care provi-
sions of the BBA are therefore not as attractive as the financial
arrangements under TennCare. As a means to Medicaid reform and
cost containment, however, the BBA provides some considerable
opportunity and appeal. As a vehicle to build a model of broader
health care reform on a platform of Medicaid reform-by rechanneling
Medicaid savings to improving access to medical care for non-Medi-
caid-eligible uninsured and uninsurable patients and receiving FFP to
support that objective-the global budgeting approach of TennCare
(using principles of overall budget neutrality) is clearly preferable.
But no other Medicaid demonstration has received TennCare's type of
global budget feature for the uninsured and uninsurable population.
In the current political climate of reemergent cost escalation,
the mandatory managed care option for Medicaid under the BBA pro-
vides considerable leverage for Tennessee. To this point, all cost-
containment benefits have accrued to achieve broader access to medi-
cal care for the non-Medicaid-eligible uninsured and uninsurable.
Patient advocates have opposed any restriction on new enrollment for
uninsurables, and in response the Sundquist Administration has pro-
posed tax increases to cover increased costs. The BBA provides impor-
tant leverage to state budget-makers since the state could decline to
renew TennCare in its current form and retain the cost-saving manda-
tory managed care features under the BBA, thereby rechanneling cost
savings to taxpayers generally rather than to non-Medicaid-eligible
TennCare beneficiaries. Under TennCare, a freeze on new enrollment
must secure HCFA approval, but under the BBA a state can adopt
mandatory managed care in Medicaid without the need for HCFA's
discretionary approval.
TennCare has been and continues to be an important demon-
stration of Medicaid managed care. The availability of such managed
care Medicaid programs under the BBA suggests that more states will
pursue mandatory managed care in Medicaid. But the BBA does not
offer the same promise as does TennCare of using Medicaid reform as
a tool for or model of broader health care reform-achieving broader
access goals by recapturing and reallocating Medicaid savings for
improved access for uninsured and uninsurable (but not Medicaid-
eligible) beneficiaries.
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